Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations

University Graduate School

3-26-2014

Socio-ecological Vulnerability to Climate Change
in South Florida
Emily Eisenhauer
Florida International University, eeise002@fiu.edu

DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI14040839
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Part of the Human Geography Commons, Nature and Society Relations Commons, Place and
Environment Commons, and the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons
Recommended Citation
Eisenhauer, Emily, "Socio-ecological Vulnerability to Climate Change in South Florida" (2014). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations.
1269.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1269

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Miami, Florida

SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL VULNERABILITY TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH
FLORIDA

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY
by
Emily Eisenhauer

2014

To: Dean Kenneth G. Furton
College of Arts and Sciences
This dissertation, written by Emily Eisenhauer, and entitled Socio-ecological
Vulnerability to Climate Change in South Florida, having been approved in respect to
style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.
We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.
_________________________________
Matthew Marr
_________________________________
Laura Ogden
_________________________________
Alex Stepick
_________________________________
Keqi Zhang
_________________________________
Gail Hollander, Major Professor

Date of Defense: March 26, 2014
The dissertation of Emily Eisenhauer is approved.
_________________________________
Dean Kenneth G. Furton
College of Arts and Sciences
_________________________________
Dean Lakshmi N. Reddi
University Graduate School

Florida International University, 2014

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I’d like to thank my advisor Dr. Gail Hollander who gave me the opportunity to complete
this project as part of the ULTRA-Ex grant. She has been unwaveringly enthusiastic for
and willing to share her keen insights into both my scholarly and public work. I would
also like to sincerely thank my committee members, Dr. Matt Marr, Dr. Laura Ogden, Dr.
Alex Stepick and Dr. Keqi Zhang for their support and guidance through my years at
FIU. Peter W. Harlem was extremely generous with his GIS help and in teaching me
about South Florida geology and tides, without which I couldn’t have completed this
research. I owe an enormous amount to Dr. Bruce Nissen and Carol Stepick for inspiring
me with their commitment to social justice work and for giving me invaluable research
training, and to everyone at the Research Institute on Social and Economic Policy and all
of our fearless community partners in the struggle for justice in South Florida. Finally I
am grateful to my friends and family for supporting and believing in me.

This material is based upon work supported in part by the National Science Foundation
through the Miami-Dade Urban Long Term Research Area program under Grant No.
BCS-0948988, as well as a Dissertation Evidence Acquisition fellowship from the
Florida International University Graduate School.

iii

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL VULNERABILITY TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH
FLORIDA
by
Emily Eisenhauer
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Gail Hollander, Major Professor

Awareness of extreme high tide flooding in coastal communities has been
increasing in recent years, reflecting growing concern over accelerated sea level rise. As
a low-lying, urban coastal community with high value real estate, Miami often tops the
rankings of cities worldwide in terms of vulnerability to sea level rise. Understanding
perceptions of these changes and how communities are dealing with the impacts reveals
much about vulnerability to climate change and the challenges of adaptation.
This empirical study uses an innovative mixed-methods approach that combines
ethnographic observations of high tide flooding, qualitative interviews and analysis of
tidal data to reveal coping strategies used by residents and businesses as well as
perceptions of sea level rise and climate change, and to assess the relationship between
measurable sea levels and perceptions of flooding. I conduct a case study of Miami
Beach’s storm water master planning process which included sea level rise projections,
one of the first in the nation to do so, that reveals the different and sometimes competing
logics of planners, public officials, activists, residents and business interests with regards
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to climate change adaptation. By taking a deeply contextual account of hazards and
adaptation efforts in a local area I demonstrate how this approach can be effective at
shedding light on some of the challenges posed by anthropogenic climate change and
accelerated rates of sea level rise.
The findings highlight challenges for infrastructure planning in low-lying, urban
coastal areas, and for individual risk assessment in the context of rapidly evolving
discourse about the threat of sea level rise. Recognition of the trade-offs and limits of
incremental adaptation strategies point to transformative approaches, at the same time
highlighting equity concerns in adaptation governance and planning. This new impact
assessment method contributes to the integration of social and physical science
approaches to climate change, resulting in improved understanding of socio-ecological
vulnerability to environmental change.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
A decade ago seen primarily as a global issue, the subject of international
negotiations and global justice protests, climate change is now a local issue. As the
impacts of climate change are beginning to be felt in a growing number of areas, local
communities are now facing the issue in day to day life. While the impacts are not
recognized everywhere, they are becoming more and more obvious for coastal
communities, many of which are experiencing the early stages of sea level rise. Over the
last several years, Miami and the southeast Florida region have been experiencing
increased urban flooding, prompting governments to begin infrastructure improvement
projects and adaptation planning. These efforts represent both practical measures to deal
with impacts and a process of grappling with difficult questions about the region’s future.
This dissertation is a study of socio-ecological vulnerability to climate change in the
context of early adaptation efforts in a major urban coastal community.
The experience of local areas in dealing with the impacts of climate change will
play a key role in shaping the human dimensions of Global Environmental Change. Cities
play a prominent role in moving forward ideas, and city leaders have emerged as leaders
in responding to climate change (“C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group”). Hampered by
still contentious politics of climate change at the nation level, the federal government’s
role has been limited to incorporating climate adaptation into its own agencies, and to
providing technical assistance and some limited funding to local areas. This leaves cities
and states to create their own adaptation policy and practice, and as some of the first to
experience impacts, coastal cities are on the front lines of dealing with very thorny issues
of planning for and responding to changes.
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Climate change has been recognized as the result of human activity, leading some
scholars to label the current era the “anthropocene” (Gibson-Graham and Roelvink 2010).
This is supported by the evolving understanding of Coupled Human and Natural Systems
(CHANS), the idea that “human and environmental systems are inextricably connected in
webs of mutual causation,” and that climate change is CHANS on a global scale (Rosa
and Dietz 2010, 4). The recognition of the impact that human societies have had, through
the emission of historically high amounts of greenhouse gasses (GHG’s) due largely to
industrial activity, has focused attention on the human drivers of climate change
(Hannigan 1995). The social-psychological and political-economic processes that drive
continued production of these harmful gasses is the subject of research in a wide variety
of fields and disciplines in the social and behavioral sciences (O’Brien 2011a). Although
many have argued that eminently workable solutions are presently available (Moser and
Boykoff 2013, Felgenhauer and Webster 2012), there is no silver bullet. Reducing
GHG’s needs to happen quickly and dramatically in order to avoid the worst impacts
(IPCC 2007) and for this change is needed across multiple sectors and scales. As shown
by the results of efforts thus far however, the barriers to broad change are significant
(Ekstrom and Moser 2013).
Dealing with the human drivers of climate change is just one side of the human
dimensions of environmental change. In the climate change literature this aspect is
known as “mitigation” (IPCC 2007), the term for efforts to reduce emissions of GHG’s,
and much has been written about options for mitigation (Kasperson and Ram 2013,
IPCC 2007) as well as barriers, politics, and justice concerns (Dawson 2010, ManuelNavarrete 2010, Giddens 2009, Beckman and Page 2008, Adger 2001). But we know
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very little about the other side, “adaptation,” or how humans are adapting to climate
change, and how adaptation fits into CHANS. This is in large part because relatively few
areas had begun adaptation until just recently. But now that climate change impacts are
being felt we are starting to get a better look at how cities are responding, planning, and
questioning. How the experience and perception of environmental change influences the
social-psychological and political-economic drivers of action (or inaction) on climate
change will be an important area of study, to glean lessons as early as possible and
inform subsequent efforts.
Understanding adaptation is also key to understanding vulnerability to climate
change. Vulnerability has traditionally been conceptualized in two ways: spatially, being
located in such a way as to be exposed to environmental hazards, and contextually, a state
of greater exposure or sensitivity to environmental hazards due to socio-political
disadvantage (O’Brien et al. 2007). The locational approach tends to lead to technological
solutions, such as protective infrastructure, while the contextual conceptualization leads
to more of a human security approach such as improving livelihoods (O’Brien et al.
2007). While the approaches can be complementary, human security often gets short
shrift, particularly in non-development contexts. Nevertheless, for decades social science
researchers concerned with vulnerability and disasters have argued that “the need to
understand and modify human and social forces is far more important than any
technological answer to greater resilience” (Haque and Etkin 2007) and as climate
impacts mount this understanding will be more and more crucial.
In this dissertation I argue that vulnerability has been conceptualized mostly in
relation to “first-order” impacts, that is the damage caused by environmental hazards
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such as floods and droughts, and what makes people and systems susceptible to being
harmed by these phenomenon. But as adaptation gains steam there is a need to pay
attention to another layer of impacts, so-called “second-order” impacts which are the
socio-economic changes prompted by environmental change and efforts to adapt to it
(PROVIA). Although others have previously noted that, as with any socio-economic
changes adaptation has uneven consequences and the potential to for greater impacts on
those who are already disadvantaged (Adger et al. 2006) as adaptation efforts expand in
local areas it will be important to study these efforts to increase our understanding of how
they affect vulnerable populations.
If the goal of adaptation is to minimize the impacts of climate change on human
societies, we must understand the nature of vulnerability to climate change and be
deliberate about protecting those most vulnerable. But planning processes have not yet
fully accepted this responsibility. Just as with first-order impacts, both spatial and
contextual dimensions are important for understanding vulnerability in adaptation. The
adaptation plans created by cities and regions typically focus on infrastructure needs, but
rarely on the needs of vulnerable populations. The widely used adaptation framework for
sea level rise—protect, accommodate, retreat (Few, Brown and Tompkins 2007)—is a
physical-technical approach that treats vulnerability only in relation to the hazard itself,
rather than a contextual condition, the result of multiple stressors including globalization
and economic changes (Adger 2006, Leichenko, O’Brien and Solecki 2010). Studying
communities that are facing the early impacts of sea level rise provides insight into the
nature of vulnerability, and the challenges, responses, and consequences of adaptation.
As a coastal city very exposed to sea level rise, and with large socio-economic inequality,
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Miami provides a unique window into these issues and one that is highly relevant as
Miami is earlier facing challenges that eventually many other locations will face as well.
I undertake to document and understanding the experience of Miami in these early stages,
which represents as an opportunity to vastly improve our understanding of the enormous
challenges ahead.
South Florida is on the “front lines” of sea level rise due to having a large
populated area at very low elevation. While the entire region is often referred to as
“Miami” by outsiders, it is known as “South Florida” to insiders. Located at the southern
tip of Florida, Miami is the core city of the southeast Florida region, a region of 5.5
million people that stretches 250 miles from Key West to Palm Beach. The region
encompasses 112 municipalities in four counties, which are connected economically and
through transportation but have recognizable cultural differences and separate identities
within the South Florida identity.
In a study of port cities worldwide, Miami (really the south Florida region) was
ranked number four for exposure to sea level rise in terms of population and number one
in terms of assets (Nicholls et al. 2008). Though there is little consensus on the timing
and rate of rise, the conclusions by the International Panel on Climate Change (2007)
predict that at least two degrees of warming is likely by the end of the century. Even if
GHG emissions peaked by 2015 and began declining, temperature would continue to rise
and sea level could rise by up to 1.4 meters (IPCC 2007).
This is a very sobering fact for South Florida, which has large areas just a few feet
above sea level, putting them at risk of inundation in the early stages of sea level rise. A
Vulnerability Analysis performed by the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change
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Compact (SFRCCC), an agreement among the four counties in the region to cooperate on
climate change policy and planning, found that one foot of rise would affect 80,000 acres
and $4 billion of taxable property value across the region,1 including two airports, three
power plants, and three hospitals. For Miami-Dade one foot of rise would impact twelve
percent of land area, rising to eighteen percent for a three-foot scenario. Although most of
the land impacted at one-foot is conservation land, a nuclear power plant would also be
significantly impacted. In a three-foot scenario nearly 11,000 acres of agricultural land is
impacted, over 4,000 acres of residential area, and over 500 miles of roads in MiamiDade County alone (SFRCCC 2012).
Sea level rise is perhaps the most significant impact that climate change will have
on South Florida due to its low elevation and porous geological substrate. Likened to
“Swiss cheese” by geologists because of the many holes that perforate the rock, this
structure allows rainwater to percolate down into the aquifers but also means that South
Florida has a high ground water table (SFWMD Public Meeting February 25, 2013). As
sea level rises it pushes up the water table and reduces the ability of the gravity-driven
system to discharge through canals to the ocean. Reduced drainage capacity means that
low-lying areas are less protected from flooding caused by intense rainfall (SFWMD
2009). For this reason it is not only coastal areas that are at risk for inundation, but also
low-lying inland areas.
Sea level rise will also exacerbate the problem of salt water intrusion into South
Florida’s water supply. South Florida draws most of its water supply from ground water
1

The analysis was performed using LiDAR data and the number of acres includes only unincorporated
areas of Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties, and urban areas of Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.
The taxable value figure does not include Miami-Dade County which declined to perform this type of
analysis.
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aquifers (Berry et al. 2011) and as rising sea level pushes the interface between
freshwater and salt water further inland, wells located further towards the coast become
increasingly saline. Salt water intrusion began in the early 1900’s when canals were dug
to drain inland areas, and in the 1970’s well fields in the east that had become too saline
had to be closed (Sonenshein 1995). Salinity control structures constructed on the canals
and maintaining high water levels inland have reduced and in some cases reversed the
inland movement of the interface (Sonenshein 1995), which requires carefully managed
water levels in order to prevent flooding (SFWMD 2009).
Climate change and sea level rise also mean potentially more destructive
hurricanes, due to higher storm surge levels and potentially more intense storms driven
by warmer ocean water. Warming oceans mean that hurricanes may become stronger,
with “the number of category 4 or 5 storms forming in the Atlantic basin roughly
doubling after 80 years of greenhouse warming,” although the number of overall Atlantic
storms may decrease by twenty-eight percent by one prediction (Misra et al. 2011).
Stronger storms cause exponentially more damage, and “an 11% increase in wind speed
translates to roughly a 60% increase in damage” (Borenstein 2010). Recent research has
concluded that the relationship between sea level rise and storm surge is non-linear, and
that extreme tidal events will occur more frequently (Obeysekera and Park 2013).
Many of these challenges associated with climate change are not qualitatively
new to South Florida. Hurricanes are a natural phenomenon, and salt water intrusion has
been a problem since the early days of development efforts altered the physical landscape
(Sonenshein 1995). A sophisticated technological and governance apparatus has
developed over decades of learning how to protect life and property in South Florida--
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flood control and hurricane prediction being two of the most crucial areas. These are
multi-scalar networks involving significant federal support, cooperation of state and local
governments, and efforts to educate residents (Carter 1974). Water conservation efforts to
protect the aquifer from sea level rise have existed for decades (Blake 1980). Efforts to
curb development in the most vulnerable coastal areas have also existed since the 1970’s
(Carter 1974). The large, billion dollar Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan is the
culmination of decades of political wrangling and acquiring technical knowledge about
the landscape and its natural processes (Hollander 2008).With all this experience, a
strong foundation of knowledge for understanding and dealing with climate change
impacts already exists in South Florida.
Nevertheless, the challenges are formidable and the options for further protective
infrastructure appear to be limited and costly. A South Florida Water Management
District (SFWMD) analysis indicates that eighteen control structures along the coast will
be compromised with only six inches more of sea level rise, meaning they will no longer
be able to provide flood control (SFWMD 2009). Replacing them with forward pumping
stations could cost more than $50 million each (Morgan 2012). A study for one
municipality estimated that constructing protection measures for the next seventy to one
hundred years, including draining, water supply, and raising roads would cost $500
million to $1 billion (Bloetscher , Meeroff and Heimlich 2010). A recent regional
planning effort that included sea level rise scenarios recommended a variety of strategies
including retreat from some areas and fortifying coastline in others both with natural
buffers such as mangroves and sand dunes, and with engineered solutions such as water
controls structures, raising land, levees, and even an ice wall (Southeast Florida Regional
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Partnership 2013). Though no cost estimates were attached, the plan acknowledged that
high cost is a serious challenge.
Miami Beach is one of the first cities in the country to be experiencing significant
sea level rise impacts, and so makes an ideal location to explore the challenges of urban
adaptation and the nature of urban vulnerability to climate change. The densely populated
city is contained entirely on a barrier island with an average elevation of four feet. The
island is very vulnerable to storm surge and high tide flooding, which has been increasing
in recent years especially in low-lying areas of the city, disrupting urban life and
increasing the risk of property damage, as my research shows. As a reaction to these
problems the City has taken the initial step of improving storm water management, and
has received attention for being the first municipality in the region to include sea level
rise projections into infrastructure planning when it proposed a new storm water
management master plan (SWMMP) in 2009. This proposal was made independently of
the regional Compact, as a reaction to increasing concerns about storm water
management and flooding, and only later became an example of climate change
adaptation. As I document, this shift from traditional infrastructure planning to climate
adaptation planning reveals tensions between different logics of climate vulnerability and
urban development which challenge current adaptation frameworks.
The challenges stem from the unique physical and socio-economic conditions that
limit options within the commonly used “protect, accommodate, retreat” framework of
climate adaptation (Few, Brown and Tompkins 2007). Thirty-five percent of the city’s
land area could be inundated by 3 feet of sea level rise (Harlem, unpublished), and if sea
level keeps rising the ability of defensive infrastructure to protect the city in its current
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state is questionable. Being such a densely built urban area, there is little to no room to
relocate assets, or to create flexible space to accommodate periodic flooding.
Conservation measures such as rolling easements that move with the shoreline are not
practical for highly developed urban areas (Titus 2011). Even if barriers could be created
to prevent inundation from tides and storm surge, the rising groundwater through the
porous substrate will eventually saturate low-lying areas. Already old building
foundations are having salt water corrosion problems (Business leader 1, interview April
3, 2013), and discussions are beginning over whether homes and roads should be raised
(Resilient Miami Beach, meeting September 18, 2013). Whatever the options for
adapting the built environment are, they will certainly be costly, and who pays those costs
and how is an issue that has yet to be confronted.
In some sense these physical impacts and the limitations of current adaptation
options, I argue, present an existential challenge for Miami Beach, threatening the very
things that make it “Miami Beach.” Activists who campaigned for the preservation of the
historic Art Deco District which led to the economic revival of the area now face the
daunting challenge of preserving, perhaps raising, somehow adapting these
architecturally significant buildings. With tourism a major part of the economy, the
prospect of building barriers such as sea walls that cut off access to water is unthinkable.
Part of the threat is a discursive threat, with the city becoming a symbol of coastal sea
level rise impacts in local and national media. A 2012 article in Rolling Stone magazine
declared “Goodbye Miami” (Goodell 2013) depicting a scenario of sea level rise and
hurricanes leading to disasters and chaos, and plummeting real estate prices plummeting.
With real estate another major part of the economy, the specter of falling values is also
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interpreted as a crisis, fed by the perception of the magnitude of adaptation challenges
and limited options.
Perhaps the biggest challenge is time. Most climate adaptation planning takes an
incremental approach, based on the assumption (perhaps the hope?) that changes to the
built environment can be phased in gradually over time without major social or economic
disruption. But as flooding and the discourse about climate impacts has evolved rapidly
in the last two years, the conflicting logics of government officials, residents, businesses,
and activists over what makes Miami Beach vulnerable, what constitutes quality of life,
and what is the best course for adaptation point to the need for a different approach. I
analyze how these different groups have interacted in my case study in order to
understand the coming conflicts of climate adaptation, which I argue are important for
understanding how Miami Beach is vulnerable, not just physically, but socioeconomically as adaptation and the debates around it proceed. I further argue that these
conflicts point to the need for a transformative approach (O’Brien 2011), rethinking the
values and priorities that guide adaptation, and centering human security (O’Brien 2006).
In what follows I will first review the scholarly literature on socio-ecological
vulnerability to environmental hazards, drawing also on political ecology and the
sociology of disasters, and then turn to the climate change adaptation literature, focusing
on decision making and the emerging interest in transformational adaptation. I will then
provide a brief background on the region’s historical development and environmental
challenges, and describe the emergence of a regional climate governance network. Next I
will present a case study of one municipality in the region already experiencing and
planning for impacts, Miami Beach, in two chapters. The first offers empirical evidence
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of the impacts of flooding in Miami Beach on urban life, the drivers of the flooding, and
the perceptions of residents and businesses of the flooding and what this means for their
decision making about the future. In the subsequent chapter I describe the controversy
over the City’s storm water master planning process, and analyze the logics of the City,
resident activists, and business interests over decision making with regards to adaptation
approaches to sea level rise. Finally, I draw conclusions about the challenges my case
study highlights for adaptation planning and the nature of vulnerability in urban, coastal
communities. The findings demonstrate the contributions of the new method I have
developed to integrating social and physical science approaches to climate change and
contributing to an improved understanding of socio-ecological vulnerability.
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CHAPTER II – THEORY AND METHODS
In this chapter I will provide the theoretical basis for my research and describe my
methodological approach. I will review two main areas of literature, firstly theories of
vulnerability to environmental hazards focusing on the human dimensions of
vulnerability, and secondly the climate change adaptation literature with a focus on
decision making. Finally I will note the particular urban challenges of climate adaptation.
I argue that while location based approaches have provided important insights into socioecological vulnerability, vulnerability to climate change must have a broader view of
impacts beyond the spatiality of first-order impacts such as flooding. Equally as
important though not yet well studied are the “second order” impacts of adaptation to
environmental change, as local governments begin to plan for infrastructure
improvements, land use changes, and other measures, all under great uncertainty.
I then outline how I approached my research topic, particularly how I integrated the
physical and social dimensions of climate impacts, and finally I describe my research
questions, data collection and analysis strategy.

Vulnerability
Vulnerability is a key concept in climate change research. It is the starting point
for understanding how human and natural systems will be impacted by the changing
climate and its impacts, extreme weather, sea level rise, drought, etc. and what can be
done to minimize the impacts. Even so, the variety of approaches and definitions makes it
difficult to identify a widely accepted usage of the term. In fact one recent prominent
publication on climate change adaptation declared that it would avoid use of
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“vulnerability” wherever possible because of the lack of consensus on meaning
(PROVIA 2012). Nevertheless, the term continues to be relevant to planners, policy
makers and scholars for particular purposes. “Vulnerability assessments” are a ubiquitous
step in climate change adaptation planning (Füssel and Klein 2006), and “vulnerable
populations” is a legitimate and widely understood reference to those who are likely to
suffer greater harm from disasters due to their socio-economic position.
One of the most important researchers in vulnerability over the last two decades,
Susan Cutter, identified three themes in vulnerability studies (Cutter 1996). One is
vulnerability as exposure to risk/hazard, which identifies the geographical distribution of
biophysical or technological threats and the population exposed, and the degree of
potential loss. The second is a social constructionist view, which highlights the society’s
resilience and the historical, cultural, and economic processes which influence society’s
ability to cope with disasters. The third theme is the vulnerability of places, in which
vulnerability is both a biophysical risk and social response, but is grounded in a particular
place. She attributed the discrepancies to different epistemological orientations,
methodologies, types of hazards under study, and fundamental conceptual differences
over whether the term refers to “the likelihood of exposure (biophysical/technological
risk), or the likelihood of adverse consequences (social vulnerability) or some
combination of the two” (Cutter 1996, 530).
The social vulnerability approach gained steam in the early 1990’s as scholars
began to place more emphasis on a dynamic and contextual understanding than
traditional hazards models. As Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, and Wisner wrote in a 1994 book,
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Analyzing disasters allows us to show why they should not be segregated from
everyday living, and to show how the risks involved in disasters must be
connected with the vulnerability created for many people through their normal
existence. It seeks connections between the risks people face and the reasons for
their vulnerability to hazards. It is therefore trying to show how disasters can be
perceived within the broader patterns of society, and, indeed, how analyzing them
in this way may provide a much more fruitful way of building policies that can
help to reduce disasters and mitigate hazards. (3)
They were among the growing number of researchers who argued that “natural disaster”
was an inaccurate description of the harm caused by natural hazards such as storms,
earthquakes, or droughts. This line of thinking held that the disaster did not come
primarily from the physical event itself, but from social processes which placed people,
some more than others, in harm’s way.
This shift in thinking about disasters began with the work of political ecologists in
the 1970’s and 80’s such as Michael Watts (1983) who challenged the idea that disasters
occurred because cultures were maladapted to their environments, an idea which
“reduced exposure and response to hazards to a series of purposeful choices by rational
individuals, with little reference to social structural constraints or historically contingent
conditions” (Neumann 2005, 24). Watts studied villages experiencing drought and famine
in northern Nigeria, and found that the decrease in food production that had occurred
during the drought was the result not just or mainly from the drought, but from the
changes in the local food production system that had occurred under and as a response to
colonialism. Villagers had decreased their cultivation of traditional food crops and
increased cultivation of cash crops in order to pay taxes and participate in the market
economy, and when the drought hit they were left with reduced food supplies, which
resulted in famine. Watts and other researchers showed that vulnerability to disasters was
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due to more than just the choices made by individuals or cultures, but was the result of
historical, social, and political forces such as globalization and colonialism.
A similar emphasis on structural constraints has been applied in urban, “firstworld” contexts by researchers in the sociology of disasters. Researchers studying
Hurricane Andrew which hit Miami in 1992 similarly found that groups which are more
marginalized and therefore have less political power and economic resources are more
vulnerable to harm from “natural” hazards (Morrow 1999). Different population
demographics including gender, class, race, and immigrant status have been shown to
influence ability to cope with environmental hazards (Peacock, Morrow and Gladwin
1997). The most well-known example is the destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina
which struck New Orleans in 2005, which was widely interpreted as the result of the
historic land use patterns, infrastructure development, and segregation (Flaherty 2010,
Dawson 2010, O’Brien 2006). Over time land had been reclaimed in the delta city
through levee construction and residential development had been encouraged in lowlying areas, exposing people to the risk of flooding if the levees were to fail and creating
a “disaster waiting to happen” (Fischetti 2001, 77). Social factors such as age, income
and race influenced who lived in higher risk areas and who was able to evacuate,
producing differentiated vulnerability and outcomes in terms of survival and recovery
(Finch, Emrich and Cutter 2008). New Orleans was a highly segregated city with
troubled racial dynamics (Flaherty 2010) and the residents of the low-lying areas
protected by levees were mostly Black, which resulted in the large disparity in deaths
with fifty-one percent being black and the majority having been residents of the lower
ninth ward (Brunkard, Namulanda and Ratard 2008). However despite calls for more of a
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focus on social vulnerability, “very little progress has been made in the handling of
disasters beyond a narrow focus on technological preparedness” (Haque and Etkin 2007).
Writing concerned with justice in climate change has been mostly concerned with
issues between nation states, involving complex treaties and legal ethical issues such as
the rights of future generations and who should bear the cost of adaptation (Beckman and
Page 2008). But as adaptation efforts begin to take shape at the local scale environmental
justice has relevant insights for the spatial distribution of environmental hazards,
particularly in urban areas. Through the 1980’s and 1990’s in Texas, Louisiana, Alabama,
Florida, and other states residents protested against Locally Unwanted Land Uses
(LULU’s) such as hazardous waste disposal sites, lead smelters, and petrochemical
producers which disproportionately burdened communities of color with environmental
and health impacts (Bullard 2000). The environmental justice framing of the environment
links nature with human welfare by declaring the environment to be “where we live,
work, and play” (Turner and Wu 2002) and places human welfare at the same level of
importance as the well-being of nature. As my work and that of many others shows,
climate change has significant impacts for “where we live, work, and play.” Because
environmental justice is grounded in the experiences of marginalized communities,
justice and equality are central to how environmental justice frames environmental issues
(Taylor 2000).
A few scholars have applied an environmental justice framework to climate
change vulnerability research, seeking to understand the spatial distribution of minority
residents across hazardous areas (Montgomery 2013). This work uses GIS to correlate
elevation or flood zone data with variables such as race, ethnicity, and poverty. However
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as purely quantitative analysis this work suffers from a lack of context, and as a
consequence produces mixed results. Although it claims an environmental justice
perspective, it analyzes only the outcome state of unequal proximity to hazards, and
ignores the processes which produce such outcomes such as the unequal or negligent
enforcement of laws and protections from environmental hazards, which are a central
concern of environmental justice (Bullard 2000). In particular, decisions that located
toxic waste dumps, chemical plants or other hazardous facilities disproportionately in
low-income communities or communities of color, termed “environmental racism”
(Bullard 2000) negatively impacted quality of life and property values (Bullard 2000,
Checker 2005). This environmental justice research showed how local governments are
capable of making decisions that disadvantage certain communities over others, and must
be taken as a lesson for climate adaptation decisions as infrastructure investments and
land use changes are considered.
This focus on process, history and context parallels the “human security” framing
(O’Brien et al. 2007) and the “vulnerability as produced” (Dooling and Simon 2012)
approach. They stand in opposition to locational-technological-systems approaches in
which the human dimensions are less visible, although they are not necessarily in conflict
and may even be complementary (O’Brien et al. 2007). Over the last two decades
attempts have been made to develop “integrative” approaches that combine the
biophysical and social dimensions of disaster vulnerability, and despite criticisms this
approach remains highly influential (Rothman and Robinson 1997). Aided by
improvements in the ability to map large datasets, the integrative approach has been used
particularly in examining vulnerability in a particular place. Cutter developed a “hazards
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of place” model that combines biophysical and social indicators to assess vulnerability in
a local area (Cutter, Mitchell and Scott 2000, Cutter 1996). This work was aimed at
improving an emergency preparedness model developed by several federal agencies in
which vulnerability was treated merely as the presence or absence of hazard risk. Cutter’s
model included indicators of physical hazard risk such as the location of toxic waste sites,
and the probability of storms or fires, among other things, and demographic indicators of
social vulnerability established in the literature such as poverty and minority status.
These indicators were applied to a local area using GIS to create an index of “overall
hazard vulnerability” that varied across a local area (Cutter, Mitchell and Scott 2000).
The fact that this model can be mapped with readily available data gives it utility
as a practical tool for planning purposes. In fact Cutter recently deployed a version of this
tool in 2013 as a Social Vulnerability Index for sea level rise, through the website
Climate Central. However the conceptual model is a fairly simplistic two-dimensional
combination of equally weighted variables that even by Cutter’s own account doesn’t
take into account “the root causes of the antecedent social vulnerability, larger contexts,
and post-disaster impact and recovery” (Cutter et al. 2008, 601), factors which are
critically important if the model is to be used for assessing and ultimately reducing
vulnerability. Further attempts to develop a conceptual model of vulnerability by Turner
et al. (2003) and Cutter et al. (2008) include temporal dynamics, social learning in the
form of preparedness and mitigation, and the interactions between natural systems, social
systems, and the built environment.
The integrated models have been criticized for their inadequacy to address the
root causes of vulnerability however. O’Brien et al. (2007) argue that integrative models
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represent an attempt at merging two different framings that doesn’t quite work. They
identify two opposite approaches to vulnerability: a “scientific framing” which sees
vulnerability as an outcome or end-point after adaptation has taken place, and a “human
security framing” which sees vulnerability as contextual, as a present inability to cope
with external pressures or changes. The contextual approach reflects a concern with the
vulnerability of individuals and groups, rather than a systems theory perspective (Berkes
2007) which doesn’t account for the differential impacts of disasters on differently
situated people or communities within the system. Thus where the integrative models fail
is that in attempting to integrate opposite approaches to vulnerability as both a starting
and an end point they obscure or ignore the processes that create it (O’Brien et al. 2007).
Further, the systems approach leads to offering solutions that are technological rather
than people-centered (Cannon 1994, O’Brien et al. 2007), which has important
implications also for how adaptation and resilience are conceptualized. The contextual
approach, on the other hand, assesses the present capacity of groups or communities to
cope with change in more general terms of poverty, capacity, culture, and history, and
looks for adaptations that reduce vulnerability and increase resiliency now (O’Brien et al.
2007).
Contextual conditions, of course, are never static but dynamic. Dooling and
Simon (2012) see vulnerability as “sets of dynamic conditions produced from historic
interactions across economic, cultural and social processes” (5). Understanding the
dynamics of the production of vulnerability allows for an understanding of the root
causes and the ways that responses to environmental change can reduce or increase
vulnerability. “A production-oriented framework provides conceptual space for analyzing
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how interactions between political economies of resource use and normative planning
and management interventions – at both global and local scales – influence which places
and populations are made vulnerable, and the intensity and persistence of conditions of
vulnerability” (Dooling and Simon 2012, 5). This shift to a focus on process and
interactions rather than static variables that determine vulnerability may prove to be
particularly valuable at this stage of climate change research, when we are just beginning
to understand the impacts on communities and the responses and adaptations that follow.

Adaptation and Transformation
Most of the concern surrounding climate change vulnerability has centered on the
effects of climate change impacts, and the potentially unequal effect of those impacts on
vulnerable communities. But comparatively little attention has been paid to the impacts
of the efforts to deal with climate change, that is, adaptation. As with any other changes
in infrastructure, policy, governance, and use of public resources, the potential exists for
unequal distribution of risk or burdens. Therefore studying the processes and impacts of
adaptation actions is an important part of a full picture of vulnerability to climate change.
Adaptation broadly refers to actions taken to adjust to the impacts of climate
change. It is often juxtaposed with “mitigation,” which in climate change research refers
to efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Research on adaptation is relatively recent,
coming mostly in the last 10 years since the failure of international negotiations to
significantly reduce GHG’s began to make it apparent that some degree of impacts could
not be avoided. In fact talk of adaptation was considered something of a “taboo” until the
mid-2000’s for fear that effort spent on adaptation would take away from efforts at
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mitigation (Pielke et al. 2007). Indeed adaptation is still considered to be a less preferable
option for some, because “mitigating climate change helps to reduce impacts on all
climate-sensitive systems, whereas the potential of adaptation measures is limited for
many systems” (Füssel and Klein 2006, 304). But as the impacts of climate change are
increasingly felt and recognized, adaptation is becoming no longer a choice but a reality
for local areas.
Adaptation, according to the IPCC is “the adjustment in natural or human systems
in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects, which moderates harm
or exploits beneficial opportunities” (Parry et al. 2007, 27). Adaptation to climate change
can be either by collective action or individual action, and it can be proactive, reactive, or
neither (Adger et al. 2006). Proactive steps can reduce negative impacts “while
facilitating a more rapid and efficient response to changes as they happen” (NCA 2011b,
984). It has been often observed that adaptation is local, since “there is no one-size-fitsall adaptation solution to the challenges of adapting to the impacts of climate change, as
solutions will differ depending on context and scale as well as on local culture and
internal capacity” (NCA 2011b, 993, also Grothmann 2011). For this reason adaptation
has fallen especially to local areas, and it presents a significant challenge for local
governments which must mediate between different interests and determine priorities for
limited resources. Attempts to plan collective, proactive adaptation strategies have had
mixed results so far, such as a case of a coastal New Zealand community attempting to
plan for likely significant future erosion due to sea level rise by limiting coastal
development, which prompted a backlash from owners of coastal properties (Hayward
2008). Indeed a study by Few, Brown and Tompkins (2007) in the U.K. suggests that in
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the absence of immediate impacts of climate change public support for proactive
strategies cannot be assumed because of concerns about the cost and consequences of
such actions.
The first step for local proactive adaptation planning is usually a vulnerability
assessment which looks at the projected climate impacts for a particular area and assesses
the structures and populations likely to be vulnerable to those impacts. Füssel and Klein’s
(2006) review of climate assessments finds that assessment models evolved from
estimating solely climatic impacts for a particular area to incorporating non-climatic
indicators and the potential for adaptation, and finally becoming full-fledged ‘adaptation
policy assessments’ which “aim to contribute to policy-making by recommending
specific adaptation measures” and which are
characterized by the intensive involvement of stakeholders, by a strong emphasis
on the vulnerability of a population to current climate variability, by the
formulation and evaluation of response strategies that are robust against uncertain
future developments, and by the integration of adaptation measures with existing
policies. (324)
Still, as noted above, vulnerability assessments conducted with integrative models mostly
lead to technological solutions, and this is evidenced by planning processes under way in
many urban, developed country settings. Plans from San Diego, New York, and South
Florida (Nordensen et al. 2011, ICLEI 2011, SFRCCC 2012a) focus on infrastructure,
transportation, and ecosystem restoration, with some consideration given to planning
policy but scant or non-existent mentions of social vulnerability factors.
Adaptation presents large decision making and management challenges, given
uncertainties about the spatiality and temporality of climate impacts, lack of knowledge
and capacity on the issue, and difficulties in aligning planning time frames and competing
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interests (Sharma and Tomar 2010, Few, Brown and Tompkins 2007). These challenges
mean that adaptation actions may even increase vulnerability in some instances, such as
when tradeoffs emerge from temporal and scalar conflicts. For example pumping against
sea level rise can protect an urban coastal settlement from flooding, but may increase
greenhouse gas emissions. Some have called these actions “maladaptive,” and additional
types of maladaptation include encouraging development in vulnerable areas, the
reduction of incentives to adapt, high opportunity costs and disproportionately burdening
the most vulnerable (Barnett et al. 2013, Kates, Travis and Wilbanks 2012). Social justice
concerns have also been noted, such as when unequal access to decision making
exacerbates impacts on vulnerable populations. Adger et al. (2006) note that often
“collective adaptation decisions made at the local and national levels end up protecting
vested interests….and marginalized groups remain vulnerable because they cannot
participate in and influence decisions and structures that create their vulnerability” (13).
The result is that “actions taken to adapt to climate change can themselves have important
justice implications because their benefits and costs are frequently distributed in ways
that consolidate or exacerbate current vulnerabilities rather than reduce them” (Adger et
al. 2006, 4), such as when reconstruction funds after a disaster flow to areas that already
have some capacity rather than those that were the most vulnerable beforehand (Eriksen
and Silva 2003).
The current approach of many local governments is one of “mainstreaming”
adaptation planning into existing government operations and planning processes (Kates,
Travis and Wilbanks 2012, Benzie, Harvey and Miller 2011, Sharma 2010). In
development contexts climate change compounds existing challenges of urbanization,
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e.g. lack of housing, transportation, water and sewer infrastructure, and additional rural
migrants (Sharma 2010). In developed country urban settings, mainstreaming climate
adaptation takes the form of incorporating adaptation into infrastructure upgrades, hazard
mitigation, and other existing functions (NCA 2011b) such as in the U.K. where
researchers found that “the key issue in current approaches to adaptation is the ambition
to mainstream climate change into different policy areas; the ambition is to address the
risk of climate change in a way that enables ‘business as usual’ as much as this is
possible” (Benzie, Harvey and Miller 2011, 236). But whereas these functions rely on
well-established methods of planning and projecting future need or risk based on
historical data for a particular location, climate change introduces considerable
uncertainty into future projections, complicating decision making (Moser and Boykoff
2013).
In light of this uncertainty new frameworks for decision making have emerged
that “promote options that allow reversibility, preserve future options, can tolerate a
variety of impacts, and are flexible, such that mid-course adjustments are possible” (NCA
2011b, 999). One of these cited approaches, adaptive management, developed as a
strategy for managing natural resources in an integrated human-natural systems
framework. It accommodates uncertainty by emphasizing social learning and traditional
knowledge for interacting with the ecosystem, resulting in practices which improve
resilience (Berkes, Colding and Folke 2000). In areas at risk of climate impacts such as
coastal environments, it has been found to enhance adaptive capacity by “building
networks that are important for coping with extreme events and by retaining the
resilience of the underpinning resources and ecological systems” (Tompkins and Adger
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2004). Adaptive management promotes flexibility that is critical for dealing with
uncertainty by putting in place “institutions that incorporate adaptive management to
assure that decisions can be updated as one gains experience and as new scientific
information becomes available” (NCA 2011a). However it has also been criticized for
allowing regulatory institutions to avoid criticism by claiming that plans are continuously
subject to change (Clark and Dalrymple 2003).
The iterative approach is central to accepted climate adaptation planning
approaches (Moser and Boykoff 2013), including the one recommended by the National
Resource Council (NRC), “iterative (or adaptive) risk management.” The NRC defines
iterative rise management as “an ongoing process in which the potential but uncertain
consequences of climate change and climate policy are identified, assessed, prioritized,
managed, and reevaluated in response to experience, monitoring, and new information”
(NRC 2010b, 92). In contrast to other decision making frameworks such as ad-hoc
decision making, which fails to address the time lag between actions and consequences,
or a precautionary framework which avoids harm but is less able to deal with competing
goals, the iterative risk management framework is a more holistic process that considers
multiple options and priorities. It recognizes that decision making in adaptation “does not
constitute a single set of judgments at some point in time but rather ongoing assessment”
(NRC 2010b, 103). The iterative process consists of a cycle of steps from identifying
objectives and criteria/values to assessing options, implementing strategies, and finally
regular monitoring and reassessment of system inputs which allows decision makers to
“learn from experience and respond to new information to reduce, control, or manage
negative outcomes” (NRC 2010b, 100). Information on trends in population and the
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economy, physical impacts, costs, policy changes is monitored and re-assessed in order to
make adjustments and to make sure strategies are effectively addressing the objectives
and respond to new problems and opportunities (Willows and Connell 2003).
An example of developing iterative adaptation options is the conceptual
framework proposed by Felgenhauer and Webster (2013), which addresses one of the key
challenges of adaption planning, the uncertainty over the timeframe of climate change
impacts. Particularly for sea level rise many of the options for adaptation are
infrastructure investments such as dykes, barriers, raising roads and bridges, which are
costly and have a life span of decades or more, limiting the opportunities for adjustments
and course corrections based on new information. Felgenhauer and Webster’s framework
“explicitly treats the problem as a multi-stage decision under uncertainty” (1556) by
assessing options in terms of lifetime and cost, allowing for decisions to be made that
address near-term needs while considering long-term scenarios and delineating decision
points for a change in strategy. The options are grouped in three types. The first is shortlived flow spending, such as beach renourishment or irrigation. These investments have
low sunk costs so the potential for over-investment is limited, and they can be started or
stopped relatively quickly. The second group is committed adaptation stock, such as sea
walls and sewer improvements, which are long-lived, high cost investments dependent on
current technology. The third group is “option stock” which is less costly and allows for
later upgrading if needed. An example is over-building the foundation for a dyke, which
adds some amount to current costs but reduces future costs by laying the groundwork that
will allow it to be enlarged later if conditions warrant. The authors argue that
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given the uncertainty, there should be greater emphasis on option stock adaptation
in the near-term, and that an optimal hedging strategy will consist of a balanced
portfolio with enough adaptation investments to reduce the uncertainty in their
effectiveness and some mitigation investment because adaptation may turn out to
be less effective or more costly than expected. (1561)
Such frameworks provide a method for decision making when a suite of options
exist. But one of the major emerging issues in adaptation research is what happens when
locations or systems come up against limits of adaptation. While incremental frameworks
such as adaptive management seek “to avoid ecological thresholds at scales that threaten
the existence of social and economic activities” (Berkes, Colding and Folke 2000, 1260),
the potential magnitude of impacts such as sea level rising three to five feet this century is
raising serious questions about the impacts on settlements in particularly exposed
locations (Nicholls et al. 2008). Indeed several communities in low-lying coastal areas
have already been relocated or are planning for relocation due to sea level rise, which
presents a host of challenges including employment, shelter, negative cultural and
psychological impacts (de Sherbinin et al. 2011). So scholars have begun to consider
scenarios for some places and systems where “vulnerabilities and risks may be so
sizeable that they require transformational rather than incremental adaptations” (Kates,
Travis and Wilbanks 2012).
Generally transformation is understood to denote “paradigmatic and systematic
changes” (Moser and Boykoff 2011, 32) and as such is differentiated from the more
common notion of adaptation as incremental, iterative approaches that “maintain the
status quo or only make minor adjustments to ‘business-as-usual’ governance and
management processes” (Moser and Boykoff 2013, 12, also Benzie, Harvey and Miller
2011). Those considering transformation question how fundamental and large scale
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change could be “mainstreamed into existing structures of society” and whether this is
even “oxymoronic” (Moser and Boykoff 2013, 12). But transformative adaptation is still
poorly understood (Moser and Boykoff 2013), particularly how planned, anticipatory,
transformation might be implemented (O’Brien 2011). Kates, Travis and Wilbanks
(2012) assess existing adaptation efforts and identify three classes of adaptations as
transformational: “those that are adopted at a much larger scale or intensity, those that are
truly new to a particular region or resource system, and those that transform places and
shift locations” (7516). Examples they give are the London plan to build higher barriers
around the Thames estuary, desalinization where it hasn’t been used before, and the
relocation of species. In most cases the examples are collective adaptations but some are
autonomous actions that cumulated in transformative adaptation, such as the re-greening
of the Sahel which was begun by farmers cultivating trees to protect crops from wind and
evaporation, and has grown into a green belt of 5 million hectares.
The socio-ecological processes driving (or blocking) transformative adaptation is
an important emerging area of research. Kates, Travis and Wilbanks (2012) list some of
the key factors in planned, anticipatory transformation,
Implementing transformational adaptation requires effort to initiate it and then to
sustain the effort over time, and frequently long periods of time. In initiating
transformational adaptation, it seems likely that external drivers in the form of
focusing events and multiple stresses are important combined with local
leadership. In sustaining transformational adaptation, it seems likely that
supportive social contexts, especially if they are combined with incentives, and
the availability of acceptable options and resources for actions are key enabling
factors (7156).
Karen O’Brien (2011) argues that the key challenge is the social and psychological shift,
and that a “deliberate science of transformation” is needed that engages “with the real
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‘adaptive challenge’ of climate change, i.e. a questioning of the assumptions, beliefs,
values, commitments, loyalties and interests that have created the structures, systems and
behaviours that contribute to anthropogenic climate change, social vulnerability and other
environmental problems in the first place” (668). She argues that research on adaptation
should “consciously create alternatives” for transformation, given that neither mitigation
or adaptation will likely be sufficient to avoid suffering.
Many scholars have argued that the road forward for climate change adaptation
lies with participatory and transdisciplinary processes, or “boundary processes,” for
epistemological, practical, and ethical reasons. Transdisciplinary research and processes
“go beyond science” to include “mutual learning among scientists and society” (Sholz
2010, 73), with a key component being joint problem definition. Joint problem definition
allows for scientific research to be conducted that bears on practical problems, and
adaptation research at its heart is about solving practical problems stemming from
environmental change. Similarly, boundary processes “facilitate the flow of information
and sharing of knowledge between decision-makers and scientists/technical experts”
(NCA 2011b, 930) by bringing scientists and stakeholders together in a decision making
process. Because adaptation is a complex problem with needs and options that vary by
location, sector, and affected populations, an interactive process that incorporates
different knowledge bases and perspectives produces more practically useful knowledge
(NRC 2011b). It also promotes engagement, which is needed for effective
implementation (Brown 2012). The National Climate Assessment’s review of decision
making support mechanisms for climate mitigation and adaptation concluded that these
processes “better enable decision-makers to apply complex information to decisions,
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consider uncertainties associated with climate variability and change, assess the wide
range of possible human responses, and engage institutions and individuals who are
potentially affected” (NCA 2011a, 925). Participatory processes have also been shown to
increase public support (Fung and Wright 2001).
A number of transdisciplinary efforts at addressing climate change are already
underway or have been tried in various forms, at local, regional and national levels (Renn
2004, Fung and Wright 2001). Local areas are the ones who will ultimately be
responsible for adaptation (Moser 2005, Sharma and Tomar 2010), and given the
magnitude of the potential impacts and changes that may be required, a successful plan
will need to have public support. Participatory processes have been shown to increase
public support, such as Fung and Wright’s “empowered participatory governance”
(2001). However success at the local level has been mixed. Few, Brown and Tompkins
(2007), who studied the feasibility of participatory processes for anticipatory planning for
climate change in the U.K. found that there was not enough consensus on the need to do
anticipatory planning at all, so that any process with a defined goal of anticipatory
planning would need to “limit the ambitions of inclusion and be explicit from the outset
about the true scope of public involvement” (56). Even with this limitation the experience
of New Zealand (Hayward 2008) points to the need for community participation in
adaptation planning because otherwise more powerful citizens or interest groups can
dominate local decision making. Indeed with the lack of experience, precedents and laws
for dealing with climate change impacts such as rising sea level, the potential for conflict
is significant and proactive, and community involved planning is necessary to avoid
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intimidation of policy makers into leniency in implementation and making decisions that
create more problems down the line (Moser 2005).
Participation is also important for ethical and justice considerations, as decision
making cannot be left to science alone. Adaptation is inevitably normative, as it involves
choices between sometimes conflicting interests, values, and options, and though science
can help define adaptation options, risk, goals, and processes, it cannot decide what is
“right” or “good” (Moser and Boykoff 2013). In addition, since the outcomes of
adaptation may not be known for some time, then “evaluating the adaptation process….
becomes at least as important as the question of success in outcomes” (Moser and
Boykoff 2013, 20). Given the potential for adaptation actions to produce externalities for
distant temporalities, spatialities or other social objectives, decision making processes
should consider equity and vulnerability (Adger, Arnell and Tompkins 2005, Ericksen et
al. 2011).

Urban Challenges of Adaptation
Using an iterative risk management strategy for sea level rise, the National Climate
Assessment suggests that “decision criteria might include minimizing long-term costs and
maximizing public safety. The relevant information might involve using scenarios to frame
uncertainty in sea level rise and to understand how to translate that information into
identifying property and ecosystems at risk” (NCA 2011a, 928).

Political ecological attention to urban contexts is rising, which is important
because climate change impacts, particularly sea level rise, will have a profound and
perhaps unprecedented impact as urban areas which are major centers of population,
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investment, industry and therefore power (Hodson and Marvin 2009) risk the loss of
some of their most valuable assets (Nicholls et al. 2008). Urban political ecology
theorists assert that “the urban process fundamentally constitutes a political-ecological
process, one that shapes the process of production of urban natures” (Swyngedouw and
Heynen 2003, 901). This is because
cities are dense networks of interwoven sociospatial processes that are
simultaneously local and global, human and physical, cultural and organic. The
myriad transformations and metabolisms that support and maintain urban life—
such as, for example, water, food, computers, or movies—always combine
physical and social processes as infinitely interconnected. From these
perspectives, there is no such thing as an unsustainable city in general. Rather,
there are a series of urban and environmental processes that negatively affect
some social groups while benefiting others. (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003,
901)
This means that the urban geographic dimension has different implications for first and
second order effects of climate change. For first order effects, research on the geography
of opportunity has shown that factors which contribute to social disadvantage such as low
income and low education, tend to be geographically concentrated and to perpetuate
states of low investment and low opportunity (Benford et al. 2009). So if a household or
community in a low opportunity area experiences hazards associated with climate
change, it is vulnerable beyond simply its socio-economic situation but also because of
the reduced adaptive capacity in its surroundings.

Methodological approach
Current models and approaches to studying vulnerability have significant gaps in
their ability to meaningfully assess vulnerability to climate change and to point a way
forward to effective and fair adaptation in local areas. In particular there is a need to
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integrate data on the biophysical changes associated with climate change with the socioeconomic responses in order to understand the interactions between the two and the types
of adaptation appropriate for a given situation. Not finding a method in the literature for
studying the early impacts of sea level rise in urban communities from a ground-level
perspective, I developed an innovative method that combines sociological methods with
physical observations in order to assess the social impacts of urban flooding. The method
fits within a political ecology approach which typically combines historical analysis,
discourse analysis, ethnography and ecological data analysis (Neumann 2005). My
research explores the physical and human dimensions of climate impacts and how they
interact to produce vulnerability. I will first elaborate on the principles underlying the
methodological approach, then describe the research design including definition of
concepts, operationalization, data gathering methods and analysis.
As discussed previously, political ecology has been influential in infusing a
critical perspective into disaster research and for emphasizing the contextual nature of
vulnerability to environmental hazards. Goldman, Nadasdy and Turner (2011)
differentiate political ecology from other social science fields concerned with
environmental politics, such as environmental sociology and cultural ecology, by
outlining three characteristic features which I will address in turn:
1. A commitment to incorporating understandings of the biophysical processes that
underlie environmental change and the availability of natural resources
2. An emphasis on understanding environmental politics as geographically and
historically situated (i.e. the “case-study” approach)
3. Strong commitments to social justice. (7)
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First, as I will describe in more detail below, my work engages substantially with the
biophysical dimensions of climate change impacts and vulnerability in the study area.
More than just a “backdrop to social conflict,” in political ecology “the nature, rate, and
spatial extent of ecological change are seen to matter in the unfolding politics
surrounding the environment” (Goldman, Nadasdy and Turner 2011, 7). While the
established models and theories I have discussed in the literature on vulnerability to
environmental hazards could have suggested a research project that focused solely on
assessing social vulnerability indicators, I felt the nature of ecological change due to
climate change, specifically the onset of sea level rise, was a sufficiently different type of
urban-ecological change as to require an investigation of its nature as a starting point for
understanding social impacts. For one thing, accelerated sea level rise causing
increasingly frequent flooding in an urban area is a new phenomenon that does not have
any ready parallels. Secondly, South Florida’s geology and topography are a unique
ecological context. And lastly, there existed no studies of the physical impacts of sea
level rise in the study area. In order to understand how vulnerability is produced, I needed
to understand what that vulnerability was in relation to.
The second point, the “case-study” approach, is characteristic of political ecology
because of its heritage both in the social sciences and ecology fields, which have as a
method deep examination of relationships in a particular place. A good list of the
characteristics of case studies is given by Billick and Price (2010)
Case studies “focus in depth on phenomena in their real-world context; rely on
non-random selection of one or a few cases whose unique characteristics facilitate
meeting research goals; use multiple types and sources of information about each
case to answer the research question evaluate theory by whether it can be
successfully modified to fit rich patterns in data associated with one or a few
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cases rather than on a simple falsification criterion; use a logic of analytical rather
than statistical generalization--that is they predict how a phenomenon is
manifested in particular cases, rather than summarize frequency of occurrence
across cases; and they require multiple-investigator teams to carry out a
multifaceted research design. (5)
Though my research was not conducted by a multiple-investigator team, I did consult
with researchers outside of my field for background information on hydrology and tides
so that I could design research a physical-ethnographic research strategy that would be
feasible and productive. I also consulted with storm water engineers so that I would be
able to ask knowledgeable questions and properly interpret the data I was gathering for
that component of the study. I found that combining these multiple sources of
information was critical to achieving my research goal of a dynamic and complex
understanding of vulnerability.
The third point, a commitment to social justice, is regarded as a liability in more
positivistic science research, but since the post-modern era self-reflection about one’s
position in the research and acknowledgement of oneself as part of the construction of
knowledge is a norm for the humanistic social sciences. I have chosen to conduct
research in the community where I live and work, and the potential benefit of sharing my
findings with the community was a key reason for choosing this research topic. My
concerns with social justice have influenced my approach to the research design,
including the questions I have raised and the theoretical perspectives I have drawn from.
But in contrast to more activist research projects, I have generally limited my activities as
a participant observer to non-activist roles, and where I have acted as an activist I have
done so for specific reasons and kept note of those activities, which I will describe here.
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In my case study of Miami Beach, I was a participant observer in neighborhood
association meetings and City committee meetings. During those meetings, and in
conversations with participants of those groups, I refrained from mentioning my interest
in climate change, identifying myself instead simply as a graduate student studying
“urban sustainability.” My primary participation in the meetings was listening and
occasionally offering comments that were not related to climate change or flooding. This
was because I wanted to observe when and how climate change was discussed in these
settings, if at all, in order to understand the discourse and what impacts it had on different
aspects of urban governance. Only after attending several meetings would I then reach
out to select participants for interviews. After more than 6 months of participating and
researching in this way, I began to identify opportunities to use the knowledge I was
acquiring in a way that put forward new ideas which I felt would be beneficial to the
community, such as creating a blog and sharing it with neighborhood activists and City
officials. By this point my data was mostly gathered and where I believe this had an
impact on my research findings I have noted it.
My approach reflects a pragmatist approach, as articulated by qualitative
researchers Corbin and Straus (2008),
What is discovered about ‘reality’ cannot be divorced from the operative
perspective of the knower, which enters silently into his or her search for, and
ultimate conclusions about, some event. This does not lead to radical
relativism…. Instead the Pragmatists, like any practicing scientist in their day or
ours, must make a couple of key assumptions. One is that truth is equivalent to
‘for the time being this is what we know—but eventually it may be judged partly
or even wholly wrong.’ Another assumption is that despite that qualification, the
accumulation of knowledge is no mirage. (4)
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Since discovery cannot be separated from the “discoverer,” that knowledge is
constructed, and research is designed to construct it. The constructivist viewpoint is that
“concepts and theories are constructed by researchers out of stories that are constructed
by research participants who are trying to explain and make sense out of their experiences
and/or lives, both to the researchers and themselves. Out of these multiple constructions,
analysts construct something that they call knowledge” (Corbin and Strauss 2008, 10).
There is a fine line between positivistic and post-modern approaches in this research
project. Climate change is real -- yet any understanding of how people perceive, interpret,
and react to it, is constructed.
So far this is not very different from other social science research projects. But for
a project on climate change vulnerability, which is a relatively new field for the social
sciences, has a strong interdisciplinary bent and a strong applied arm, and a contentious
political history to boot, the construction of knowledge begins with the very decision to
select a topic called “climate change,” and to select a study area as a location being
impacted by climate change, and further to try to talk to the people who live there about
it. My selection of this topic was in many ways a response to the construction of natural
science researchers and government planners who voiced concerns based on scientific
data that Miami Beach was vulnerable to sea level rise and that this was related to recent
flooding events. But I was aware that the people I would be interviewing might not, and
in fact probably did not, share this understanding. Throughout the research I was very
conscious of negotiating a path between maintaining enough structure so that my results
would be meaningful, but still allowing for responses that elicited the thought patterns of
my informants in ways I did not expect. For example, by probing residents’ views on
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changes they had seen in Miami Beach I found that residents who did not necessarily
believe in human caused climate change still showed concern for the long-term viability
of the City.
I did not assume that residents and businesses would have thought about climate
change previously, and so I avoided use of the term initially in the interviews. I recruited
participants to talk about the impacts of flooding, and only if they mentioned sea level
rise did I ask if they connected the flooding to climate change. By allowing this flexibility
and avoiding the suggestion of politics that the term climate change carriers, I was able to
elicit alternative perspectives on the flooding, such as the perspective that it was not
increasing, and even alternative perspectives on sea level rise, i.e. that it is “nature.” If,
during the interview, a respondent mentioned climate change or sea level rise, then I
would probe further with questions about how they connected the flooding to climate
change and what they felt that meant for their future decision making. Or if he/she asked
me questions about the flooding, sea level rise, or adaptation planning I would answer as
directly as possible, providing honest answers but trying not to overwhelm my
interviewee with information. Especially in these moments, the interviews were more like
a conversation and we learned from each other.
Also, the open structure of the interviews was critical in allowing me to capture
what is my main theoretical focus, which is that vulnerabilities are produced, not just by
the physical phenomenon of sea level rise but by a host of social, economic, and
historical factors interacting with a changing environmental. One example of this was
when I learned from the grocery proprietor that three years ago he purchased some planks
as an adaptation to the flooding, but only after a competing grocery moved in several
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blocks away, and he was afraid his businesses would suffer when customers now had an
option to go elsewhere when his store was inaccessible due to the flooding. Qualitative
work is designed to be flexible enough that many of these nuances can appear. Yet it is
impossible to be comprehensive enough to account for every aspect, and I don’t claim to
have achieved that here.
This is one of the key reasons why more qualitative research is needed in climate
change research. Models and indexes abound but they cannot readily illuminate the
complex interacting factors that go into decision making. They have been criticized for
use as policy tools such as by Barnett et al. (2008) who write “we question the very
possibility of reducing complex social–ecological processes to numbers, or a number,
given the diversity of spatiotemporal processes involved” (115). Although their critique is
directed at the use of indexes for large scale units of analysis such as inter-country
comparisons, I believe this critique is also valid at smaller scales, because vulnerability
factors can vary greatly even neighborhood by neighborhood. This critique is relevant to
my study area because the vulnerability analyses currently available for the region are
models based on quantitative date—elevation. Although South Florida has as
sophisticated an understanding of our biophysical impacts as any area due to work by
water managers and local scientists from universities, there has been little research so far
on socio-economic factors of vulnerability to climate change in South Florida.
Füssel and Klein's (2006) analysis of the evolution of vulnerability assessments
found that second-generation vulnerability assessments, which include assessment of
adaptive capacity along with traditional vulnerability factors, require the involvement of
social scientists and make heavier use of qualitative data. They argue that qualitative
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approaches allow these types of assessments to produce more realistic estimates of
society’s risk due to anthropogenic climate change by
identifying a number of ways to maximize the utility of vulnerability analysis,
including more recognition of vulnerability as a product of coupled human–
environment systems; identifying the ‘complexity, interconnectedness, and
iterative nature of the components’ that generate vulnerability; situating the
vulnerability of a particular place in a larger spatial and historical context; [and]
including both quantitative and qualitative data. (320)
This approach which highlights the complexity and the importance of context in
producing vulnerability is in essence what I have attempted.

Research Design
My study consists of two components which will be used to produce an analysis
of social vulnerability to climate change. My primary concern with climate impacts is
with sea level rise, both the current impacts of flooding and the long-term reshaping of
the landscape. I define vulnerability as “a state of well-being” which is “not the same for
different populations living under different environmental conditions or faced with
complex interactions of social norms, political institutions and resource endowments,
technologies and inequalities” (Adger 1999). Also of critical importance is how
vulnerability is produced (Dooling and Simon 2012) through the interaction of contextual
conditions and actions taken at different scales, including particularly adaptation actions.
My focus is on the individual, household, community, and county level factors, as little
apparent action is being taken at the state, national, and international levels on adaptation
as of yet.
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Research Question 1: What hazards do the early stages of sea level rise pose for the
urban ecology and how does this impact urban life? What are the perceptions of urban
flooding among residents and businesses who experience significant flooding and how
does this impact their decision making?
The first component of the research is an urban ecological analysis of the
potential hazards related to sea level rise in Miami Beach. The existing vulnerability
analyses are based on predictions of sea level rise measured in static feet and analyzed
spatially with Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to produce include “inundation
maps” which show the extent of flooding in an urban area at high tide for a given stage of
sea level rise. But this method has many limitations because the maps do not take into
account the variation in water level due to tides, which is important for understanding the
true impact on urban life during the early stages of sea level rise. Nor do the maps take
into account physical barriers, drainage systems, or other built environment features that
control the flow of water. So it is not clear from these maps how low levels of sea level
rise actually impact the daily lives of urban residents, and therefore a better
understanding of the impacts of tidal flooding is important for understanding what the
early of stages mean for South Florida.
I began by conducting observations in the study in the study area during times of
flooding under varying conditions of rain and high tides in order to map the extent of
flooding and to identify sites that experience severe flooding for more extensive focus.
Over a period of eighteen months I conducted ethnographic observations on thirty-two
different days, mostly concentrated during a period of four months in the fall of 2012
when flooding was unusually severe. I took photos and noted flood depths and times
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which I later matched with National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) tidal data from the Virginia Key tide station, which is the closest station to
Miami Beach that records water levels, to produce an analysis of the extent and changes
in flooding in Miami Beach over the last fifteen years, as far back as data from the
Virginia Key station is available.
I also conducted interviews with ten residents and nine businesses in the areas
surrounding the selected sites. This is theoretical sampling (Corbin and Strauss 2008)
designed to recruit a sample of people with direct experience with flooding. I recruited
interviewees mainly through contacts I had in the neighborhood, asking people I knew if
they would help me to arrange an interview with someone they knew who lived in the
area. Most contacts arranged one interview, with two being the most interviews I had
from the same source. I also recruited three interviews from knocking on the doors of
residences I saw that experienced flooding. The interviewees came from a range of socioeconomic statuses, genders, ages, and ethnicities (see chart below). I interviewed five
homeowners (including one couple) and five renters, and seven small and two large
businesses. The purpose of the interviews was to elicit the impacts the flooding has on the
lives and businesses of the interviewees, their perceptions of the flooding and its
connection with sea level rise, and how the impacts and perceptions influence their
decision making about the location of their home or business. The interviews were semistructured, and ranged from thirty minutes to one and a half hours. The interviews were
recorded if the subjects would allow, and if not then detailed notes were taken during the
interview and immediately afterward the notes were typed up to allow as much recall as
possible. The interviews and the flood observation data were imported into NVivo and
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coded for themes under major categories including disruptions, adaptations, and
perceptions. Findings in these major categories are reported in chapter four, as well as
further analysis of the connection between disruptions and perceptions in an attempt to
assess correlation between experiences with flooding and decision making.
Table 1.
Miami Beach Resident Interviews.
Tenure
Owner 1
Owner 2
Owner 3
Owner 4
Owner 5
Renter 1
Renter 2
Renter 3
Renter 4
Renter 5

Socio-economic status
middle class
middle class
middle class
middle class
middle class
middle class
middle class
low income
low income
low income

Age
Elderly
Middle aged
Middle aged
Middle aged
Middle aged
Middle aged
Young
Elderly
Elderly
Elderly

Gender
Female
Female
Male & female
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Female
Male

Research Question 2: What are the different “logics” of climate adaptation are emerging
in the South Florida “climate governance network” and how is this expressed in
planning actions so far?
The second component of the research design seeks to understand the different
"logics" of various stakeholder groups in the emerging climate governance network,
including government officials, scientists, and activists, and how those different logics
shape beliefs about adaptation strategies and South Florida's future. Documenting this
emerging governance network is important for understanding how decisions are made
that shape adaptation planning and influence the vulnerability of different communities in
Miami-Dade. My goal for this step is to shed light on important questions including: How
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are climate change vulnerability and adaptation conceptualized? What are the relevant
timeframes? What actions are being taken on adaptation, and what is driving those
processes? What knowledge or experiences support decision making? These questions
were designed to understand the dynamics of adaptation planning and the key conflicts,
which will point to how vulnerability is produced. This component also serves as baseline
research for future documentation of Miami-Dade’s adaptation planning but I do not seek
to be comprehensive, rather to focus on the specific question of construction socioecological vulnerability.
The research consists of two main parts: the first is a case-study of planning for
climate change adaptation in Miami Beach. I interviewed ten city officials, which I
arranged by calling and requesting meetings, six local activists and two business leaders
who I established contacts with through participating in neighborhood meetings. I also
attended fourteen city meetings, and attended seventeen neighborhood association
meetings. The second part of this research question describes the emergence of the
regional governance network and its approach to vulnerability and adaptation planning. I
conducted interviews with eight local government officials who were leaders in the
emerging climate governance network of county and regional level officials. I attended
nineteen local or regional forums on climate change adaptation and took extensive notes.
The interviews and selected meeting notes were transcribed and coded, using for
discourse analysis. Taylor et al. (2014) use discourse analysis in a study of urban
planning debates to “identify in everyday policy and planning debates how diverse urban
realities are framed, and reasoned, in the language of different actors” and to “uncover
how these meanings intersect with and influence the political and material outcomes of
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the policy process” (7). The interviews and meeting notes were coded for language that
revealed major concerns about flooding and climate change, varying definitions of the
problems, and views of how problems ought to be dealt with. The coded responses were
analyzed to ascertain the underlying “logics” that unified the various groups of actors.
The findings from are reported in chapter five.
The final chapter of the dissertation brings together both components of the
research to draw conclusions about how vulnerability to climate change is produced in
South Florida. Through this framework my research, which more precisely detects the
relationship between physical hazards and socio-economic context, contributes to an
improved understanding of vulnerability and risk from sea level rise by integrating
physical factors into their social, historic, and economic context.
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CHAPTER III – BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
In this chapter I will describe the context of South Florida’s vulnerability to
climate change, touching on its history of development into a major metropolitan region
and the status of current socio-economic vulnerability indicators. I will also provide
background on the emergence of regional climate governance and explore some of the
aspects that point to vulnerabilities.

South Florida’s Development
South Florida’s environment has always been intertwined with its economy.
Agriculture, tourism, and real estate are three major climate-dependent sectors of the
economy, and these sectors have driven the region’s economy since urbanization began.
At the end of the 19th century northern investors began buying land to establish
plantations for tropical crops such as cocoanut and avocado. Later this land became prime
real estate for development as the area became desirable as a winter resort for the
wealthy. Henry Flagler was at this time building his railroad down Florida’s East Coast
and decided to extend it to Miami, according to local legend, after an early Miami booster
sent him an orange blossom that had survived a harsh frost in the rest of the state in 1894
(Muir 2000). Four years later the railroad arrived, Flagler built his Royal Palm hotel
south of the Miami River, and Miami grew quickly thereafter, attracting famous visitors
including U.S. Presidents and wealthy industrialists.
Accomplishing the vision of these early developers meant changes to the
landscape happened quickly in the urbanization of Miami. Early settlement was
concentrated along a limestone ridge that ran along the east coast and fresh water flowed
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from the Everglades to Biscayne Bay through natural channels in the ridge called
“transverse glades.” In 1907 the State of Florida began dredging canals in order to drain
the Everglades for agricultural land. These canals reduced the water levels in the
Everglades, altering a delicate ecosystem which depended on cycles of wet and dry to
support its unique habitat (Carter 1974). The rapids on the Miami River were dynamited,
which allowed salt water to flow further up the river, turning it brackish.
Development on Miami Beach followed very soon on the heels of Miami. As
historian Howard Kleinberg (1994) relates, in 1904 a ferry service was started from
Miami to “Ocean Beach,” the early name for the barrier island in Biscayne Bay, so that
visitors could take day trips to the sandy beach. The island was covered with mangrove
forest, although the southern end had been cleared for a cocoanut plantation which
ultimately failed. As Miami grew developers started to pay more attention to the island,
and in 1913 Carl Fisher arrived and bought up the old cocoanut plantation land for real
estate development. That same year he received his first dredging permit from the state.
Fisher filled the swampy land on the western side of the island through “bulkheading,”
which meant building sea walls, dredging from the bottom of Biscayne Bay and pouring
the muck to fill in the land. More dredging to create a channel deep enough for yachts led
to the creation of an entirely new small island, Star Island, in Biscayne Bay, on which
Fisher built exclusive residences. Other developers followed suit resulting in almost a
dozen man-made islands in the Bay.
With real estate a large part of its economy, Miami Beach has had its share of ups
and downs. The City was incorporated in 1917, encompassing approximately seven
square miles of the barrier island and man-made islands. Real estate development and
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urbanization picked up speed, and developers financed and built infrastructure such as
bridges for cars, canals, and donated land to the city for parks and schools. Miami and
Miami Beach benefitted from the 1920’s boom time all over the nation, and the
wealthiest Americans came to spend the winter in Miami Beach. Apartments filled to
capacity in the winter, and the wealthy built mansions. Fisher and others built grand
hotels and casinos, and by 1925 Fisher had made $50 million from his Miami Beach
enterprises (Kleinberg 1994). Despite the interruption of a devastating hurricane in 1926,
development rebounded and continued through the 1930’s, 40’s and 50’s. During the
1970’s Miami Beach entered a slump, and became known for large numbers of elderly
residents and a high crime rate. In the 1980’s renewed interest in preserving the historic
Art Deco buildings of the 1920’s and 1930’s led to the revival of the area’s tourism
economy based on arts and entertainment, and of course climate.
Miami Beach is a major economic engine of South Florida due to its popularity as
a tourism destination. According to figures published by the City’s Economic
Development Office, in 2010 Miami Beach had a Gross City Product of almost $7 billion
annually, five million overnight visitors and seventeen million beachgoers annually.
About a quarter of Miami Beach’s economy is hospitality, and forty-four percent of the
jobs in the city are in accommodation and food services. Approximately 30,000 people
commute to Miami Beach daily for work, increasing the City’s daily population by onethird (Miami Beach Economic Indicators 2010).
Although Miami Beach’s economy is very integrated with Miami Dade County
and the region, its population has somewhat different characteristics. Miami Beach is
Whiter, slightly older, and has more wealthy households than the County as a whole (see
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Table 1). The racial disparity reflects historical patterns of segregation in Miami Dade
and Miami Beach, which despite early attempts at building housing for Black laborers
generally discouraged Blacks from living in the City until at least the 1960’s (Kleinberg
1994). The Hispanic population began growing in the 1980’s as Cuban immigrants
moved in, and today Cubans are the largest Hispanic group but are not as dominant as in
the County. Miami Beach has increasing numbers of South American residents who tend
to be more affluent and have been buying properties as investments or second homes
(Campo-Flores and Dougherty 2013), and also increasing numbers of Central American
residents who tend to be less affluent and work in low-wage service sector jobs,
construction and grounds keeping.
Table 2.
Selected Miami-Dade County and Miami Beach Demographic Indicators.

Percent White non-Hispanic
Percent Hispanic
Percent Black
Percent foreign born
Percent of Hispanics who are Cuban
Mean household income
Source: American Community Survey 2008-2012

Miami Beach
40.3%
52.3%
3.6%
52.0%
52.6%
$86,688

Miami-Dade County
15.7%
64.6%
17.3%
51.2%
36.4%
$65,799

Social Vulnerability
Traditional social vulnerability indicators include age, race, income, and gender
(Cutter, Mitchell and Scott 2000). Miami Beach has many residents who would not be
deemed vulnerable by these measures, but also a significant number who would be. The
City has a large population of elderly residents, many of whom live in single-person
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households, and are significantly more likely to live in poverty than their U.S. peers.
According to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2 over half the city’s residents are
foreign-born, most from Latin America, but there are also significant numbers from
Europe, Russia, and Canada. Three-quarters speak a language other than English at
home, and forty percent speak English “less than very well.” Miami Beach also reflects
the transient character of the larger Miami metro area. More Miami Beach residents lived
somewhere else in the U.S. or abroad in the past year than did in the U.S. as a whole.
Miami Beach has a gap between socio-economic groups reflected in the skewed income
distribution. The median household income is $42,330, lower than the U.S. median of
$51,222, however the mean household income is higher than the U.S. mean by about
$8,000. More residents have college degrees or advanced degrees than the national
average. High rents and property values and a recent come back in the housing market
reflect the high desirability of the City as a place to live and the influx of investor owners
particularly from Latin America. A majority of residents, sixty percent, are renters, and
half of renters pay more than thirty-five percent of their income in housing costs. The
urban character of the city is reflected in transportation options--a quarter of households
don’t have a car, and higher percentages walk or bike to work than the national averages.
The South Beach area, specifically the census tracts between 5th Street and 15th
Street, and between Alton Rd. and Meridian Ave, is a diverse neighborhood including
long time elderly residents, recent immigrants, low-income renters, single family
homeowners, and luxury condominium owners. This neighborhood is about 60% foreign
born, the vast majority from Latin America, with about sixty percent non-citizens, over
2

Data from the American Community Survey 5 year estimates 2006-2010.
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half arrived after the year 2000, and about sixty-five percent speaking English “less than
very well.” Forty-five percent of households earn less than $25,000 per year, and nearly
half the labor force is employed in the tourism industry. Many live in small rented
apartments in relatively poor condition. Rent prices have risen dramatically in Miami
Beach in the last decade, from $632 per month in 2000 to $1059 in 2012 according to the
U.S. Census -- an increase of sixty-seven percent compared with sixty-three percent in
Miami-Dade County as a whole and forty-seven percent in the U.S. The fact that the
median rent in the County is nearly as high as Miami Beach, at $1057 in 2012, means
that there is little refuge for those who can ill afford the rising rents on Miami Beach.
Moreover, for those who work on Miami Beach, the added time and expense of
commuting from outside Miami Beach likely negates any savings in housing cost. One
important difference is that rental units on Miami Beach tend to be older and smaller than
elsewhere in Miami-Dade County, with relatively few two or more bedroom units
available. This plus the high rents mean that overcrowding is more of a problem on
Miami Beach. Eight percent of Miami Beach renter households have 1.51 or more
persons per room, compared with three percent for Miami-Dade County. For Miami
Beach owner occupied households the figure is only 1.5 percent.

The Emergence of Regional Climate Governance
As I described in the introductory chapter to the dissertation, the immediate
impacts that are associated with climate change in South Florida are not new to the area.
But climate change will exacerbate these phenomena, speeding up sea level rise and salt
water intrusion, increasing the number of hot days and the strength of hurricanes. The
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decades of experience that government, NGO’s, and scientists have in studying, planning
for, and adapting to our unique environment provide a strong foundation of knowledge
for understanding and dealing with climate change impacts already exists in South
Florida. But there is considerable anxiety around what the impact will be from the
acceleration or amplification of these phenomena under climate change, and whether
technology and policy innovations will be developed quickly enough to preserve a way of
life that in any way resembles the current urban development. To answer this question it
is important to look at how governance of climate issues is emerging.
Governmental action on climate change in South Florida goes back to the early
1990’s when concerns about climate change impacts centered around hurricanes, as
South Dade had just been hit by Andrew in 1992. Miami-Dade County was early to the
climate change conversation in becoming a founding member of ICLEI – Local
Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) through the leadership of Harvey Ruvin, known
to many locals as the "father of the contemporary environmental movement" in MiamiDade (CLEO Anniversary Celebration 2012). ICLEI came about through the efforts of
Ruvin and other members of the National League of Cities and National Association of
Counties who were concerned with global climate change and who recognized that local
governments were critical to developing solutions due to their ability to limit sprawl and
dependence on automobiles (Governance Leader 5, interview August 24, 2012). As part
of the first ICLEI campaign “Cities for Climate Protection” Miami-Dade adopted in 1993
an Urban CO2 Reduction Plan which “led to the reduction of approximately 34 million
tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent emissions” (Seijas et al. 2010, 505).
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Over the next decade Miami-Dade County continued to participate in ICLEI
initiatives such as ClimateWise and the Cities 21 Project, and also passed resolutions
urging state and federal action on climate change. According to a Miami-Dade County
official by 2005 it had become clear not only that the County's CO2 emissions had not
fallen, but that global failure to curb emissions meant that local areas would have to start
preparing for climate change impacts (Governance Leader 5, August 24, 2012). A
Climate Change Task Force (MDCCTF) was created in 2005, chaired by Ruvin, with six
committees and 150 participants from academia, planners and architects, local activists,
government and non-profits (MDCCTF 2008). A science committee reviewed recent
literature on thermal expansion of the oceans and ice melt, and settled on a prediction of
three to five feet of sea level rise by 2100 for South Florida (MDCCTF 2008). Over the
next three years the MDCCTF produced recommendations in six areas: science,
greenhouse gasses, built environment, natural systems, economic, social and health, and
intergovernmental affairs. The recommendations covered a broad range of areas from
requiring that all county departments include goals for greenhouse gas reduction in their
strategic plans to establishing a green collar jobs task force to restricting land uses in
areas at risk from sea level rise to a county-wide education and outreach program on
climate change (MDCCTF 2010).
Many of these recommendations were included in the sustainability plan released
in 2010 by the mayor's office called GreenPrint. But the MDCCTF process did not result
in the kind of action by the County that many hoped for. A status update of the MDCCTF
recommendations compiled in 2010 showed that while progress had been made on some
recommendations, particularly those on energy efficiency which could draw on funding
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from the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant that came as part of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), few recommendations addressing
adaptation planning had seen much progress (MDCCTF 2010). In particular
recommendations for large scale response and public education went unfulfilled. For
example the status of a recommendation that “the County bring together all agencies and
entities involved in economic development and planning in order to develop a unified and
comprehensive response to the challenges of climate change, housing, economic
development, and quality of life” was listed as “This recommendation will require
County Commission action. No action has been taken to date” (MDCCTF 2010).
Indeed there was a widespread perception that the County Commission did not
want to deal with climate change. A county official indicated in an interview that he
thought that some of the commissioners had been influenced by the builder’s association
which didn’t want the county to release sea level rise maps because of the potential
impact on the industry (Governance Leader 8, interview July 7, 3013). Although the
MDCCTF had recommended that the County produce maps of areas that would be
impacted by sea level rise, and had projected up to twenty-four inches of sea level rise by
2060, the County’s Department of Environmental Resource Management website
devoted to the MDCCTF cited an EPA projection of eighteen to twenty inches by next
century, and stated that “the areas most susceptible to impacts due to changes in sea level
rise are the areas already subject to flooding by major rain events and storm surges. These
areas are called flood zones and are shown in the FEMA maps” (Accessed August 28,
2011). The MDCCTF sunsetted and a new mayor took office, a fiscal conservative who
downsized the sustainability office. Activity then shifted to the four-county Compact,
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which drew heavily on the work of the MDCCTF, and worked to build momentum
regionally for climate change adaptation.
Although Miami-Dade County and the SFRCCC received assistance from several
federal agencies including NOAA and the U.S. Geological Survey, I found the lack of
direction or specific guidance on adaptation planning from the federal level meant that
progress was stop-and-go. The hands-off approach means that that adaptation is left up to
the state and local governments, and although the number that are developing climate
adaptation plans is growing, progress on implementation activities is still limited (NCA
2011b). Adaptation planning typically follows several steps: assessing potential impacts
specific to the area, creating planning strategies for dealing with those impacts,
implementing the plan, and doing on-going monitoring of environmental changes leading
to revisions to the plan (NCA 2011b). Plans typically focus on infrastructure elements –
raising bridges and road, storm water, etc. and planning elements on land use, zoning,
and building codes.
At the state level in Florida there was a brief period of action between 2007 and
2009 when the Governor, moderate Republican Charlie Crist, appointed a climate action
task force. In an interview, a regional governance leader explained that the task force
published a state adaptation plan in 2008, with the help of a research group from
Pennsylvania State University that had a template for doing climate change impact
assessments and a Florida Atlantic University applied research center that had been doing
some work on coastal adaptation at the urging of the National Energy Commission, a
privately funded research and advocacy group with IPCC connections (Governance
Leader 3, interviewed August 13, 2012). The legislature created the Florida Energy and

56

Climate Commission (FECC) in 2008 and the Governor’s office organized two summits
in Miami in 2007 and 2008 that were well-attended, including by elected officials,
according to an interviewee. But in the third year of the Crist administration the political
situation changed as the governor started thinking about running for the Senate. The third
climate summit was cancelled. In 2010 the new administration of Rick Scott, a
conservative Republican, together with a more conservative state legislature repealed the
FECC legislation.
Just as the state was pulling back and climate change became intensely politicized
at the national level, the southeast Florida region began serious efforts to assess and plan
for impacts to the region. A SFRCCC member described it this way
The same thing happened at the federal level, congress imploded and I think the
administration’s done a lot but they’ve been doing it sort of stale-mated because
they couldn’t get anything out of congress. So there wasn’t anything happening at
the state level, there was retrenchment, the federal level was becoming much less
clear, and the four counties down here, especially one county commissioner in
each of the counties said this is too important to our region. (Governance Leader
3, interviewed August 13, 2012)
With the state pulling back, localities in Florida were left on their own to plan for
adaptation.
The first SFRCCC Climate Leadership Summit was held in 2009, coordinated by
elected officials representing each of the four counties of Monroe, Miami-Dade,
Broward, and Palm Beach. The initiative grew out of the recognition of common interest
and geography shared by the four counties with respect to climate change. The story of
the founding, often repeated at SFRCCC meetings and written in the Regional Action
Plan, is that representatives from several of the counties were in the Capitol visiting their
Congressional representatives to advocate for climate policy, but each county brought
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slightly different information on sea level rise planning scenarios for the region. They
realized that having consistent information and speaking with one voice as a region of 5.6
million residents would be much more powerful than working as separate counties, and
resolved to return home and work to establish a joint effort. The first summit was held
later the same year, to serve “as a platform for broader discussion among county and
municipal elected officials and the community as to the pressures and challenges that
climate change poses for Southeast Florida” (RCAP 2012). An agreement was drawn up
which acknowledges that South Florida is one of the most vulnerable regions of the
country to climate change, and agrees to developing joint policy positions, an adaptation
action plan, and committing staff resources. Within four months all four county
commissions unanimously ratified the SFRCCC agreement. The major commitments of
the SFRCCC were to developing joint policy statements on state and federal legislative
priorities that would urge action to mitigate climate change, and that would recognize
“the unique vulnerabilities of Southeast Florida to the impacts of climate change” and
would “further a joint policy position that includes specific recommendations regarding
the allocation of federal climate change funding based on vulnerability to climate change
impacts” (SFRCCC Agreement 2010).
The SFRCCC is unique and important in several ways. While individual cities or
counties in the U.S. such as San Diego and New York City had begun creating climate
adaptation plans, the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Compact was the first “megaregion” to do so. This was especially remarkable for a region that, despite its integrated
economy, common environmental issues, and similar history of development, had seldom
valued regional planning and mostly actively worked to maintain distinct identities for
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each of the counties. One SFRCCC member called it an “an unnatural act for county
commissioners” to agree on a regional Compact of this type (Governance Leader 3,
interview August 13, 2012). But it came at an appropriate time. The SFRCCC is a unique
reflection of the complicated geography of climate change. While adaptation approaches
vary from local area to local area, even from street to street in some instances, it also is
impossible for a local area to go it alone, as my Miami Beach case study later will show.
Addressing adaptation for coastlines and watersheds requires viewing an entire region as
an integrated system, which will only accelerate a trend to regional collaboration.
The SFRCCC has a steering committee composed of two staff members from
each county, one municipal representative from each county, and a non-voting member of
the South Florida Water Management District. Additional staff from each county plus the
SFWMD and one environmental non-governmental organization (NGO) form a technical
support team. There is also a joint policy advisory team composed mostly of county
staff, some of the same people who are on the steering committee, and a science advisory
team that completed the consensus paper on Sea Level Rise. Each fall since 2009 the
SFRCCC has convened a Climate Leadership Summit, with each county rotating as host.
Outside speakers from academia, private research groups and federal agencies serve as
panelists on climate mitigation and adaptation topics, the SFRCCC steering committee
provides an update of activities, and county and municipal government representatives
share plans and strategies for mitigation and adaptation. The summits draw around 200
participants including academics, local government staff and elected officials, NGO’s,
private engineering firms and federal agency scientists. In 2011 the SFRCCC released a
Regional Climate Action Plan (RCAP) as a framework for climate adaptation and
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mitigation for the region’s local governments. The RCAP included a vulnerability
analysis for sea level rise which used LiDAR data to show the areas impacted by one to
three feet of sea level rise, and over 100 recommendations on mitigation and adaptation
activities (SFRCCC 2012c). The RCAP provides information and recommendations for
South Florida counties and municipalities to understand the impacts of climate change
and begin their own planning processes.
The RCAP was designed to be a framework that counties and municipalities can
tailor to their own needs and different contexts. It is non-binding on any government, and
endorsement by a county or municipality does not commit that entity to any particular
actions or recommendations, which are instead implemented through standard processes
such as capital improvements or grant funded programs. Because of this the Compact has
to rely on “soft power” to advance its agenda, by educating and involving like-minded
government officials and members of the public. Below I will describe some of the
factors in the SFRCCC’s successes to date as well as some of its limitations, based on my
interviews with members and observations of public meetings. I argue the success of the
SFRCCC so far has been due to steering committee members with strong personal
commitments to the work and to the focus on increasing regional collaboration and
expanding and sharing resources. The limitations stem from narrowly conceived
vulnerability and lack of public involvement.
Personal commitment
From my observations and interviews I found that, with the absence of a mandate
from the federal or state level for climate adaptation, the SFRCCC exists largely due to
the efforts of local government officials who were personally committed to the work
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because of a belief that addressing climate change is absolutely critical to the future of
South Florida. Some of these staff members have science backgrounds, including PhD’s
in natural sciences. Others had no science background or particular interest in
environmental issues but learned about the potential impacts from those who did, such as
one local official who recalled
I remember the first meeting I said… “do we really have to accept that it’s
changing and that we can’t do anything about it and that we have to adapt?” And
so that got me started on really studying, at least doing some studying about it to
understand that no it’s probably too late to just forestall it, we really have to
adapt. We have to consider that too. (Governance leader 4, interview August 14,
2012)
That sense of urgency about the need to address climate change has created a culture of
commitment and determination among SFRCCC members to moving forward adaptation
planning within local government. One local official who became convinced about the
need to act on climate change official remembered eagerly sharing anything available
with coworkers
….at that time in 2005 there really wasn’t a lot out there that was talking about
impacts…. information was kind of hard to come by at that time because nobody
was really talking about it, and at the state it wasn’t an issue, so you just kind of
had to get it as you could. I was so hungry, whenever I saw anything about
climate change I was so excited because you never saw anything, and I would
treasure it and I would send it out to everybody. And now I can’t possibly keep
up. (Governance Leader 6, interview August 31, 2012)
That commitment translated to personal choices as well, such as in the case of one
official who, when sustainability initiatives were downsized by a new administration,
went to work for a different government altogether in order to keep working on climate
issues, saying, “They had a green team when I got here…. they had a sustainability action
plan that they did also with the energy grant. But I’ve just given it a little more structure
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and attention. I’ve elevated the issue too. And everybody kind of knows that it’s my
thing” (Governance Leader 4, interview August 14, 2012).
For some steering committee members the belief in the importance of working on
climate change led to an emotional connection to their work, and to each other. This was
evident at the third annual summit when SFRCCC steering committee members honored
a member who was retiring. She teared up upon receiving the recognition and talked
about how much the work had meant to her, saying “This is so important to me, after my
family. [SFRCCC facilitator] is my newest best friend for the last 4 years” (SFRCCC 4th
Climate Leadership Summit, December 2011).
The SFRCCC is therefore not simply another task force appointed to work on an
issue of ordinary significance. It is a personal commitment from those who believe that
climate change will have significant impacts on South Florida and that local government
must move to address them. This commitment drives them to look for opportunities to
persevere even in unfavorable political climates, and it helps create bonds of friendship
between steering committee members that is an important source of support for those
working on an extremely complex and politically charged issue.
Widening the Circle
But SFRCCC steering committee members also recognize, and often repeat, that
to make progress on adaptation others need to be brought into the conversation beyond
the core group. Referred to as “widening the circle” this is an important strategy both for
creating momentum for adaptation activities within government and for public outreach.
As one official put it, “It’s important that we widen the circle. We can’t just keep talking
to each other. We need to bring in the others, we need to bring in the police, fire, public
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works, the planners, and say this is the information, so how is this going to change the
way you do your job?” (Governance Leader 4, interview August 14, 2012). Educating
local government staff is seen as a crucial step in mainstreaming climate adaptation into
how government operates, and something that with Compact agreement functioning as
political cover can be furthered by professional staff without political debate.
Also as a public outreach strategy, Compact steering committee members are
reaching out to different audiences. One staff member told about attending a public forum
on transportation.
This was an audience that all of a sudden I was informing them with the science
and they probably didn’t even know that was going to happen. We need to do
more of that. We need to, when it’s a homeowner’s association… and they have
breakfast once a month, go to them and inform them. And the message is, this is
what we’re learning, this is what the science is telling us now, what does this
mean to you? If you’re going to go back and you’re going to run a transportation
agency, right? Or if you’re going to go build a new development what does that
mean? That’s what I’m trying to do. (Governance Leader 4, interview August 14,
2012)
Thus far moving forward on adaptation has been a process of education and inclusion,
rather than directives and policy which may be as yet too politically and technically
difficult to achieve.
Building more regional collaboration
Despite being neighbors with similar environments and a fairly integrated
economy, the four counties of Southeast Florida have historically worked to maintain
distinct identities and do not have a significant history of cooperation on regional issues.
Initially, Miami-Dade and Broward each had their own climate change task forces and
each of the counties was using different projections of sea level rise. But once the
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benefits of acting together as a region were realized, a few environmentally minded
county commissioners worked together to establish a process for regional collaboration
on climate change. As one founding member of the SFRCCC described it, the four
counties had previously seen each other as competitors, but through the Compact have
"built relationships and trust” (SFRCCC 4th Climate Leadership Summit, December
2011).
Building relationships and trust are key to how the Compact functions because it
is not a legal entity with authority for governing the region, but a regional framework for
collaborating and an agreement to work together. The reason for this structure, according
to one of the steering committee members, is that with four counties and over 100
municipalities, the framework can be adjusted and adopted to the needs of each
jurisdiction. “You have to know your audience and know your constituencies. That’s the
good thing about the regional plan, that if we have the framework then we can all kind of
go out and do our thing the way it’s best for us” (Governance Leader 4, interview August
14, 2012). Another steering committee member put it in the language that a separate,
more comprehensive regional planning process is using, the language of “subsidiarity,” to
mean decision making happening at the smallest level practical for an issue. For example
in transportation, highways should be a regional issue but sidewalks could be designed at
the block level (Southeast Florida Regional Partnership 2013). In the words of this
steering committee member, subsidiarity is the “idea that decisions have to be made at
the correct level in order for there to be appropriate buy-in. That idea can be expanded to
talk about climate resiliency and adaptation. There are things that we have to do at the
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regional level that will require regional support and regional cooperation” (Governance
Leader 7, interview June 24, 2013).
The idea of subsidiarity fits with the nature of climate change adaptation, in that
an entire region may experience similar impacts and certain actions can be taken
regionally, but many actions are much more locally specific because of differing socioeconomic and physical contexts. For example water is managed in South Florida on a
regional level through the South Florida Water Management District, which manages
flood control and water supply for the entire watershed south of Lake Okeechobee. But
counties and municipalities have their own storm water, waste water and water delivery
systems which will need to be adapted. A county level official explained,
The [South Florida] water management district is sixteen counties on the
peninsula of Florida and they’re certainly going to be taking on some big
engineering activities to deal with that, come down a little bit smaller you’re
looking at beach renourishment programs that provide for shoreline protection,
you may find that cities are looking at sea wall ordinances or storm water
retrofits, maybe you come down to a given neighborhood where cities are
petitioning to try and get certain types of adaptation work done – that happened in
the Riviera Isles area of Ft. Lauderdale where they petitioned the city to put in
back flow preventers as a pilot. So again I think this idea of subsidiarity can be
applied here because you can see that every level has to start thinking about what
the next steps are that are going to help deal with the issues. (Governance Leader
7, interviewed June 24, 2013)
But having a framework for regional cooperation on climate change adaptation is
important then because infrastructure is connected across county borders and the changes
that one government makes can affect the others “upstream” or “downstream.” As the
official went on to say,
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There are certain things that can’t be done locally. Regional transportation issues
have to be dealt with regionally. Ft. Lauderdale’s not going to go out and raise I95 because they’re concerned with adaptation. But they can work with state DOT,
they can encourage these kinds of things but certain kinds of things have to be
done regionally and certain things have to be done locally. And not every
municipality is going to choose the same set of solutions. (Governance Leader 7,
interview June 24, 2013)
Some cooperation has already been happening, for example with some eastern
municipalities buying water from municipalities further westward due to the salinity of
the eastern well fields (Sonenshein 1995). But officials have cited increasing
collaboration in other areas as well such transportation. As one official described it,
For things to work effectively, they need to be coordinated. So that’s why we talk
about trying to better regionally connect and coordinate our transportation
systems. Because there’s all kinds of movement across county borders from
Monroe on up. So anything we can do to make that more efficient and effective
will impact quality of life, will impact emissions, you name it. (Governance
Leader 6, interview August 31, 2012)
The SFRCCC contributes to this increase in regional collaboration by setting an example
and framework. As one official said,
I think that the compact helped people make the recognition that it was possible to
work across these lines. And I think that we started making connections across
these lines which made it easier to do more of that type of work. It’s not that it
wasn’t happening before, but I think that the existence of the compact has
expanded people’s thoughts about their ability to collaborate and their ability to
accomplish more by working in a collaborative setting. Certainly since the
compact started the Sustainability Stewards is a great example – we had not
worked with the cities that way previously. I mean there were examples of
pockets of it, but this was a bigger effort to try to work collaboratively with the
cities. And I think that’s very true on the county level. It’s a big scale effort, and
the counties hadn’t really worked together that way in the past, and so it’s
changing the nature of the relationships. (Governance Leader 7, interview June
24, 2013)
The collaboration has also led to expanding and sharing resources. For example
Miami-Dade had early leadership with the work done by its Climate Change Task Force,
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which was used extensively as a basis for the RCAP. Broward County, which had a more
supportive County Commission, created a climate change division within the Department
of Natural Resources Management staffed with hires from federal economic stimulus
spending (ARRA), and supported the work of the SFRCCC by compiling the report and
convening the science committee. The contributions are made according to available
resources and expertise, as one member described,
Early on in the development of the Compact staff steering committee there was a
survey that we put out to determine what resources each group had to address the
issues. And so early on we had an understanding that each of the counties had a
different level of resources available, and they’ve made different levels of
progress towards dealing with these issues in general. So we were aware from
early on that each member of the Compact was in a different place relative to each
other and relative to the region. And so I think that some of our first couple years
especially when we were dealing with the technical aspects were to try and get us
on the same place. And if you read the compact, our compact charter, the compact
clearly states that each of the counties will provide what resources they have
available that area reasonably available. That’s not the exact language, but it says
to the extent we have the resources available we will participate and help. If there
are times when different members carry more of the load, but that has to do with
their interest in a particular issue as well as their expertise and the availability of
those resources. (Governance Leader 7, interview June 24, 2013)
By sharing resources and demonstrating the ability to develop regional
collaboration, the SFRCCC has attracted more outside resources particularly from the
federal government and large environmental NGO’s. NOAA assisted in preparing the
RCAP vulnerability analysis and USGS provided technical support as did the SFWMD.
The Union of Concerned Scientists and World Resources Institute have attended
SFRCCC meetings, and the Kresge Foundation provided a grant to support the
coordination and moving forward with implementing the adaptation plan. The Broward
MPO recently received a federal grant to look at regional transportation impacts of
climate change.
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Focus limited to physical vulnerability
Although the SFRCCC has been fairly successful at building momentum for
climate change adaptation in South Florida it also has limitations that are important to
recognize. So far the focus of its work – evidenced by the vulnerability assessment and
RCAP—has been on the physical environment, i.e. the built environment and natural
systems. The RCAP did not contain a section on health, housing or social equity, and
discussion of the economy was limited to the value of exposed real estate. One steering
committee member explained this was a matter of the expertise on the steering
committee.
Well they had three working groups, and one was transportation, one was natural
systems, and one was built environment. And I think that’s where the staff felt
comfortable that they could take the work from. The people involved don’t have
the background in these other issues, and so the reason health and agriculture are
coming up in the next wave of work is because they realized that they didn’t get
attention. So I think in that sense, I don’t think there’s any resistance to it as much
as they didn’t probably feel comfortable that they could manage the outcome and
deliver it in a product that they could get commissioners to go along with.
Governance Leader 3, interview August 13, 2012)
Another staff member saw it as a matter of priorities, that certain actions needed
to happen first in order to address the most pressing adaptation concerns, saying
We’ve got to get stuff into our planning documents now, in order to start dealing
with some of these issues, and because climate change and sea level rise are slow
activities and on a longer time horizon, then those issues just haven’t been
brought to the tippy top of the priority list yet. And that being said I don’t think
they’re being ignored…. we are in the infancy of these kinds of conversations and
so some of the bigger issues are some of the ones we’re trying to address now, but
that’s absolutely a conversation that needs to be had and it’s likely to be had in the
next for example the next version of the RCAP where we’ll bring in the public
health aspect and we’ll try to work more on some of those kinds of issues. But we
need to get the big stuff done first. (Governance Leader 7, interview June 24,
2013)
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However SFRCCC members did recognize the potential for additional benefits of
adaptation, termed “co-benefits” (NCA 2011b). They cited the Florida Department of
Health’s study on climate change impacts, and Broward County’s regional health
planning council initiative as ways of creating opportunities to adapt to climate change
and improve air quality, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and encourage bicycle riding.
A “Coalition of the willing”
As mentioned the SFRCCC is an agreement between the four southern counties to
collaborate but it does not require any particular action. Since action is voluntary, it is
also uneven, particularly among municipalities. Although the steering committee includes
a few of the most active municipalities, SFRCCC members recognize that much
education remains to be done with municipalities. As of 2014 only 24 out of 112
municipalities had signed the Mayor’s pledge, most in Broward County. Since
municipalities have a lot of responsibility for infrastructure development, services, and
land use regulations, their participation in adaptation action is key to success in the
region.
Limited public involvement
The SFRCCC’s purpose is to steer collaboration among local governments, but
steering committee members recognize that public involvement is also important.
However opportunities for public involvement with the SFRCCC are limited. The annual
summits are open to the public but there is a cost to attend, they are held during the
working day, and generally not geared towards a general audience. Very few members of
the public attend the summits, and media coverage has been scant. However the 2013
summit included an evening town hall meeting with congressional representatives, which
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was standing room only. SFRCCC steering committee members are all county staff, with
one non-governmental representative on the technical support committee. This is in
contrast to the Miami-Dade CCTF which involved many more citizen stakeholders and
had meetings open to the public, although here too there was a lack of widespread public
communication about the initiative and few members of the public actually attended.
Conclusion
South Florida’s environment and economy have always been intertwined, and the
climate has closely shaped the major industries that dominate the economy. Miami’s
socio-economic profile indicates significant areas of vulnerability according to traditional
vulnerability indicators such the gap between income and cost of living. The region has a
long history of dealing with environmental challenges, many of which prefigure the
challenges of climate change. The region also acknowledged its vulnerability to climate
change early on, and has recently taken the lead in the state on adaptation planning,
leading to increased cooperation among local governments and the development of a
local plan. The current efforts benefit from the experience of long time leaders who have
remained committed to environmental issues and who have inspired newly committed
leaders in spite of political obstacles. Despite the absence of state leadership, these local
and regional leaders have formed an innovative regional compact and are linking scales
across political divides. They have created momentum for the process by building
relationships and sharing resources.
However as a comprehensive adaptation effort, it is limited by its largely
technical approach which doesn’t fully account for the socio-economic dimensions of
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vulnerability, and by the limited participation of the public and municipalities. Whether
the effort will be able to provide long-term leadership remains to be seen.
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CHAPTER IV – IMPACTS AND PERCEPTIONS
As explained in previous sections of this dissertation, Miami Beach is predicted to
experience a variety of physical impacts associated with global climate change, including
sea level rise that will likely result in a reshaping of the urban landscape. I have argued
that the increasingly frequent urban flooding that Miami Beach is currently experiencing
can be seen as the onset of perceptible, accelerated sea level rise and that studying this
phenomenon provides insight into the physical and social challenges that Miami Beach
will face in dealing with this problem. In this chapter I will describe and analyze the
impacts of urban flooding that Miami Beach is currently experiencing, and how residents
and businesses are perceiving, reacting and adapting to these impacts.

Biophysical Impacts of Sea Level Rise in the Study Area
As described in the introduction, the predictions for sea level rise made by local
scientists and officials for South Florida indicate that over the next fifty years sea level
could rise by as much as two feet (SFRCCC 2012a). So-called “inundation maps” are an
increasingly common tool for visualizing the impacts of sea level rise on a local area
(NOAA Digital Coast). For areas where the data is available, these maps are produced
using LiDAR data3 which allows a very detailed representation of elevations. The image
below left for example shows Miami Beach’s current topography. The image below right

3

LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is a remote sensing method for measuring land elevations. An
aircraft is flown over a large area collecting measurements from a light beam bounced off the ground. The
data points are 1.5m apart and are vertically accurate to within 6 inches. Trees, buildings, and other nontopographical features are mathematically eliminated from the dataset. LiDAR data for Miami-Dade
County were collected from 2002-2004 by a joint FIU-UF research project and area available for download
from the Florida Department of Emergency Management. (IHRC)
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was produced using the same elevation data and adding a layer that shows the locations
which would be inundated during high tide in scenario of two feet of sea level rise.

Figure 1: Inundation maps of southern Miami Beach (Maps by Peter W. Harlem, used
with permission)
What these maps show is that relatively low-lying and “flat” areas such as Miami
Beach could be significantly impacted by just a few feet of sea level rise. Miami Beach’s
maximum elevation is twelve feet NAVD and minimum is 0.5 feet, with an average of
six feet (CDM Smith Inc. 2012). The higher elevations are on the east side of the island
where the sand dunes are, and the western side of the island is lower, having previously
been mangrove forest which was bulkheaded and filled with material dredged from the
bottom of Biscayne Bay in the early decades of the 20th century (Kleinberg 1994).
Analysis of LiDAR data shows that with two feet of sea level rise approximately seven
percent of Miami Beach’s land area would be inundated, but with three feet that rises to
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approximately thirty-four percent, and with four feet approximately sixty percent
(Harlem 2011).
However these inundation maps are limited in their ability to accurately represent
future sea level rise scenarios. The maps are nicknamed “bathtub maps” because they
represent a simple visual layering of inundation on top of current elevations and are not
true hydrologic models. The maps do not take into account how water flows over a
landscape, nor the composition of its geologic substrate which determines conductivity
between bodies of surface water, nor coastal changes such as erosion (Harlem 2011).
They are also static, whereas tides are dynamic. The inundation layer is based on the
Mean Higher High Water datum which is the higher of the two daily high tides South
Florida experiences. This means the scenario depicted in the maps does not represent a
permanent state of inundation but rather a high in the tidal cycle with water levels
varying throughout the day.
Importantly, they also do not take into account the built environment, particularly
drainage infrastructure. My research looks at the connection between the biophysical
impacts of climate change and the built environment on Miami Beach, as a basis for
understanding the ecological and social impacts that sea level rise may have on the urban
area. How Miami Beach is experiencing climate change and sea level rise has everything
to do with its drainage system. The existing drainage system is driven by gravity, with
water generally flowing from higher elevations in the east through underground pipes
westward and out into Biscayne Bay (Kleinberg 1994). However given the low land
elevations, the slope or “head” in the system is very small. This means that if the water
level in Biscayne Bay is higher than the outfall, water can flow back up through the pipes
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and into streets, producing flooding that is not associated with rain events but instead due
to extremely high tides or storm surge.
Water level and tidal data indicate that this is a growing problem for South
Florida. The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration maintains a
network of 3,000 tide stations across the U.S. for the purpose of predicting and
monitoring tides. For the Miami area the Virginia Key tide station is the primary source
of tidal predictions and data. Data is only available for this station going back to 1996,
when it was moved from a location in Government Cut. The station with the longest
history in South Florida is the Key West station which has data going back to 1913. Key
West data indicate that mean sea level has increased by 0.73 feet or 8.76 inches over the
past 100 years. This increase has been cited by the South Florida Water Management
District as a primary cause of worsening drainage conditions in South Florida, as the
drainage infrastructure was built in the 1930’s when sea level was lower and did not
interfere as frequently with draining water from the urban areas during storms.
Tidal flooding is also becoming more frequent. South Florida has a semidiurnal
tidal cycle with two high tides and two low tides per day, with a tidal range of about two
feet. The tidal range, heights and timing vary with seasonal lunar and solar orbital cycles,
so that several times per year tides are higher than average due to the position and
proximity of the sun and the moon. The phenomenon known as “perigean spring tides”
occurs when the moon is closest to the earth (perigee) and during the full moon or new
moon when the moon and the sun are in alignment and the gravitational pull of both on
the earth’s oceans produces slightly higher tides (NOAA 1998). During these times of the
year, which occur in late fall and late spring in South Florida, high tides are higher than
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in other months. Tide predictions are based on models that take into account these
astronomical cycles, as well as hydrodynamic, topographic, and other factors particular to
a local area.
However the actual tide heights and times experienced on any given day in a local
area are influenced by weather conditions, ocean currents, and other non-periodic factors
which are not included in the model predictions and are not part of NOAA’s regular
prediction services (Ehret 2012). For short term tide predictions, it is the National
Weather Service which monitors marine conditions and issues tide predictions and flood
warnings for up to a one-week period. If a significant enough tidal event occurs, NOAA
will conduct an analysis and issue a report such as a report released in January 2013
analyzing water levels during Hurricane Sandy (NOAA 2013). The report indicates that
the maximum storm surge reported at Virginia Key was 1.44 feet on October 28 as the
storm was passing by Jacksonville, and the maximum storm tide (highest water level
recorded during the storm) was 2.17 feet NAVD.
But Hurricane Sandy was not the only thing causing elevated water levels in
South Florida that year. Further analysis reveals that water heights were above predicted
levels for most of 2012 (see Figure 2). The cause of this discrepancy is not clear however,
and pinpointing the reason for such variations is complex. According to a NOAA
researcher I spoke with, “Sea level fluctuates several inches on a routine basis, and those
small fluctuations can last for a few days to a few months, sometimes years. There is no
easy way to identify what causes these variations, there are any number of contributing
factors which cannot easily be accounted for” (Ehret 2013). Possible explanations include
seasonal cycles, Gulf Stream fluctuations, El Niño/La Niña, or sea level rise itself in the
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twelve intervening years since the benchmarks were last updated.4 In 2012 the Virginia
Key station recorded more than 7348 hours where water levels were above predicted,
which is eighty-three percent of the year. The maximum water height and the maximum
difference were both recorded while Hurricane Sandy was passing offshore.
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Source: NOAA Virginia Key tidal station historic water data hourly water levels

Figure 2: 2012 Verified minus predicted hourly water height values, Virginia Key, FL
Table 3.
2012 Virginia Key water height statistics (All values in reference to NAVD88)
Average predicted water height: -0.876 feet
Average verified water height: -0.592 feet
Average difference: 0.284
Maximum verified water height: 2.12 feet (recorded 10/28/2012, 18:00 LST)
Maximum difference: 1.56 feet (recorded 10/29/2012, 9:00 LST)
Source: NOAA Virginia Key tidal station historic water data hourly water levels

4

NOAA tide predictions are based on benchmarks called “datums” which are calculated by averaging
water height over a period of 19 years. The current datums in use are from the 1983-2001 epoch.
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This analysis of available tidal data for South Florida demonstrates the difficulty
of relying on established datums and traditional benchmarks for gauging the impact of
tidal events and isolating oceanographic and weather related drivers of urban flooding in
areas with very low grade elevations such as Miami Beach. As I will show in the
following section, a few inches of water height can mean the difference between a
“birdbath” on a street corner and an impassible street crossing, or between a flooded
sidewalk and a dry sidewalk. Yet the tools currently available for measuring and
analyzing the impacts of changes in water level on an urban environment are not well
developed for such small variations. As sea level rises along the coast it will be important
to derive new measures that are relevant to a particular urban environment for the
purposes of planning and preparation for extreme events. The following is an exercise in
developing such a measure.

Field Observations and Data Analysis
In order to understand the current drivers of flooding in Miami Beach and the
effect that rising sea level may have on urban life, I conducted observations in the
Flamingo Park neighborhood in Miami Beach, which has several of the areas most
susceptible to flooding in the city (CDM Smith Inc. 2012). I collected data on the height
and extent of flooding under varying conditions, and on the timing of human responses to
the flooding. Using an ethnographic approach I noted the adaptations made by residents
and businesses and engaged in conversation with persons at the sites about their
responses to and perceptions of the flooding. I correlated this data with water height data
available from NOAA to produce an analysis of the incidence and duration of flood
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levels that were associated with particular responses, as a way of gauging the impact that
flooding currently has on urban life in Miami Beach. This method also provides a way of
gauging how perceptions of flooding compare with actual incidence of flooding over the
last fifteen years. In total I conducted observations on thirty-two different days over a
period of eighteen months, mostly concentrated during a period of four months in the fall
of 2012 when flooding was by most accounts unusually severe.
When I began my research the only information on urban flooding in Miami
Beach that was available was a map of “flood prone areas” from the Public Works
Department. This map did not distinguish between areas that tended to flood due to rain
events and areas that flooded solely due to tidal events, so my first step was to identify
and distinguish the two. I began by observing flooding during the perigean spring tides in
October – November 2011, and noted locations where water appeared to be coming out
of drainage inlets. Next May-June, when tide was relatively high and the summer rains
had started, I canvassed the neighborhood after several rainstorms to see where water was
ponded, and sketched a map of the areas where water was ponded. I found they did in
fact correspond to the LiDAR map of low-lying areas, and to the map the city had already
identified of flood-prone areas based on their observations. From these maps I selected
ten sites that represented a variety of elevations and built structures for further
observation. After further observations during conditions of tidal flooding I selected two
areas for detailed ethnographic observations of response and adaptation activities.
From August to November 2012 I conducted forty hours of observations during
two tropical storms and the perigean spring tides. I documented at least one full high tide
cycle at each of the study spots, arriving at the location 2.5 hours before high tide and
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remaining at least 2.5 hours afterward. I took more than 500 photographs of flooding
conditions, responses and adaptations, and recorded detailed observations of the type of
responses and adaptations I saw, and the times and locations they occurred. For the
analysis I linked these time recorded observations to water height data available from
Virginia Key and used the NOAA inundation analysis tool to estimate the amount of time
that water height was at or above the level that triggered a particular response to flooding
on Miami Beach. Below I will present the results of two attempts to quantify the impacts
of flooding on urban life in terms of the reactions and adaptations it triggers and their
social cost.

Results
Inundation map ground-truthing
Inundation maps such as those shown above come from Digital Elevation Models
(DEM) which visualize LiDAR data to present an overall picture of the elevation in an
area. Inundation is depicted on these maps by changing the colors of data points below a
certain elevation to blue, to mark the areas that would be below tide level given a certain
amount of sea level rise. However the maps are only an estimate, because they do not
represent the way water flows over land, through land, or through connections such as
drain pipes. Therefore even though an area may be indicated as vulnerable to sea level
rise at a certain level, without ground-truthing the maps we cannot know whether any
particular location would in fact be inundated in an actual flooding event. In order to
assess the degree of correspondence between the inundation models and actual flooding, I
mapped the extent of flooding over an approximately seventy block area of South Beach
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during an extremely high tide event and layered this information on to an inundation map
in a DEM using GIS.
On October 29, 2012, high tide was observed at 9:42 a.m. at 2.02 feet NAVD. No
rain had been observed in the last six hours. It took me approximately four hours from
8:30 to 11:30 a.m. to cover the entire area, noting on a street grid map the locations where
water was pooled. Because time was limited to cover such a large area I did not take any
measurements but merely noted visual observations on a street grid map. I then created a
line layer in GIS from my notations, using a street grid layer as a guide. The line layer
was added to the DEM on top of a two feet NAVD inundation scenario. The results are
shown in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Ground-truthing 5th Street to Lincoln Road with 2 feet Inundation Scenario
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The correspondence between the observations and the DEM is quite close, with a
few exceptions which are noted below. This is somewhat surprising because the main
conductor of flood waters is the drainage system, and in such situations water height in
the streets is not at the same level as the actual tide level because of hydrodynamics.
Nevertheless, the inundation map appears to be a reasonably accurate depiction of an
actual inundation scenario at low resolution.
The exceptions come for locations in which the street is not level and so water
cannot easily flow over high places to get to lower places. This is shown in the chart
below of the variance in elevation over one street which appeared inundated in the DEM
but was not observed to be inundated during the flooding event. The street contains high
points up to 2.2 feet over which it appears there was not enough water to flow to reach
the lower points on the other side and cause the street to be fully inundated.

Figure 4: Ground-truthing 2 feet inundation scenario with street elevation profile graph
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Site 1
One area which experiences particularly obstructive and frequent flooding is 6th
Street between Jefferson and Meridian avenues. South Beach has been heavily gentrified
over the last couple decades, but this neighborhood still has a lot of subsidized and lower
rent housing. On this street is a community center which houses Miami-Dade County
social services outreach program and a non-profit elderly services program. Several
subsidized housing developments for elderly are located within a few blocks. There are a
small grocery store and laundromat on this block that serve the mostly low-income and
immigrant residents of the surrounding area. The owners are also immigrants and have
been in this location since 1992. The grocery is very busy, and the owners say it is a great
location for the business, except for the flooding.
On days when the tides reach approximately 0.68’ NAVD water emerges out of a
drainage inlet on the southeast corner of the intersection and flows west down the gutter
in front of the grocery. When the water begins to overtop the sidewalk, workers bring out
metal planks about eight feet long and place them perpendicular across the sidewalk and
into the street so that customers can enter the store from the street when the sidewalk
becomes impassable. On this day, October 16, 2012, I observed these men putting out the
planks at 9:00 a.m. The planks remained there for three hours until the water receded and
the workers removed them, shown in Figures 5 and 6.
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Figure 5: Deploying the sidewalk planks, October 16, 2012. Photo by author.
I observed people crossing these planks with wheelchairs, high heels, and strollers
to get into the store. When I spoke with the owner he said that he stood outside to help
people across so no one would fall, but on this day I observed no one outside for most of
the time. They have not discussed this with the City, although I saw two City trucks drive
by the store. On this day the water kept rising and half an hour after they put the planks
out the sidewalk was completely submerged and the planks were not enough for people to
completely avoid getting their feet wet. The picture below of two women crossing over
the planks to enter the store with a baby carriage was taken at 9:30 a.m. High tide was
predicted for 10:06 a.m. and the water continued to rise until there was about four inches
of water on the sidewalk. However the store did not sustain any damage because the floor
slopes up about two feet immediately inside the entrance, minimizing the risk of
flooding.
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Figure 6: Crossing the flooded sidewalk, October 16, 2012. Photo by author.
The flooding disrupts commercial activity by interfering with the ability of
potential customers to enter the store, and the planks represent a planned adaptation to the
flooding that is based on repeated experiences with flooding as well as a level of
knowledge about the conditions and drivers of flooding that allow the adaptation to be
efficiently deployed. A conversation with the store manager revealed that they are aware
that the flooding occurs when the tides are extremely high, and that this usually happens
during full moons and is worst during the fall months. The planks were first purchased
three years ago during a time when tides were high and the manager feared that instead of
waiting for the water to recede customers would go to a large grocery chain that had
recently opened four blocks away. The planks cost several hundred dollars and are heavy
to carry around to the back of the store where they are stored when not in use. But even
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with this adaptation, the store owner claimed he lost $4000 for every two hours the store
was impacted by the flooding.
The planks are an adaptation that represents a new cycle of human behavior
which runs in concert with a cycle of the natural world. They are usually deployed when
the water reaches the top of the sidewalk, and removed when the water recedes to about
the same level. Although the human cycle is not as precisely regular as the natural cycle,
it is regular enough that measuring it provides a way of quantifying the disruptions to
urban life and potentially the social cost of urban flooding. I used this cycle to develop an
index to measure the social cost of the flooding in this location, called the “Sidewalk
Index.” On October 16, 2012 I observed that the planks were brought out and placed in
position at 9:09 a.m., when the water had just overtopped the sidewalk. At 11:50 a.m. the
water had receded to just below the level of the sidewalk, and the planks were removed
ten minutes later at 12:00 p.m. Table 4 contains observations and corresponding ocean
height at Virginia Key tidal station.
Table 4.
Street Observations, Times, and Water Heights, October 16, 2012
Event
Planks placed in position
High tide
Water receded below sidewalk, first plank removed.
Second plank removed

Time
9:09 a.m.
10:24 a.m.
11:50 a.m.
12:00 p.m.

Virginia Key
Observed Tide
1.22’
1.57’
.99’
.84’

The Virginia Key tide station is on the ocean side of the island whereas the
flooding at this location is being driven by the tidal cycle along the Biscayne Bay side of
Miami Beach. Since no tidal data is available at that location we do not know what the
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exact time lag is between when high tide is recorded at Virginia Key and when actual
high tide occurs in this section of Biscayne Bay. Further, there is also a lag between the
time when water level rises in Biscayne Bay and when the water emerges from the inlet
onto a city street. So it is not possible to determine the precise time lag between an
observed tide height at Virginia Key and the corresponding water level at any given
location. For the purpose of estimating the amount of time when the planks are deployed
I assume that they are placed and removed when water heights are at equal levels. I take
the average of the two water heights (1.22 and (.84/.99)) and use a water height of 1.0675
feet to denote the tide level at Virginia Key which triggers the deploying of planks at the
grocery. Using the NOAA inundation estimator I find that in 2012 water height exceeded
this level sixty-one times for a total of 152.7 hours. I further refine this total by
eliminating the times when the water height is exceeded while the store is closed, which
is from midnight to 7:00 a.m. I conclude that grocery experienced significant impacts
from flooding for 113.3 hours in 2012.
The furthest back that tidal data is available for Virginia Key is 1996. Performing
the same analysis with this historical data reveals that the instances of extreme water
levels appear to have increased in the last six years. The chart below shows the number of
hours that water height was at least 1.0675 feet NAVD going back fifteen years, which is
the furthest back that tide data is available for this location. Since 1996 three years have
exceeded 100 hours of flooding at this level, all three since 2008. 2012 was the most
extreme with 153 hours of tide level above 1.0675 feet NAVD, shown in Table 7.
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Figure 7: The Sidewalk Index
Site 2
Another site of significant urban tidal flooding which I observed is the
intersection of Alton Road (SR 907) and 10th Street. Alton Road is a main artery on
Miami Beach, approximately 100 feet wide, with two lanes of traffic, a center turn lane,
and parallel parking on each side. Bus stops just north of the intersection on both the
northbound and southbound sides serve two routes connecting Miami Beach with
downtown Miami and northern Miami-Dade County, and busses stop approximately
every twelve minutes during rush hour. The intersection is in the center of a busy
commercial district with a Walgreens drugstore on the northeast corner, a Whole Foods
grocery on the northwest corner, an office building on the southwest corner and an
advertising school on the southeast corner. This intersection is heavily used by
pedestrians as a connector of two major South Beach neighborhoods: Flamingo Park,
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with approximately 13,500 residents, and West Avenue with approximately 10,000
residents5.
During some of the worst days of flooding this intersection was featured in local
TV news reports. On at least fifteen days during October and November the City placed
cones blocking the two outside travel lanes where the water was highest, shown in Figure
8. According to City officials, the lanes were blocked off when water levels were
predicted to be high or when they observed significant flooding, shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8: High Tide Flooding on Alton Road, October 17, 2012. Photo by author.
But at no time was the intersection completely closed, and cars, pedestrians and
transit users continued to navigate the flooding. I observed this intersection on twentyfour different days, making notes about the impacts and disruptions caused by the
flooding, such as sidewalks becoming impassable, bus riders having difficulty embarking
5

West Avenue neighborhood population per West Avenue Neighborhood Association Chair. Flamingo
Park population estimated by author from 2010 Census block group estimates.
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and disembarking, and store entrances being blocked. These urban disruptions are
described in further detail in the second part of the chapter.
On November 2, 2012 I arrived at the intersection at 9:30 a.m. to observe the high
tide cycle and its impacts. High tide was predicted for 11:48 a.m. and according to the
Virginia Key data the tide was running about 0.5 feet above predicted levels. There had
been no rain in the last five days. As an indicator of the disruption caused by the flooding
I chose to observe the point at which pedestrians had to step outside of the crosswalks in
order to cross the intersection. When water levels are high enough water emerges from
the drainage inlet on the northeast corner of the intersection, which is inside the
crosswalk crossing Alton Road. According to my observations on previous days,
pedestrians will typically step or “hop” over the ponded water until it extends three to
four feet into the street. Once the water extends beyond this distance they will look for
places to cross where they can step over the water, which often means walking in the
street around the water instead of waiting on the curb, as the man in Figure 9 is doing
while waiting to cross the intersection.

Figure 9: Man Waiting to Cross Alton Road, November 2, 2012. Photo by author.
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At this crossing on this day, I observed a pedestrian walk around the water outside
of the intersection at 9:51 a.m. I measured the extent of the water which reached about
4.5 feet out into the street, and was 4 inches deep in the inlet. As the water continued to
rise I noted the times when similar behavior occurred at the other crossings. These times
are shown in Figure 10 below. As the tide was receding, I noted the times when
pedestrians were again able to cross while remaining in the crosswalks. These times are
noted in Figure 11 below.

↑
N

9:51

10:39

10:06

n.a.

10:01

10th St.

10:43

n.a.

9:47

Alton Road

Figure 10: Alton Road and 10th Street: Times when crosswalks observed to be no longer
usable for pedestrians as tide rises. November 2, 2012. Illustration by author.
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↑
N

1:39

1:20
1:15

1:28

10th St.
1:47

n.a.
n.a.

1:54

Alton Road

Figure 11: Alton Road and 10th Street: Times when crosswalks observed to be usable
again for pedestrians as tide recedes. November 2, 2012. Illustration by author.
For the analysis of the timing of the disruption of this intersection, I chose the
northeast corner which was the first to flood of all the corners. I have used the actual
observed behavior of pedestrians because there is a relatively steady stream of
pedestrians using this crossing and therefore it provides a fairly reliable time stamp.
However it is not a perfect measure because some individuals are more able to step
across wider distances than others, particularly those with less mobility. It is therefore a
conservative indicator. For the analysis I take the average of the Virginia Key water
height level at 9:51 a.m. (0.42 feet) and at 1:39 p.m. (0.48 feet) which is 0.45 feet. Below
is a chart showing the number of hours that water levels were above 0.45 feet from 1996
to 2012.6
6

The water heights used in the analysis as benchmarks for urban disruptions do not correspond to actual
elevations in the observation locations. For example, in Site 2 the inlet from which water flows into the
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Source: NOAA Virginia Key tidal station historic water data hourly water levels

Figure 12: Tide Hours above 0.45 feet NAVD, 1996-2012, Virginia Key, FL
The chart shows a similar pattern to that from the first observation site. 2012 recorded the
most hours of water height above 0.45 feet with nearly 900 hours, or ten percent of the
year. Four of the years with the largest number of hours occurred in the last six years.
The longest period when the tide was observed above this level was October 28, 2012,
corresponding with Hurricane Sandy passing offshore. Water levels were above 0.45 feet
for eight hours from 8:48 a.m. to 4:48 p.m., and the highest water level recorded during
this time was 2.14 feet NAVD at 12:48 p.m.
This analysis demonstrates that small changes in water level, on the order of
inches, can have significant urban impacts. As sea level continues to gradually rise,
progressively more low-lying areas will begin to experience such impacts. This has

street has an elevation of 3.13’ NAVD according to Roadway Plan drawings obtained from FDOT. The
discrepancy is due to the pressure and velocity from wave action which pushes water into pipe outfalls,
resulting in higher water levels in the street than in the tidal data.
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implications also for municipal infrastructure project design which will be discussed in
the next chapter.

Urban Life Impacts
The previous examples demonstrate that tidal flooding in urban areas disrupts
urban life and prompts the people who live and work in the area to react and to adapt.
These behaviors can be classified as unplanned adaptations or on-the-spot reactions, or as
planned adaptations or behaviors learned from repeated experiences with flooding. In this
section I will describe the disruptions and adaptations that I observed through my
ethnographic work and that were related to me in interviews with local residents and
businesses.
Damage and Disruptions
The types of disruptions that flooding causes to urban life in Miami Beach range
from relatively small, almost imperceptible inconveniences to more substantial damage to
property and even danger to life. The most common disruptions are the inconveniences to
pedestrians of having to walk around water ponded at crosswalks in intersections where
storm drains are located close to intersections and street crossings. This inconvenience
becomes a danger when pedestrians are walking along the crest of the road to avoid
water, particularly for the elderly or disabled (see Figure 13). Miami Beach has made
efforts in recent years to become more pedestrian friendly, but pedestrian accidents are
still more common than they should be and Florida is notorious for its high rate of
pedestrian fatalities. A 2002 FDOT report found that Alton Rd. is Miami-Dade’s third
worst “high crash corridor,” and that only twenty-seven to forty-five percent of drivers
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yielded to pedestrians when turning at intersections. Thus flooding worsens an already
dangerous situation, as the example in Figure 13 shows.

Figure 13: Man With a Walker in Flooded Street, October 16, 2012. Photo by author.

Bus passengers were another group affected by the flooding. When sidewalks
became flooded people would no longer wait at the bus stop. Bus drivers would try to
accommodate by picking people up or dropping them off in areas that weren’t as flooded,
perhaps half a block away, but this created confusion for people who were unsure where
to wait for the bus. It also backed up traffic when the bus stopped to pick up people who
were waiting in the street. I observed one woman nearly miss her bus because she had to
walk half a block out of her way to avoid a flooded crosswalk, and had to flag down the
bus so it would wait for her to cross. Agile people were able to jump over puddles, but I
observed few elderly or less mobile people attempting to navigate the flooded streets to
board a bus. The elderly and less mobile are a significant portion of transit riders, and
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their absence during this time leads me to suspect they may have decided not to attempt
an excursion when there was significant flooding, perhaps altering their routine or
depending on other means of transportation.
Many people I interviewed who lived in flood-prone areas reported having trouble
getting to their destinations and either waiting to leave their homes until the water
receded, switching routes, or using a different mode of transportation. One woman I
interviewed who did not have a car said, “Now I don’t have a car so I walk everywhere or
bike, and it definitely impacted me a lot…. If flooding was too bad sometimes I would
just opt not to go out….. for example, grocery shopping that day and I was like oh forget
it, I’ll wait until there’s no flooding. Which at some point you just give up and deal with
the flooding” (Renter 2, interview May 23, 2013). Another woman who was taking
classes at Miami Dade College downtown told me she had trouble getting through the
flooding on her scooter.
Last year I remember I missed two days of class because I couldn’t leave my
house. My car was broken and I was driving my scooter and I couldn’t leave my
house on my scooter or walking. So I was ready to leave to school and then-actually I left but I couldn’t leave the beach, I couldn’t get through either West or
Alton. It was a really bad traffic also, then I got up to there like a few blocks away
and then the water was really high and I couldn’t, I had to come back home.
(Renter 1, interview May 2, 2013)
A man told me that the flooding interrupted mail and deliveries, and that leaving the
building was a challenge. “On foot it was impossible unless you wanted to get wet, so I
left on bike or in car. People coming to visit was out of the question” (Owner 5, interview
March 14, 2013).
The loss of business was the main concern for many businesses in the areas most
susceptible to flooding. The grocery proprietor told me that before he bought the planks

96

he wasn’t as concerned if business dropped off for a few hours because people would
wait to come later. But when a large grocery chain moved in a few blocks away he
became worried that people would go to the other store instead of waiting, and so
purchased the planks to try to make it easier for people to enter the store. He claimed he
lost $4000 of business for every 4 hours the store was closed. Another business manager I
interviewed also felt the flooding prevented customers from coming into his store. I
chatted with him outside of the store one day as the water in the street was rising, and he
was starting to bring sandbags out. He was concerned because it was Halloween and he
was counting on being able to sell his Halloween merchandise to last minute customers,
since South Beach is known for being a popular spot for appearing in Halloween
costumes. A gym manager I interviewed described having to be flexible with his classes
since people would arrive late, and to alter his class workout routine which included
running out around the neighborhood. An employee at another grocery told me about
difficulties getting deliveries when the delivery area was flooded. He said the forklift
can’t drive in more than six inches of water, and deliveries won’t come if they know it’s
flooded. The store gets daily deliveries in the mornings, and getting late deliveries affects
tagging and getting items onto the shelf which can affect sales for a day and a half. Once,
when they weren’t able to get a delivery from a supplier before the supplier closed at
2pm, the product was not available. On the other hand, the store manager commented that
the flooding perhaps increased sales as people stocked up on items they were afraid they
might not be able to get if they couldn’t get to the store.
Many of these example show how flooding impacts businesses is based on their
location in the commercial landscape. Another such example is a dry cleaner located in
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an area that experienced frequent flooding in fall 2012. Normally, according to the
manager, dry cleaning picks up in November as customers come down for the winter and
start bringing in more costly items. But when we spoke in early December he said that
Because of the flooding our income was the same as in the summer until last
week. [Other nearby cleaners] weren’t flooded as much, so I assume people went
there. Loyal customers waited for us. But we saw the season wasn’t picking up
yet. In the season we make $55-70k a month, I’d say average $55k. It’s not just
more clothes or more people, but in the summer people have regular shirts, which
are cheaper. In the winter there are more dry cleaning clothes, dark clothes,
colors, coats, etc. and they cost more. In the summer we make $42k-$47 a month,
so there’s a $10k difference that we didn’t see till last week [when the flooding
stopped]. (Small Business 4, interview December 3, 2012)
Other costs were associated with physical damage. The most common complaint
was about damage to cars, which is a major concern in a neighborhood where most
residences do not have parking facilities and thousands of residents and visitors park on
the streets every day. Nearly every interviewee talked about seeing cars flooded, and
many were concerned about the damage to their cars from driving through salt water.
One interviewee said his mechanic told him he had rust damage under his car, but as the
rust occurs gradually it is difficult to quantify. The salt water also does damage to
electrical wiring in buildings and fixtures. After several days of flooding in late October I
observed a city work team repairing some wiring in a light pole, and spoke with one of
the workers who said “the wires get eaten out by the water, so we’ve got to replace them”
(October 29, 2012). I said that that must have happened on 11th too because I noticed the
lights were out last night. He said it was all over the city, and when I asked how often this
happens, he said every time there’s a high tide.
On the morning of October 27, as Hurricane Sandy was passing by off the coast
and the low-lying streets were under a foot of water, I was out taking observations and I
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came across a high rise condominium with a crowd of about 100 people standing outside,
appearing to be waiting. There was an alarm going off, so I asked a man sitting on the
curb what was going on and he said they had evacuated the building but he didn’t know
why. Another man came over and said he heard the electrical room had gotten flooded
because of the high tide. I asked another man standing next to me if he lived in the
building and he said yes, he had gotten home at 7am after working the night shift at the
airport with a cargo carrier. He didn’t know why they evacuated either. Two firefighters
walked by and told the building manager they could let people back in. I went around the
side of the building, which is directly on Biscayne Bay, and there was a fire truck and
two men guarding the entrance to the parking garage which sloped down under the
building. They told me not to go in because they were safety issues. The garage had about
one foot of water in it. I asked a man in a fire department shirt if this happened a lot and
he said not that often but it does happen. Another firefighter said with the high tide and
the full moon and the wind from the storm pushing the water on-shore, it made the water
really high. No one seemed particularly tense or upset, the strong wind from the storm
perhaps acting as a reminder that the damage could have been much worse.
Adaptations
Although occasional flooding has always been part of life on Miami Beach, the
frequency with which flooding is now occurring, and the growing recognition that this is
connected with sea level rise, means that responses to flooding are turning into
adaptations – new, non-temporary behaviors and changes to the built environment that
can be observed as people learn to adjust to the new reality.
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The most visible adaptations involve landscaping changes and physical changes to
property or methods for preventing water from intruding into buildings. One store had
installed new landscaping that was repeatedly inundated by the high tides, as shown in
Figure 14.

Figure 14: Flooded landscaping, October 28, 2012. Photo by author.
After the shrubbery and most of the trees eventually died, the landscaping was replaced
with rocks, as shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 15: Flood-proofed Landscaping, February 9, 2014. Photo by author.
By far the most common adaptations were sandbags, which were seen in front of
businesses and homes in areas susceptible to flooding and became more common as time
wore on. Some interviewees said that their landlord had provided the bags, and others had
purchased them or gotten them from the City. Some had them in storage and brought
them out when they saw the water rising in the streets, others left them in or near
entryways. I observed only two commercial buildings using metal flood barriers which
according to the City they are required to have by the building code. These barriers are
heavy and must be bolted down, requiring an electric drill. When I asked one small
business owner if he had these flood barriers and used them, he said “it would be a lot to
invest in something like that which fits on with a seal, and it wouldn't work well with the
stucco” (Small Business 7, December 19, 2013).
As the days of flooding continued, some of these adaptations took on a more
permanent character. Residents of the apartment building below initially placed a board
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over a place in the walkway that was often under water as shown in Figure 16. Later the
building manager built a wooden step, shown in Figure 17.

Figure 16: Board Over Flooded Walkway. May 23, 2012. Photo by author.

Figure 17: Wooden Step Over Walkway, October 17, 2012. Photo by author.
A store that opened in this location early in 2012 encountered its first flooding
problems that June with rain storms and higher tide levels. They brought out sandbags
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which were piled rather haphazardly against the door to prevent water from hitting the
base of the door, as in the photo below. By October they began arranging the bags in a
circle in front of the entrance which made it easier for people to step over and also meant
that the bags could be left in place between flood times. If the water rose higher they
would add a second layer of sandbags, which didn’t completely prevent water from
reaching the doors, but worked fairly well to prevent the major problem which was the
wave action created by cars driving by through the flooded street.

Figure 18: Sandbags Piled in Front of Store, June 8, 2012. Photo by author.

Figure 19: Sandbag Ring in Front of Store, October 27, 2012. Photo by author.

103

Although these physical adaptations became less temporary, residents and
businesses realize they are not really a permanent solution. Sandbags obviously interfere
with wheelchair access, and the makeshift walkways were not constructed according to
any code or permitting process. One owner recognized the problems with this, but felt he
had no choice. I asked him if the City had ever said anything about the walkway he made
for people to walk over, and he said no, never, and that he wouldn’t make any money if
he didn’t have it. I ask if anyone had ever gotten hurt using it and he said no, and that
“I’m taking a risk and I shouldn’t, but otherwise I couldn’t pay my bills” (Small Business
1, November 28, 2012).
Perceptions and Decision Making
In my interviews I also sought to understand how people perceive the flooding
and how that impacts their decision making. I asked whether they felt there had been any
change in the flooding they had seen since they had been on Miami Beach, what they
attributed the changes to, and whether this would influence their decision making in the
future about their business or residence. Given the small sample size I did not attempt to
correlate perceptions with individual politics or demographics, but rather to understand
how the flooding, its drivers and impacts were interpreted and the thought processes
about future decisions.
Perceptions of the flooding
The most predominant view among the interviewees and people I spoke with
while doing my observations was that flooding has always been a problem on Miami
Beach, particularly when it rains, but that it has gotten worse in the last several years. A
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business owner on Alton Road for 15 years said, “It started about three years ago. It gets
bad when there’s a lot of rain, worse than just high tide” (Small Business 5, interview
January 16, 2013). But in the last year the street flooding that came with the extreme high
tides made it obvious to nearly everyone that something was different, and that rain was
no longer the main driver of flooding. A homeowner who has lived in the same house in
the Flamingo Park neighborhood since the late 1980’s said,
The first rain—we would notice that the first rain of the season all the leaves
would go into the sewers and then things would back up…. But it seemed the City
would come around and clean all the sewers out, cause it was all the dead leaves,
and then they cleaned all the sewers out and it would go right back down. That
was the only time we noticed flooding back then….. If it rains at the same time as
one of those high tides that’s when you really have the problems. That’s the way
it was four, five, six years ago, but last year it seemed even worse, it was backing
up even without rain. (Owner 3, interview March 9, 2013)
Similarly, a renter who has lived in the same area for 6 years said,
I definitely feel like it floods more around here, around 10th and Alton especially
when it’s not raining. Like rain no longer seems to be the indicator of whether or
not it’s going to flood. So it can be a perfectly sunny day and day after day there
will be feet of water at that corner. (Renter 2, interview May 23, 2013)
Many recalled the June 2009 flood when most of the neighborhood was under two to
three feet of water for several hours as the time when they first noticed the flooding, such
as this condo owner who had bought in the early 2000’s,
Well it seemed to jump to a new place then. A new kind of flooding that we
hadn’t seen before…. That flood was so big and then maybe there was 1-2 after
that that had an impact, maybe not such an impact because that was sort of a
shocker. But it’s not like each time it gets worse and worse. I mean I haven’t
noticed that. We’ve already seen it so it’s not a shock now. (Owner 2, interview
March 31, 2013)
However this view was by no means a consensus. I spoke with people who
insisted that the flooding had always been just as bad, some who claimed it had actually
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improved, and some who were hardly aware of it. One day when I was making notes in
front of the grocery with the planks, a man crossed over the plank, looked at my rubber
boots and said, “you’re well prepared, did something break?” “No,” I say, “it’s high
tide.” “Really?” He says. “I’ve lived here seven years and I’ve never seen it like this”
(October 16, 2012). Although that seems hard to believe that people would not have
noticed the flooding or not understand where it comes from given the data on tide levels,
it is possible that the intermittent and localized nature of the flooding, and residents
general experience with the Florida climate may explain the apparent ignorance of
flooding and its drivers. It is possible that the man who had lived in Miami Beach for
seven years and not noticed the flooding lived on a street that does not experience
significant tidal flooding, that he had not happened to be in flooded locations during high
tide events, and if he did see water in the streets he may have attributed it to rain. In
Florida’s sub-tropical climate it is not an uncommon experience to enter a building when
the street is dry and the sun is shining, and come out an hour later to find the sun still
shining but the street wet because of a twenty minute rain shower.
There did not seem to be a correlation between perceptions of the flooding and
how long someone had lived or worked in the area. Two people I spoke with who had
worked on Miami Beach for over twenty-five years, insisted that it had always been like
this, that it has not gotten worse. One actually stated that it had gotten better, due to
improvements made by the City, and it is true that the City has completed projects which
made significant efforts to improve drainage in several sections of the City. While
another woman who has lived in the same apartment for fifteen years but had just
returned after being away for the last four years, said she didn’t ever remember the
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flooding in the past. These different perceptions point to the difficulties of perceiving
gradual long term change, particularly for an intermittent phenomenon.
But with more experience with flooding, more media coverage and more
conversation happening among locals, people were learning. Knowledge was spreading
by word of mouth, and business owners were having conversations with their customers
about the flooding. One business manager said, “At first we didn’t know where it came
from. The first couple days it was raining, and we thought it was the rain. But then there
was no rain and the street was still flooded, and the customers were making comments”
(Small Business 4, interview December 3, 2012). When I asked another business
manager how he made the connection between the flooding and the tides, he said “We
just figured it out. It will be flooded and there won’t be a drop of rain. And it happens
twice a day” (Small Business 6, interview December 14, 2013). People began to notice
increased media coverage as well. I observed TV news trucks filming the flooded
intersection of 10th Street and Alton at least three times, but only one interview subject
made reference to media coverage, in this exchange I had with a homeowner couple in an
interview,
Homeowner 1: It’s very recent that it’s become common knowledge and
perceptible.
Homeowner 2: Yeah last year was when people really started talking about it.
Emily: How did you notice that?
Homeowner 2: Because we were part of it, everybody just started, all of us that
live on the beach, we have a lot of friends here,
Homeowner 1: Well also the Herald, the local paper is covering it more. (Owner
3, interview March 9, 2013)
But despite all the disruptions, somewhat surprisingly the majority of people I
spoke with said the flooding didn’t bother them very much, and very few expressed any
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strong emotions about it. The few who did express strong emotions felt that the City
should be doing more, such as a woman who told me, “This is a rich city [gesturing at the
buildings around] why don’t they do something? They say it comes from the Bay but I
don’t believe it because it smells” (August 20, 2012). But the predominant attitude was
one of “dealing with it.” When I asked one resident if the flooding bothered her, she said
“not really” and explained that she’d just walk down the sidewalk by the park, and jump
over the flooding or take off her shoes if she had to (Owner 2, interview March 31, 2013).
Another one said that when the tide is high “you have to wait a little to go out and it goes
down. You relax. Every neighborhood has its problems. It doesn’t bother me” (Renter 4,
interview February 7, 2013). Several people explained this attitude as a feature of a
Miami Beach mentality, as one business owner said, “Miami Beach residents are tough
people, it reminds me the most of NY of any place I’ve been in the U.S. They’re like
yeah it’s flooded (shrugs shoulders) but they still come in” (Large Business 2, interview
February 5, 2013). A resident put it this way, “It’s a Miami thing, people just deal with
crap. It’s not a very political city, not like San Francisco, because it’s a transient place to
live” (Owner 4, interview February 14, 2013). This reference to politics shows an
ambivalence about what can be done about the flooding. One business owner said that
you have to deal with it because “Well there’s nothing else you can do. I got frustrated, it
was like 3 weeks straight, and it seemed like forever. But what can you do?” (Small
Business 6, interview December 14, 2013).
The link between perceptions of flooding and climate change or sea level rise is
complex. Not everyone I interviewed connected the flooding with rising sea levels, and
those who did had differing beliefs about what was causing it and what could be done
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about it on Miami Beach. Those who paid attention to science and politics immediately
connected the flooding to sea level rise, like the business owner who said he “supported
Al Gore 100%” (Small Business 1, interview November 28, 2012) or the middle class
condo owner who said that he “read a lot and listen to NPR, so I thought it could be
related to sea level rise and climate change” (Renter 1, interview May 2, 2013). But for
others the connection was not clear, due to lack of familiarity with the link between
climate change and sea level rise or to doubt about the connection between sea level rise,
tides, and the drainage system. I asked a business manager if he connected the flooding
with climate change or sea level rise, and he said “It could be— but it hasn’t rained and
it’s flooded more, and it doesn’t make sense how a high tide could cause that much
flooding. It’s hard to know, it’s not my area” (Small Business 5, interview January 16,
2013). A renter I spoke with, when I asked if she knew where the flooding was coming
from, said “It’s hard not to imagine that to some degree it’s related to sea level rise, but
also I know the drainage systems here are problematic” (Renter 2, interview May 23,
2013).
Concern about sea level rise meant that many were skeptical that the proposed
projects to fix the flooding by improving the drainage infrastructure would work. When I
told one business manager that that the city has plans to fix the street, she said, “last year
the city installed a big pipe under the street. They’ve tried two to three times, but they
can’t do anything. The only solution would be to raise the buildings” (April 30, 2013).
When I explained the pumping stations to a homeowner she said, “Where are you going
to pump the water? If you pump it out it will just come back in.” A resident said, “as little
as I understand, the water is higher than the land, so I don’t know what they’re going to
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do” (Renter 3, interview February 6, 2013). Nevertheless many still wanted the City to do
something, such as one condo owner who called the City and said, “That’s it I’ve had
enough of this. What are you guys doing about the flooding? You need to do something.
We can’t live like this. It’s every day” (Owner 5, interview March 14, 2013). Business
owners were particularly frustrated, such as one store owner who had been complaining
to the City for years. “I’m a simple person. I pay a lot of taxes, property tax, federal, state
sales tax. I create jobs. It’s so frustrating. I can’t fight the city. I can’t get tenants. People
see the water. I’ve been trying to sell this corner for two years but can’t because of the
water” (Small business 1, interview November 28, 2013).
Those who did not believe in sea level rise caused by climate change still
frequently felt that the situation was ultimately not sustainable because development on
the island was fighting “nature.” One woman referred to the construction of the beaches
by the Army Corps of Engineers in the 1980’s and said, “In 1982-83 walking on Ocean
Drive you could feel the ocean spray. Then the government fixed the beach, they pushed
the water back, and that’s not natural. When a problem comes the sand goes up and goes
down again, its nature” (Renter 4, interview February 7, 2013). An employee at a
business that closed its doors regularly when the streets were flooded said “its nature, and
you can’t do anything about it. It’s the ocean. If a hurricane comes, it will take everything
away. The city can’t do anything about it, we just have to get used to it and if anyone
doesn’t like it they should leave Miami Beach. The only solution is to shut my door”
(April 30, 2013).
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Decision Making
Given the disruptions caused by flooding, the concerns about sea level rise and
doubts about the ability of the City to deal with these problems one might expect people
to be thinking about leaving the area. However very few people I spoke with, particularly
business owners, had considered the possibility of moving. Every business I interviewed
said they had a terrific location and could not imagine relocating. “You couldn’t make up
a location this great,” one store manager told me. When I asked about the possibility of
relocating he said “We might make changes, but Miami Beach would have to be under
water before we’d relocate” (Large Business 2, interview February 5, 2013). Even
businesses that knew about the flooding beforehand still chose their location. A small
business owner told me, “We get high foot traffic and high visibility. It’s a great
location.” When I asked if they had known about the flooding beforehand, would they
still have chosen this location, he said, “Definitely. The rainy season is only six months
and how many times does it really rain that hard and flood? The other businesses around
here are thriving and dealing with it, so we thought we’d be ok. We knew it was the
lowest point on the beach and was susceptible to flooding.” When I asked if he would
consider relocating, he said, “No. Space like this is hard to find on Miami Beach. We’ve
established ourselves and everybody recognizes us and knows where we are. It’s cheaper
to keep it here” (Small Business 6, interview December 14, 2013).
Similarly, a large national chain built a store on leased land even though they
were aware that the parcel experienced flooding. The developer of the project said
accommodating the flooding went into the design of the new store, which was raised as
much as possible while still being ADA compliant. The store replaced an old apartment
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building which had been severely impacted by the flooding, which the new building was
better able to handle. As for concerns about the future, he said
I have not spoken to one person who has based any investment strategy on rising
tides. It’s almost like there’s no real consensus, there sort of a belief that the tides
are rising but there’s no real consensus in the business community about when it’s
going to happen and the effect it’s going to have. So therefore people don’t, they
ignore it. (FIU School of Architecture Symposium, March 14, 2013)
For some, the type of business and business regulations played a role in their
desire to stay put. When I asked the manager of a highly regulated business if he would
consider moving he said no, because the location is great. “It could get worse and I still
wouldn’t move,” he said. “[My business] isn’t like a clothing store, you can’t put them
anywhere.” I said to him, what if I told you the predictions were for two feet of sea level
rise in fifty years would that impact your decisions any? “That’s a lot,” he said, “but what
would that mean?” I said the water would be about two feet higher. “Sometimes it’s that
high now,” he said. “It doesn’t scare me, I can’t move” (Small Business 5, interview
January 16, 2013).
For other businesses the amount of sunk costs involved in establishing the
business means that moving is out of the question. One small business owner told me,
“People ask me, with the flooding why stay? Because getting a business open on the
Beach is a nightmare to consider moving. It took six months to open between the City
and the County, the impact studies, they wanted to study traffic flow, etc. It took $60,000
to open, six months rent with the doors closed” (Small business 7, interview December
19, 2013). Even the prospect of rising costs for dealing with the flooding didn’t change
his mind. When I said that the pumping projects might increases costs for water and
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sewer and asked if that would affect his decision making, and he said “No, I’m pretty
much stuck here. I’ve just got to pay for everything.”
But even the owner who was most concerned about rising sea level told me that
he was sixty years old and didn’t want to move. He came to the U.S. in 1982, to West
Palm Beach and learned the grocery business. In 1989 he had a business on Collins Ave.
and then he rented the space where the market is now, which was empty at the time. He
rented for two years and then bought the building – the owner gave him a good price.
“It’s a great location,” he said, “I’m doing fine, I’m supporting my family.” But he sees
the flooding getting worse and is frustrated by lack of action from the City. He owns
several businesses and has been trying to sell one for two years, but can’t, he says,
because of the water. I ask if that’s really the reason, and he says, “Yes, if people are
going to buy they do research.” He said, “We don’t mind paying more taxes, but they
need to fix the problem. These properties are my retirement plan. I’m in my sixties, I’d
like to slow down but I have to support my kids and I don’t want to sell for nothing.” I
tell him that some scientists have predicted for this area two feet by 2060, and he says
yes, that would be under water. I ask if that would change any decisions he makes about
his business, and he says “I don’t know, I don’t think too much about it. This is my home,
I love it, my kids love it, I have no plans to move. It’s beautiful here, who would want to
leave?” (Small Business 1, interview November 28, 2012).
I found only two businesses who said the flooding might impact their decision
making. One was a restaurant manager who did feel that his business had been impacted
by the flooding, and said that if he had known about the flooding before renting the space
he would still have wanted to rent but would have tried to bargain for reduced rent or a
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relief clause in case they can’t open because of the flooding. The other was a young man
who had just become manager of a business and had already spoken to the owner about
buying it. I asked if the flooding would be a factor in his decision to buy, and he said no,
it’s a good business. Then I referred to a comment he had made earlier about a customer
who had mentioned a newspaper article saying that Miami Beach would be under water
in thirty years, but he said, “I haven’t thought much about it. I’d have to look into it and
think about how much I’d need to invest in order to sell in a few years, or if it would last
longer” (Small Business 4, interview December 3, 2012).
For businesses, location is primarily about the economics of return on investment,
but for residents it is more complicated. The economics are important, but so are quality
of life, particularly ties to the community, being near the water, and being able to get
around without a car. Having easy access to transportation, the supermarket, and work
was important to people across the income spectrum. A low-income woman who had
rented for fifteen years in a building that often experienced flooding said “I love it here,
that’s why I don’t move. It’s so easy because the bus is right there, the supermarket, and
work. The only thing they should do is take care of the traffic, it’s horrible” (Renter 3,
interview February 6, 2013). A middle aged homeowner who had relocated from the
northeast said, “We looked off the beach a lot when we were looking to buy and it just,
we were so spoiled by living on the beach and being able to walk everywhere and having
the water and so, I just didn’t want to go back to commuting lifestyle again. But that said,
I go off the beach to work but still” (Owner 2, interview March 31, 2013). A renter told
me, “I love the location, I love being between Lincoln Rd. and I take the bus a lot too so
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it’s nice to be a block from Alton. But it’s also sort of a quiet neighborhood, it feels like a
quiet neighborhood and I love being on the water” (Renter 2, interview May 23, 2013).
How economic considerations interplayed with other considerations was different
for renters and homeowners. An elderly woman I interviewed had lived in the
neighborhood since the early 1990’s, and was now disabled and received assistance from
her neighbors and friends who stopped by to visit her every day. “A long time ago it
came in and flooded, a little, not too much. The manager cleaned the water out and came
and helped me because my legs are not too good and I’m alone, so they look after me.
I’ve been here fourteen years, it’s a quiet neighborhood. I like it” (Renter 4, interview
February 7, 2013). But she recognizes that because she has a housing subsidy through the
Section 8 program she has to live “wherever the government sends me. Now prices are
very high, one apartment is $900, I can’t pay it.” In 1993 she recalls, “a one bedroom
just like this was $450.”
A middle-class renter who loved much of what the neighborhood had to offer was
also worried about being priced out of the neighborhood. For that reason she has thought
about buying, but had concerns about sea level rise.
I have really mixed feelings about it, and part of it is because of sea level rise, the
projections are daunting. So I kind of feel like, first of all I feel like I could very
well get priced out of the neighborhood so that would be a smart reason to buy.
But I’m not one hundred percent sure that I want to stay here long term, I think I
probably will but I’m not convinced enough. And the problem is that if you buy
and there’s significant sea level rise then your investment won’t be very good. So
yeah that part of it definitely gives me pause. It’s not the only reason I haven’t
bought a place but it’s something I think about when I think about buying a place.
(Renter 2, interview May 23, 2013)
But she also emphasized what she liked about living on Miami Beach and the changes
that had been happening recently in Miami.
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I feel like Miami’s becoming a more interesting place, and that the
neighborhood’s becoming more interesting. With the New World Symphony and
the Wallcast, things like Panther Coffee on the beach, the kinds of things that
people like me like…. I like Miami Beach a lot, I like the City I think it’s a good
city and they do good things with their tax dollars. I love Flamingo Park and the
great pool that I swim in, and stuff like that. So I just think it’s a place that is very
livable for me and I enjoy it, so I definitely think about that and I imagine that if I
don’t buy a place I’ll end up getting priced out… but again, in ten years are the
infrastructure problems going to be so significant that it becomes a much harder
place to live? So it’s definitely a question. (Renter 2, interview May 23, 2013)
But if rent went up too much on Miami Beach, she didn’t feel like there were other
options in the area. “If I got priced out of the neighborhood I probably won’t move off
the beach, I probably wouldn’t live in Miami anymore” (Renter 2, interview May 23,
2013).
Similarly homeowners I interviewed had many things they loved about the
neighborhood but were also concerned with property values as well. The owner of a
condo since the early 2000’s said she wouldn’t move until her teenage daughter finished
high school, but that “flooding definitely impacts how I think about the beach long term.
I don’t want to watch our apartment dissolve, I don’t want it to lose its value and then we
have nothing so you know. In four to five years I can imagine selling it or moving on. I
can live with the flooding now because we’ve done it for so long, it’s just, you know all
indications look like it’s going to get worse” (Owner 2, interview March 31, 2013). But
the high degree of uncertainty makes it impossible to time this decision. Another
homeowner couple who had lived in the same house since the early 1980’s said they had
thought recently about selling, but had no immediate plans to. When I told them that the
SFRCCC was developing an action plan for transportation, infrastructure, and other
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aspects of climate adaptation and had issued projections for two feet of sea level rise by
2060 we had the following exchange:
Homeowner 1: Shit. Two feet, I mean that’s terrible in terms of South Beach
we’re at one or two feet above sea level as it is, so if it’s two feet as an average
and then you get these flooding events it’s going to be a mess. Like Venice. Yeah,
we’re trying to get out of here.
Emily: Are you really?
Homeowner 1: Well not trying right now, but we talk about it.
Homeowner 2: We think about it, we have thought about it, especially when the
flooding happens. It does spark conversation around here.
Emily: Would you want to go somewhere else on South Beach or go completely
off the beach or…
Homeowner 1: Our savings are tied in this house you know, so we would want to
be able to leave before the real estate value would go down. At a certain point it
will become inevitable and no one’s going to want to buy here because it’s, you
would assume, because you don’t want to buy swamp land. So we joke about
selling the next time it reaches its maximum and before—you’re saying it’s 2060?
Emily: That’s what the projection says.
Homeowner 1: So that’s in fifty years. Well we won’t be alive.
Homeowner 2: We’ll be long gone.
From there the conversation turned to weighing the pros and cons of their current location
and the uncertainty of trying to decide where they might move.
Homeowner 1: It’s not that we want to live in an urban environment but we like to
have access to culture. But a good mix of culture and certain critical mass of
people but at the same time access to nature. So here the nature you have, South
Florida’s beautiful and we have the water and so we can ride our bike to the
beach, so somewhere like that. But I guess it wouldn’t be coastal again. So—
Homeowner 2: If we move we’re not going to move coastal. For sure.
Homeowner 1: Well nothing’s for sure.
Homeowner 2: Pretty much that is part of the conversation.
Homeowner 1: Well there are coasts where there are mountains right up on the
coast. If your only concern is sea level rising—but we talk—
At this point I asked why they would want to leave the coast, and the conversation
continued:
Homeowner 2: We feel like, global warming is a real issue. And it’s going to get
worse. And if we do make a move, we’d rather move somewhere where we’re not
really going to have to worry about it.
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Homeowner 1: Well that’s not the only thing that global warming will change is
the sea level. It’s hard to anticipate where the weather will be relatively stable and
hurricanes don’t come or, it’s hard to—if it changes, continues to change so
dramatically all bets are off, it’s like very nerve-wracking. It’s like the anxiety of
the unknown, until now was always known. Well if you go to South Florida it’s
going to be warm and humid or if you go to, whatever, and you knew what to
expect there. But now it seems like, at least in my mind, it’s hard to anticipate
what the weather pattern will be somewhere in ten to twenty years. It may not be
at all like what it is now.
Homeowner 2: But I think that’s what I’m really saying is that lately we have real
conversations about global warming and the effects of it and that they’re going to,
that we will feel the effects of it. Or we don’t really know whether we will or not,
but it could. It could escalate and who really knows, you can’t really say with
certainty oh that won’t happen for years because nobody really knows. Is it going
to be years or you already can see climate change. And it’s pretty apparent in the
last couple of years it’s been really apparent. I mean the weather has changed, the
climate here is completely different than it used to be. (Owner 3, interview March
9, 2013).
This exchange shows that the value of the investment in property is a great concern for
homeowners, and protecting it is of utmost importance. But there is not yet enough
information available to make an accurate assessment of the risk that sea level rise poses
to that investment, and especially not when weighed against the other considerations such
as quality of life and connection to a community that one likes and a home one has lived
in for decades. At first the amount of projected sea level rise is a shock, but then the 50
year timeframe seems to ameliorate the concern. Still, the magnitude of the uncertainty
quickly enters the conversation, that weather changes are occurring everywhere, and
nowhere seems safe. The discussion ends without a resolution.
Cost of living was on the minds of renters, but for homeowners interestingly it did
not figure very much into our conversations. Insurance was the main complaint, and
everyone said that windstorm insurance had been going up and they were frustrated by
that. But not many had concerns about flood insurance or about other increases in the cost
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of living like property taxes or utilities. One condo owner did say, “Buildings are
helpless,” he says, “it’s bigger than us and there’s not much we can do. It’s going to be
expensive” (Owner 4, interview February 14, 2013). But when I discussed the storm
water plan with one condo owner he was unconcerned about the cost, “I don’t think the
City of Miami Beach is broke by any means. I think there’s plenty of money there to be
used. They’re using it for beautification and all these other extraneous things which are
nice but they’re not important. This is important” (Owner 5, interview January 16, 2013).
When I said that storm water utility fees would likely go up, and perhaps taxes as well
due to the issuance of bonds, he replied, “I know that my taxes really haven’t changed
throughout these years. I pay more or less the same property tax every year that I have
been. There were even a couple years there that we got a rebate, we got like a $200 or
$300 rebate on the taxes. That’s what I mean, I think the city’s doing ok.” He was more
concerned about the impacts of dealing with construction in the neighborhood than he
was with the cost. This is quite different from the opinion of resident activists on climate
change, who, as I will show in the next chapter, believe the cost of climate change
adaptation will be one of the most important decision factors for Miami Beach residents.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have described and analyzed the impacts of urban flooding that
Miami Beach is currently experiencing, and how residents and businesses are perceiving,
reacting and adapting to these impacts. The dominant, though not consensus, opinion is
that the flooding has gotten worse in recent years, and this is borne out by an analysis of
water height data which shows that the four years with the most hours of significant

119

flooding have occurred over the last six years. Changing water levels makes it difficult to
know which measure to rely on. My work is an attempt to derive a socially significant
measure. 2012 was a particularly bad year, due to Hurricane Sandy and to generally
elevated water levels throughout the year. October and November saw several weeks
straight of flooded streets in low-lying sections of South Beach, prompting residents and
businesses to adjust to disruptions in their lives and businesses, and to create physical
methods to cope with the impact of the flooding, some of which became semi-permanent
or took on a learned character.
However even with the direct experience with increasing flooding, and even
though most believe it is connected with sea level rise, knowledge of climate change and
its potential impacts on Miami Beach was still minimal. Residents and businesses mostly
just “dealt with it,” and were just beginning to incorporate climate change into their
decision making, although it was not clear how to do so. For businesses, particularly
small businesses, relocation is not an option. For some, the cost of moving is prohibitive.
For others, their business is tied to the location, and simply wouldn’t work anywhere else.
For all, the economics at present are that flooding is not nearly costly enough to prompt
consideration of relocation. At present climate change is not a factor in business decision
making, but we can start to see the calculus that will come into play as knowledge of sea
level rise increases. How will sea level rise impact the timeframe for the return on
investment? Will it increase risk to the point where values start to come down? How will
this affect the intergenerational transfer of assets, thus both the retirement security of an
older generation and the level of risk taken on by the younger?
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For homeowners, there is no formula for a “return on investment” but we can start
to see a calculus that weighs cost and risk versus quality of life. Renters may have more
flexibility, but also face rising costs, and those who have lived on Miami Beach a long
time have seen housing costs more than double in fifteen years. As costs of living on the
coast go up, the cost of insurance and the cost of infrastructure upgrades and protection
will increase the cost of living further. However the coast itself, the proximity to the
water, is only one part of Miami Beach’s attractiveness. For many people the ease of
getting around and the community connections are the more important factors.
Vulnerability concerns are different for renters and property owners. Owners are
concerned about the value of their property and losing their investments or savings.
Renters are not facing that loss but still have to deal with increasing costs, and the
development of Miami Beach over the last few decades shows that rising rents are an
important concern for renters, the choice being either to simply spend more on rent, look
for subsidized housing, or leave the area. An important exception is that business owners
who may not own the property nevertheless have significant money invested in
improvements to the property that cannot readily be transferred, and this is especially a
burden for small self-employed businesses. Even if the business could physically be
relocated, for those which tailored their business to serve the customer base in a
particular location relocation would essentially mean starting over.
This ethnography of the early impacts of sea level rise shows that awareness is
starting to grow and people are beginning to connect it with their situation but are not
really sure what they’re factoring in, not really sure what’s changed and what it means.
Although businesses are not thinking about relocating, residents who are attuned to
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information about sea level rise express concern about the future of the area. Even for
those who have lived in the area for a long time and experienced flooding and hurricanes,
the experience of the last several years with increased flooding plus the knowledge that
sea level is rising combines to make them question the future. The people I spoke with
were for the most part not plugged in to local government or planning processes around
climate change, and those who were concerned about sea level rise seemed to feel
isolated, anxious about the uncertainty and unclear about the proper course of action. The
structure of governance and public participation on climate change adaptation is the
subject of my next chapter.
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CHAPTER V – ADAPTATION PLANNING
In the last chapter I focused on impacts and adaptation to sea level rise by
individual households and businesses. I described the physical drivers of flooding in
Miami Beach, the impacts on urban life for residents and businesses, perceptions of the
flooding and the connection with climate change. These data show the un-coordinated
responses which can be seen as coping strategies or as the beginning of autonomous
adaptation. But as impacts have become more apparent and more disruptive, collective
and institutional responses have emerged as well. In this chapter I will focus on the
emergence of collective adaptation in Miami Beach by analyzing a City storm water
infrastructure planning process. By examining the use of accelerated sea level rise
projections in the design and planning process and the responses of resident activists, I
show how different perspectives and values shape emerging adaptation efforts. I argue
these conflicting logics highlight important challenges for an iterative or “adaptive
management” approach to sea level rise in a highly urbanized context.

Adaptation Planning in Miami Beach
While actions of the Compact at the regional level create momentum for climate
change adaptation planning, the work of implementing adaptation projects largely falls to
local governments, the counties and cities. The City of Miami Beach began a storm water
master planning process in 2009 which included projections for accelerated sea level rise,
the first municipality in the region and perhaps the country, to do so. But as this case
study illustrates, climate adaptation planning challenges traditional infrastructure
planning processes in several ways. The strategies needed to protect low-lying coastal
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areas from sea level rise present large costs above and beyond normal capital budgets,
and trigger deeper thinking about the longevity of the investment. The lack of guidance
on adaptation strategies and standards from higher levels of government means coastal
communities are left on their own to deal with long-term planning issues that go beyond
the traditional bounds of city level planning.
These issues became apparent as a group of resident activists emerged to
challenge Miami Beach’s Storm Water Management Master Planning (SWMMP)
process. In this section I explore the nature of the conflict and the different “logics” held
by stakeholders, by which I mean the different attitudes and beliefs about the nature of
the threat and the best course of action. These conflicting logics reveal some of the major
fault lines in climate adaptation, but are also rooted in locally specific debates. Two main
camps emerged, the City as leader and implementer of the infrastructure plan, and a
group of resident activists with close ties to environmentalism, climate science and local
development politics. The City took a pragmatic, managerial approach based on a
traditional infrastructure planning process but included sea level rise projections as a
proactive step, a sign that climate change is becoming mainstreamed into government
operations. The resident activists however challenged the city’s efforts as inadequate to
deal with the major challenges that sea level rise presents for the City, and took the
process as an opportunity to voice fears and frustrations over the slow pace of action on
climate change and the direction of development in the city in general.
What is unique about this case study is that Miami Beach’s particular context—its
political character, its economic base, its geography and geology—created a situation
where local activists, instead of opposing climate adaptation based on a denial mindset as
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was happening at the time in other parts of the country, called for more and different
action based on the belief that sea level rise will ultimately overwhelm the City within a
relatively short time frame. This presented a challenge not just for traditional
infrastructure planning but also to accepted frameworks and strategies for climate change
adaptation, not only from a technical standpoint but also from the standpoint of providing
the certainty and security expected from a major city. When incremental adaptation meets
its limits, whether they are physical or social, then a transition or transformation is called
for (Kates, Travis and Wilbanks, 2012). Miami Beach is a city on the edge of
transformative change, and it provides a compelling case to study the complex interface
of science and decision making.
Sustainability
Climate change, although it affects multiple sectors of government operations,
tends to fall within the scope of environmental concerns. Like other cities with
environmentally conscious citizens and staff, Miami Beach had a growing interest in
sustainability. In 2007 the City formed an Ad-hoc Green Committee, which in 2009
became the Sustainability Committee—a permanent committee made up of citizen
volunteers who’s “role was to identify and promote policies and practices within the City
to help achieve a sustainable environment” (Analysis of Evaluation and Appraisal Report
2010). Each commissioner appointed a member of the committee, and several of the
members were leaders of local environmental organizations. The committee was chaired
by a sitting commissioner, and it met monthly to review items referred by the
Commission as well as serving as a forum for discussion on other sustainability related
issues brought by citizens. The committee was staffed by the Environmental Resources
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Division of the Public Works Department which had a staff of two plus one intern. The
major staff responsibilities were dealing with water quality issues related to runoff into
Biscayne Bay, and maintaining and restoring the dune system along the beaches.
In 2009 the staff led the Sustainability Committee through the process of creating
a comprehensive Sustainability Plan which included ten program areas: Green Building
and Housing, Solid Waste Management, Water Conservation and Quality, Energy
Conservation, Alternative Transportation, Natural Resources & Ecosystem Management,
Community Outreach and Participation, Green Procurement, Economic Development and
Planning, and Air Quality & Climate Change. The plan was framed as a response to
climate change, as indicated in the introductory paragraph, “Recent research points to
scientific consensus on potential changes to our local environment related to global
climate change,” and elsewhere, “The City of Miami Beach may be especially vulnerable
to some of these changes given its location, elevation, and strong economic and social
ties to a healthy environment” (Sustainability Plan 2011, 2). The plan lists goals and
recommendations linking the reduction of greenhouse gasses with reduced climate
impacts on Miami Beach.
The use of fossil fuel emits GHG’s that contribute to climate change, reduce air
quality and affect the health of residents. Future impacts of climate change, such
as sea-level rise, may affect the health of residents. Future impacts of climate
change, such as sea-level rise, may affect quality of life and property within the
city as well. By reducing GHG emissions where possible, the City of Miami
Beach can meaningfully contribute to local air quality and the avoidance or
reduction of anticipated climate change impacts (21).
It calls for reducing the city’s carbon footprint in order to “decrease the risk or severity of
climate change impacts, such as storm-related flooding, sea-level rise, and frequency of
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extreme weather events such as hurricanes, and extreme temperatures and/or
precipitation” (21).
The plan was unanimously adopted by the Commission in January 2011, making
it official City policy. It doesn’t distinguish between climate “mitigation” and
“adaptation” although most of the initiatives related to climate change would fall under
what would typically be considered “climate mitigation,” that is, efforts to reduce
greenhouse gasses. It lists two initiatives that would typically fall under adaptation, the
SWMMP which was already underway, and a possible future initiative to explore the
Florida Building Code “for adaptivity to sea-level change.” This plan reflects the focus of
the Sustainability Committee, which was working mostly on issues that would fall under
mitigation or environmental quality such as passing a recycling ordinance, establishing an
Energy Economic Zone, and environmental education activities. Although several
committee members attended the public meetings about the SWMMP, it was not an issue
the committee took up or discussed in any detail, and the only time the committee
formally weighed in on storm water issues was to recommend that plans for the
convention center renovation include underground water storage capacity. Thus while the
committee was the officially recognized voice of sustainability for the City, it was not an
active leader on climate change adaptation.
The Boundary Condition
Miami Beach began experiencing the effects of sea level rise earlier than most
other areas of the region, and from 2009 to 2012 undertook a storm water management
master planning process to deal with the increased flooding the City was experiencing.
Sea level rise that had already occurred in the last 80 years had begun to overwhelm the
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1930’s era drainage system and cause water to back up into city streets more frequently
during extreme high tides. In 2009 when Miami Beach began the SWMMP process
climate change was an intensely politicized topic at the national level, but was only
beginning to be discussed at the local level, and very few resources were available to
local governments to assist with climate adaptation planning. Miami Beach thus took a
standard infrastructure planning approach, with the additional step of including
accelerated sea level rise projections. The goal of the new plan was to improve the City’s
ability to deal with flooding, but it was not initially conceived of as a climate change
adaptation project.
The impetus for the new plan came from the gradually increasing flooding events
impacting the city, and from several large flooding events in 2009. Although the City had
not been keeping data on flooding events, the increasingly frequent events had been
noticed by Public Works officials, who are responsible for maintaining the drainage
system. One long-time staff member said,
I’ve been with the city close to 15 years and little by little I’ve seen more flooding
due to high tides rising…. Every year we say it’s getting higher and higher. We
see it because we didn’t see it a couple years ago, like Dade Boulevard, right here
in Miami Beach High School, which is Collins Canal. Right now we’re building a
brand new sea wall. It’s going to be like a sidewalk, bicycle, pedestrian but when
years and years ago I never used to see Collins Canal, the water coming out into
Dade Boulevard. Now it is, so that tells you something (Administration Official 1,
interview June 5, 2012)
Noticing these gradual but steady changes led the city to take actions to address
high tide flooding in the areas they had observed that were particularly prone to it.
Beginning in 2007 Public Works began to address high tide flooding in low-lying areas
by installing tide-flex valves, or “backflow preventers” onto outfalls. According to City
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Public Works officials these were expensive and not foolproof however, and in some
locations where drain pipes were cracked water flowed into low-lying places on the
streets anyway. The valves could also do nothing to prevent flooding from extremely
heavy rains that coincided with high tides. The existing storm water plan, in place since
1997, was not primarily designed to address flooding at all, let alone high tide flooding. It
had been created as a requirement for a state permit that dealt with eliminating pollutants
from runoff into Biscayne Bay (SWMMP 2011). The plan was based on water quality
standards, flooding potential, City staff rankings, and complaints but was limited in scope
and by 2009 was technologically out of date (SWMMP 2011). In addition to beginning
their own planning, Public Works officials said they had also begun sending pictures of
high tide flooding on Alton Road to the Florida Department of Transportation which had
jurisdiction over the right-of-way, which had some of the worst spots in the city. In 2009
FDOT began planning for drainage improvements on Alton Road, and ultimately settled
on a plan to install 3 pumps under the southern end of the road where flooding was most
frequent and disruptive.
In the year 2009 the City experienced several significant flooding events which
caused officials to propose the development of a new SWMMP to upgrade to the
drainage system. A major storm on June 5, 2009 dumped 9.88” of rain on the city in a
matter of hours, just before high tide, which caused streets to be flooded with 2-3’ of
water for several hours until the tide receded. Then in September 2009 the city
experienced unusual high tide flooding in several low-lying locations such as the Alton
Rd. and 10th St. intersection. In a memo from City administration to the Commission
from September 18, 2009, the City administration proposed to the commission that a new
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storm water management study be conducted and a new system designed, which would
use new LiDAR technology and result in a more comprehensive and cohesive plan. The
letter also included mention of sea level rise, stating “sea level rise… may be
exacerbating the effects of seasonal high tides” and cited a talk by University of Miami
geology professor Hal Wanless, one of the most quoted local climate change experts. The
letter indicates that staff was “investigating the feasibility of commissioning a
technical/scientific study that will analyze the impacts of sea level rise from the past
decades and the potential impacts to our City in the future” (Letter to commission on
seasonal flooding, September 18, 2009).
As I have described elsewhere, despite the fact that in 2009 climate change was
an extremely politically charged issue in national politics during this period, at this point
there was not widespread awareness of potential climate change impacts or planning
activities in South Florida. The mention of sea level rise in Miami Beach public
documents aroused no notice or comment from the public. I found no hint of criticism of
the SWMP from a climate-skeptic point of view either in public forums, media
references, or any of the interviews I conducted with city leaders. The fact that this was
around the same time as other localities in the country were experiencing backlash for
incorporating sea level rise projections into coastal planning (Rawlins 2012) made the
lack of opposition in Miami Beach somewhat surprising. One official I interviewed
attributed the lack of opposition to the generally liberal political environment of Miami
Beach, and to rational economic thinking. “Miami Beach isn’t your typical place in South
Florida, it’s a little more progressive, a little more forward looking. I’d heard, I don’t
know if this number is true or not, there’s like $23 billion in private property here in
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Miami Beach. And I think if you’re a property owner $200 million is a lot of money to
spend on storm water but if you’re thinking I’ve got $23 billion of assets to protect, $200
million’s a good insurance policy”7 (Administration Official 5, interview October 18,
2012).
The decision to include sea level rise projections that were above historical trends
in the SWMMP originated with engineers in the Public Works department who were
responsible for overseeing the planning process, were aware of sea level rise and believed
that including projections was a rational and responsible action. In an interview a Public
Works official stated that they had made the decision to include sea level rise projections
in the plan because “we knew that if we’re going to be spending $100 million or
whatever the number is on infrastructure, that infrastructure can’t be obsolete a decade
later. So we recognized that sea levels are rising, and so we wanted to incorporate that
into our planning” Administration Official 5, interview October 18, 2012). An elected
official offered a similar view, that given the large investment using realistic projections
was necessary. In the elected official’s political calculus, “the alternative, which is you
guys blew $200 million, was worse” than potential opposition from climate deniers
(Elected Official 1, interview October 1, 2012).
But the City was entering new territory and had to develop methods for dealing
with several kinds of uncertainty, which opened room for controversy. The first problem
was how to determine the actual numbers for sea level rise to be used in the storm water
modeling. The difficulty was due to the uncertainty in the projections of sea level rise that
7

This does not mean that everyone on Miami Beach believed that sea level rise was happening, as I
described in the previous chapter. But since climate change denial is associated with right-wing views (Pew
Research Center for People and the Press 2013), lack of organized conservative political presence in Miami
Beach likely explains why no opposition camp appeared.
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were available and the lack of actionable guidance available from higher levels of
government. According to the SWMMP (2012) the engineering firm that the City hired to
do the modeling and write the storm water management master plan used the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency Storm Water Management Model for hydrologic and
hydraulic modeling for planning Miami Beach’s drainage system. Since storm water from
Miami Beach drains into Biscayne Bay, the storm water planning model takes into
account the height of the Bay (ocean height) in order to determine what drainage capacity
is needed to move water out of the city during a rain storm. Normally the model would
use the one-year tidal stillwater elevation, which is a number derived from the local
FEMA Flood Insurance Study. However when the engineering firm calculated this
number for Miami Beach it turned out to be too low, being below the initial water level
and according to the report “results in flooding at the initiation of the SWMM
simulation” (2-40). So a different method of determining the boundary condition had to
be used, and the City wanted one that took sea level rise into account. A second
engineering firm was subcontracted as a consultant to look at ocean height data and sea
level rise projections. At a meeting with the U.S. Geological Survey and representatives
from the IPCC it was decided to use the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) guidance on
sea level rise projections, shown below in Figure 20, which provided curves for low,
intermediate, and high projections of sea level rise (SWMMP 2011).
But selecting a starting point for the curves, i.e. the current ocean height, proved
difficult. The consultant produced a report reviewing ocean height data from NOAA but
did not recommend the use of the official NOAA datum, according to a Public Works
official, because it was too low. The NOAA datums are standardized to eliminate
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periodic trends in sea level, and to provide a common reference throughout the United
States. The NOAA official Mean High Water (MHW) datum is based on averaged data
over the previous “epoch” from 1983 to 2001. As seen in the chart below, which is from
a public presentation of the SWMMP report, this datum for the Virginia Key tide station,
the closest one to Miami Beach, is lower than the annual averages for all but four of the
most recent thirteen years. As noted in Chapter 4 accounting for such small variations is
extremely complex and NOAA officials acknowledge that it is possible that sea level has
risen since the period on which the datum is based (Ehret 2013). But no guidelines were
available for a different estimation method of arriving at the current “true” Mean High
Water for a given locality. So the City selected 0.29’ as a starting point, which was the
MHW for 2009 and the fourth highest of the annual averages for the last fourteen years
for which annual data is available (SWMMP Public Presentation, August 17, 2012).
Using the intermediate ACE curve an additional 0.38’ is added to account for sea level
rise over the twenty year life of the plan, to arrive at a final number of 0.67’ NAVD. This
was the number ultimately used as the boundary condition in the model (Resolution
Adopting 2011 Citywide Storm Water Master Plan, October 24, 2012).

Figure 20: Historic and Projected Mean High Water Levels at Virginia Key, Chart from
Miami Beach SWMMP Public Presentation, August 17, 2012
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This figure was arrived at only after some debate, both public and internal, and
this chart represents a revision from the first draft of the SWMMP for which the
engineering firm had used 0.50’ NAVD as a boundary condition (Draft SWMMP report
2011). The 0.50’ number had been selected because it “conservatively approximates the
tidal boundary condition elevation used by FDOT” in their Alton Road project, which
was 0.45’ NAVD (Draft SWMMP report 2011, 2-40). A group of resident activists,
initially several men who were concerned about rising sea levels and wanted the City to
be more proactive about addressing climate change, had gotten involved in the SWMMP
process and expressed concern that the boundary condition used was too low to deal with
the high tide flooding that Miami Beach was experiencing (Resident Activist 2, interview
October 3, 2012). They asked for meetings with City officials, sent emails to the City
Manager, and spoke at committee hearings on the plan, prompting the City to hold a
public meeting at which the above chart was presented explaining the selection of the
boundary condition used for the model.
It is notable that at the same time as denial of climate change seemed to hold sway
in most parts of the country, Miami Beach’s decision prompted action from the opposite
end of the spectrum, from those who believed the city wasn’t doing enough and should
use higher projections. City officials confirmed that they had not received complaints
about the inclusion of sea level rise in the plan. Said one, “Surprisingly nobody has said
what are you doing including sea level rise. The opposition we’ve had, I wouldn’t even
say it’s opposition, it’s a technical disagreement on not even so much the rate of sea level
rise but the starting point, what elevation is the high tide right now” (Administration
Official 5, October 18, 2012). As I argue though, the disagreement was more than

134

technical, but a signal of opposing views on how the City should approach climate
change adaptation.
The resident activists considered the 0.67’ number an improvement over 0.50’ but
still too low. They pointed out that the consultant who performed the analysis of tidal
data recommended “a minimum MHW level of 0.36’” (SWMMP Appendix H 2011),
which would have given the curve a higher starting point. They also objected to the use
of MHW, which was in accordance with Florida Department of Transportation drainage
standards, instead of Mean Higher High Water (MHHW) as recommended by the MiamiDade Climate Change Task Force. MHHW incorporates the highest tides and so is a
slightly higher figure than MHW, by 0.06’ to be exact. Even after the plan was finally
approved by the commission in November 2012, one of the resident activists wrote in an
email to the mayor, acting city manager and commissioners, that 0.67’ was too
conservative, noting that in 2012 the city had seen a significant number of high tide
flooding events well above 0.67’ and stating that “the storm water master plan was out of
date the day it was approved” (Resident Activist email, March 2013).
The group of resident activists who were challenging the SWMMP had been
involved with City government for many years, serving on various committees and
participating in civic forums. Several had backgrounds in science, engineering,
environmentalism or natural resources advocacy. They communicated with local
scientists who were working on climate change and had versed themselves in studies on
climate change and sea level rise. They were attuned to the more extreme predictions and
believed that “sea level is coming, faster than you think,” as one told me in an interview
(Resident Activist 2, interview October 3, 2012). Another told me he had “never been
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skeptical” about climate change because he had noticed the rise in tides in Miami Beach
over the years, and had involved with environmental causes for many years. He was very
pessimistic about the political will to deal with the problem, both nationally and locally.
“All these guys that are in congress made this problem, like I made this problem, we’re
the old guys. Our consumption and our growth, you had to have six percent growth per
year, new clothes, new cars every year, made that… and God forbid if they’re going to
change anything” (Resident Activist 3, interview October 5, 2012). But he also believed
it was possible to tackle the problem with major action, on a scale which he compared
with the scale of the Manhattan project. He saw his activism as prodding the City
government, residents and businesses to have a greater sense of urgency about climate
change in order to get to meaningful large scale action both on mitigation and adaptation.
The resident activists were not necessarily unified on how they thought the City
should deal with climate change, but they agreed on criticisms of the storm water plan:
the boundary condition was too low, the projections were too low, and the time frame
was too short. They pointed out that the City’s original proposal for the SWMMP was to
plan for fifty years, but the timeline in the report was shortened to twenty years for the
drainage system, although it kept the planning horizon for raising seawalls at fifty years.
These objections to the plan came to a head of sorts at a public meeting I attended in
August 2012 at City Hall, at which the two engineering consultant firms and the South
Florida Water Management District presented the plan and answered questions from the
public. The meeting was held at 10:00 a.m. in City Hall and had about forty attendees,
including members of the press. The presenters explained the data on tides and sea level
rise, the Level of Service (LOS) the plan would achieve, and the Tiered Best
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Management Practice Treatment Train Approach to strategies for dealing with storm
water. The Treatment Train consisted of interventions ranging from lower intensity and
lower cost, such as swales and backflow preventers, to high intensity high cost
interventions like pumping and outfall upgrades. The consultants explained that this
scaled approach made the plan flexible and would support allow for later upgrading if
needed to increase capacity. During the question and answer period one of the resident
activists stood up and said “I don’t buy it.” He said the City was presenting a rosy
scenario that was weak and glossed over the reality of the situation. He asked if the
design would be different if they looked at a longer time frame, and didn’t they want to
design for the life of a mortgage which was thirty years? He said citizens needed
information to take into account when deciding the location of their homes and buildings.
“Tell us the cost,” he said. The City’s response was that the program would be the same
at twenty or thirty years, and twenty years is the City’s Capital Improvement Projects
time frame. The major difference with a thirty year time frame, they said, would be
additional pumping which could be accommodated within the present approach if needed
at a later time.
The City ultimately addressed some of the concerns raised by resident activists,
however, for example by including an additional cost estimate for the highest sea level
rise curve (a boundary condition of 0.87’). The additional cost was $10 million on top of
the $196 million plan (SWMMP Public Presentation, August 17, 2012). But they
downplayed the importance of the specific number chosen for the boundary condition,
and emphasized the flexibility and adaptability of the plan. They maintained that even
with higher projections or a longer time frame the basic strategy would remain the same,
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but as sea levels rose it was likely that larger pumps would be needed, and they would
have to run more frequently. As one of the Public Works engineers put it in an interview,
We’ve been trying to emphasize that but it kind of gets lost in people saying well
you didn’t choose this number right or that number right. The importance is the
system needs to be flexible. When we design pump stations we need to be sure the
structure that we’re putting them in is big enough so that later if we do have to go
out and put in bigger pumps they’ll fit. That’s the type of thing we’re looking at
doing. Even if we’re right and 0.67’ is the number in 20 years, it’s not going to be
but if we are, it still is going to keep rising 21 years from now, 22 years from now
it’s going to be different, and so we are going to have to have a flexible system
that’s going to have to adapt to a higher level at some point. So we need to make
sure we design what goes in the ground now it has that flexibility. (Administration
Official 5, interview May 28, 2013)
Public Works did not see the boundary condition as the determining factor in the
success of the plan. From the engineer’s perspective a model is just a model, and actual
conditions vary.
We’re designing for a five-year one-day storm. And that’s six inches over 24
hours. I mean, how often do you have an exact, five-year storm. And so it’s just,
there are all sorts of parameters which kind of guide you to a certain pipe size or
designing your system in a certain way, but you just kind of have to remember
they are just guidelines. Particularly when we go to pump systems, there are so
many losses through valves, through the pump itself, through the piping, that a
couple inches just gets lost in the background. So it’s not that big a deal. What
you really need to do is design a flexible system. (Administration Official 5,
interview May 28, 2013).
In addition the City emphasized that tidal data would be monitored and the science would
be reevaluated in three years to determine if the plan needed to be changed (SWMMP
Public Presentation, August 17, 2012). In the end, the plan was approved by the
commission in December 2012 with the 20 year time horizon and the 0.67’ boundary
condition (Resolution Adopting 2011 Citywide Storm Water Master Plan, October 24,
2012).
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The conflict over the SWMMP centered on a set of numbers, but it could not be
resolved because the numbers had different characters and different meanings to the City
engineers and to the resident activists. The seeming precision of the numbers that were at
issue, the 0.29, 0.36 and 0.67, was misleading, implying a level of certainty that could
never exist, sea level rise or no. The engineers in the City understood that although
modeling presents itself as exact, using numbers and calculations that are as precise as
humans and current technology can make them, the results are only approximations of a
reality too complex to be fully knowable. Uncertainty is already a challenge, and with the
added uncertainty of future sea level rise, the best solution the engineers could offer was
a plan that was flexible, vigilant, and adaptive.
But to the resident activists, the numbers were signals of the seriousness with
which the City approached the issue of climate change. Most already shared a distrust of
the City government for various reasons, including its handling of past infrastructure
projects, its perceived preference for large scale development, and the refusal of elected
officials, especially the mayor, to publicly acknowledge that climate change was real.
They interpreted the decision to user a lower number as meaning that the City was
downplaying the potential impacts of sea level rise and refusing to consider longer term
strategies. They believed the reason for this was that the City did not want to be upfront
about the likely costs of adaptation. As one of the resident activists put it, “They should
use the most scientific information possible, the latest information possible. And the
recommendation in there is pretty close to what they should be using for the initial. But
the whole report is done to minimize any expenditures that would be needed” (Resident
Activist 2, interview October 3, 2012).

139

Despite this belief held by the resident activists however, cost never appeared as
an explicit factor in the City’s decision making. The engineering firm had in fact
prepared an estimate of the cost-savings that the plan would bring from avoided flood
damage8, approximately $4.5 million annually, in order to respond to potential concerns
about cost. But these figures were not mentioned at any of the meetings or discussed
more than in passing in any memos. When I asked a Public Works official about the
estimates he said, “It wasn’t really talked about that much. We thought it was important
to show that you do nothing and there’s still a cost, but most people know that already.
They know you have to do something, so we didn’t need to bring it up much”
(Administration Official 5, interview October 18, 2012). As for the cost of the plan itself,
the City did finally ask the engineering firm to estimate the additional cost for the higher
sea level rise projection, and it turned out to be only a fraction of the cost of the entire
plan - $10 million.
Still, city leaders did recognize that engineering is expensive, and from their
perspective planning in phases was appropriate for conserving resources. As one
explained in an interview,
As an elected official and as a resident, one of the things we’re always trying to
balance are the needs and the costs. And you know it’s kind of like buying
insurance. That’s what we’re doing here. We’re insuring the survivability of the
City and that we’re not going to drown and that the buildings aren’t going to be
under water. And those that aren’t on waterfront don’t end up with waterfront
property eventually. It’s like, you could become insurance rich and house poor.
You could buy so much insurance whether it’s long term care, life insurance,
health insurance, that you don’t have any money to live. So you can’t insurance
every last nickel…. Once you sell bonds, if we were to say well let’s sell $400
million of bonds, people are going to be paying those bonds off. And maybe we
didn’t need it, or maybe we didn’t need it for 50 years from now. So those that are
8

Using the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Hazus model for estimating potential losses from
disasters.
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here for the next 50 years why should we saddle them with something that may
not be needed? So I think it makes sense to do it in stages, as long as the plan, and
I’m being assured that the plan is flexible, and if we under or over-estimated our
capabilities we can change.” (Elected Official 1, interview October 1, 2012)
He went on to say,
I think the plan that is being put forth is a good one. So I think we are amongst the
first cities to actually be planning dollars and capital dollars to address the
situation, others are trying to pooh-pooh that it’s not going to happen, just kick the
can down the road, we’re actually confronting it, and dealing with it in a head on
manner and a reasonable manner. (Elected Official 1, interview October 1, 2012)
But the estimations of the cost, the increased estimate for the higher 20-year
scenario and the potential savings from avoided damage weren’t convincing to the
resident activists. One stated in an interview,
We are paying bonding. It’s going to come back to me on my taxes. I don’t know
if I want to do that. It’s already very expensive to live here. It’s very expensive,
this is the most expensive place to live. I don’t know if I want to spend another 20
or 30% to live here because we flood when it rains. If you’re going to spend this
kind of money in my view you should look at it for 50 years and build the system,
tell people what it’s going to cost them. This is what it’s going to cost you in
assessments, water bills, this and that, it’s going to cost this much to run these
pumps all year, or whenever we have to, it won’t start in the beginning but maybe
25 years out we might have to run them 60 days a year, 80 days a year to keep us
dry. High tides and new moons and who knows. And start looking at a cohesive
plan here….. And then you try to say, to keep our quality of life we can go this far
down the road and then we don’t go any farther but you need to give people
parameters, you need to give them an end point where you won’t keep sucking
them dry. If you want to live here this is what you’re going to have to do to get
the next 50 years out of this. But after that there’s no guarantees. And you really
need to level with them. (Resident Activist 3, interview October 5, 2012)
For him, the perception that the City was minimizing the costs of the SWMMP meant
that they were not informing the public about the individual, long-term costs of upgrading
infrastructure to fight rising sea level. Not providing this information was withholding
information that would be important for individual decision making, and had the effect of
discouraging participation in the planning by not providing information that would help
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people to see the impacts on their lives. Another resident activist also expressed a desire
for longer term thinking.
I believe the City has taken the approach of twenty years based on the logic that
most systems have a life span that is independent of sea level rise. My personal
thought is that if we were a society that is determined to be proactive in its
approach to mitigating the impacts of sea level rise and we had a cultural bias to
working with a common goal on this issue of national importance, we'd be able to
take the approach of projecting out further than that. (Business Leader 2,
interview August 8, 2013)
These statements show a desire to go beyond storm water infrastructure planning
to climate change adaptation planning, and beyond an incremental to a long-term
approach However there was not agreement among the resident activists about what a
long term approach would look like, and few articulated a vision for the future of the city
beyond the next couple decades. One who did proposed a plan that would require
relocation and provide assistance in the event of a major disaster.
Well my feeling on this, and socially this would probably fly like a lead balloon,
but it’s the way it has to be. When your house gets knocked down, the insurance
money that you would have been paid to get it back is not rebuild but to move
somewhere else. So essentially you’re paying not into an insurance premium to
fix your house but a premium to buy another house somewhere else in a less
stressed area and you won’t be allowed to rebuild. Period. You’re done. Whether
it’s a hotel like the Fountainbleu that gets knocked down, you cannot rebuild it,
and if this house gets knocked down I won’t be able to rebuild it. But I will have
paid all these years into a fund, which is my insurance, you’re not going to pay it
back to me for repairs you’re going to actually give me enough money so I can go
to Tennessee or North Florida and buy another house out of the area. (Resident
Activist 3, interview October 5, 2012)
Recognizing that a mandatory relocation plan would not be popular, he nevertheless felt
that given the trajectory of sea level rise, relocation was something that should be
seriously discussed. Others did not go so far as to question the future viability of the City,
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but said they simply wanted greater recognition of sea level rise and for the City to be
more proactive.
These resident activists were the loudest resident voices in the debate, and their
voices are important because they highlight many of the very challenging issues the City
faces and illuminate challenges for adaptation planning. However I interviewed other
resident activists as well who were involved in environmental causes or other local
brands of activism, and who were concerned with climate change but not outspoken
critics of the SWMMP. They had a hard time seeing the way forward. One talked about
the issue of historic buildings, a very powerful interest in Miami Beach, noting that
[they were built] when sea level was lower and there was no flood insurance.
Historic buildings in flood plains are exempt which is good for preservation but
bad for sea level rise…. it’s an issue because of the physical and economic threat.
The City could easily become Venice – it’s a tourist destination threatened by
flooding. We don’t have the options they do because we’re not in a bay,
surrounding by dykes isn’t an option, it would damage tourism. It’s a fairly
intractable problem. (Resident Activist 6, interview February 1, 2013)
To the City officials I spoke with, sea level rise was a new challenge, significant
but not insurmountable, and the path to adaptation was largely technical - engineering
and beach renourishment. In the field of climate change adaptation these fall under
“protection” or hardening of infrastructure and assets, as opposed to two other strategies:
“accommodation” which is making room for periodic flooding, or “retreat/relocation”
which is moving assets out of threatened zones (Few, Brown and Tompkins 2007). The
“protection” approach is preferred by the City for two reasons. The major one is that
since Miami Beach is already densely built out it has no flexible space for
accommodation strategies, or empty space to relocate assets. As one City official put it,
the
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problem here is that we don’t really have any build out space…. We are limited in
land and we really can’t do this build out, we’re going to have to put increased
pump stations on the western quarters of our city, and perhaps as we do
reconstruction build holding facilities under ground so that we can hold the water
until we’re able to pump it back out to sea. (Elected Official 2, interview March 5,
2013)
The Public Works Director also explained this in a presentation Miami Beach’s SWMMP
at the SFRCCC annual summit. He began by describing Miami Beach’s residential
density and its place as the economic engine of Miami-Dade County as the context for his
work as an engineer, saying, “We’re built out, so where could we relocate?” (SFRCCC
4th Annual Climate Leadership Summit 2012). Essentially, Miami Beach has nowhere to
go and still be Miami Beach.
As for the other adaptation strategy, beach renourishment, the wide sandy beach
that is the heart of that economic engine is the product of a 1970’s Army Corps of
Engineers project to create a dune system on the beach, which at the time was nonexistent. Before urbanization the island had a few sandy beaches but they were narrow.
Since the 1970’s periodic beach renourishment has brought in sand lost to erosion or
relocated sand that gradually washed from one place to another. As the Public Works
Director stated at the SFRCCC summit, “That renourishment was adaptation and it’s
important to maintain that. We’re building beach walks between the beach and hotels and
redoing the dunes at the same time. Sometimes the hotels don’t like it but we’re making
progress” (SFRCCC 4th Annual Climate Leadership Summit 2012). The beach and the
dunes serve to protect the island from hurricane storm surge, and are an important sea
turtle nesting habitat. The City recently began partnering with non-profit organizations
on restoration of the dune system, which will remove invasive plant species and restore
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native vegetation, reducing erosion and improving the habitat. Dune restoration was
listed in the Sustainability Plan as an adaptation strategy, an example of a longestablished coastal protection strategy being re-framed as sea level rise adaptation
(Sustainability Plan 2011).
Another reason that officials looked to engineering solutions for protection was to
buy time. Given the uncertainty of the projections, they felt it was pragmatic to make
infrastructure improvements now in the short term, and then see how the situation
evolved. One City official told me he was interested in exploring underground water
storage, a flood protection method wherein storm water is held in underground tanks until
it can be pumped out to sea, as an option to “provide enough relief for another 50 years.”
Another former official told me,
You can’t run around suggesting that we’re all going to be under water in the next
50 years. If that’s true, there’s nothing we can do about it. If however it’s more
gradual, then yeah, sea walls need to be enhanced, and our dune structures need to
be enforced, and instead of gravity we’re going to need to use some injection and
pumps. Bigger pipes, more pumps, that’s not the end of the world. We can do
that. (Administration Official 7, interview February 22, 2013)
This reflects one of the many different perspectives on the timing of sea level rise, and
what that timing means. To the City officials, it is worth it to invest in engineering if it
can feasibly be constructed to last at least fifty years. It’s a matter of cost and will. He
went on to explain,
To me it’s a matter of dollars and cents. There is a solution, it’s a willingness to
implement the solution, an engineering solution, and the cost of it. We’ve got to
raise the sea walls, and that’s easy, it costs money but it’s easy to do. And you’ve
got to expand your outfalls, and you got to figure out how you’re going to create
retention wells, those are all easy solutions it’s just a matter of cost. But the
economics are there now. The threat to the economy is so great that you have to
do this. So I don’t worry, smart people, business people will see that you got to do
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it. It’s an investment in the infrastructure. So I’m not worried about that.
(Administration Official 7, interview February 22, 2013)
The City also recognized the limits of infrastructure planning, and heard the calls
for a more comprehensive approach to climate change, but they felt this would require
more assistance from other levels of government. The mayor, responding at the public
meeting to the criticisms from resident activists, said that this was a storm water plan not
a climate adaptation plan, and that climate adaptation needed a holistic approach that
included the county. “It’s not fair to put all these questions just on Miami Beach, we have
to come up with a holistic plan,” she said, “We are really looking to the county because
we want to move together. Miami Beach shouldn’t go out on a limb and do its own thing,
we want to really work and follow the lead of the county. This is a start for us to continue
to look at this” (SWMMP Public Presentation 2012). There was also recognition of the
need for eventual federal help, as one official expressed in an interview,
I would hope that the 4 counties would get behind an effort to lobby for state and
federal dollars to address this because whatever we do it’s not going to be cheap,
nor permanent. It’s going to be an on-going process that you fund it as you go,
with whatever adaptations are necessary along the way. It won’t be cheap. Even
as you’ve seen the county itself was talking about not so much for sea rise but
even just the changing out of the sewage lines and everything we’re talking about
a billion dollars, all of a sudden it went from like I think a couple years ago they
were talking $3 billion and now they’re talking $12 billion, and they’re probably
off with that. So hopefully we can find some federal support. But you know
what’s interesting, just to show you nationally, we have a national flood policy,
but yet we can’t get states and governors and senators and congressman to agree
to have some kind of national hurricane insurance. They say hey that’s your
problem. (Elected Official 1, interview October 1, 2012)
To public officials the costs were large but were not only due to sea level rise but to
existing challenges of aging infrastructure. They expected to look for federal help, but
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understood the current national politics complicated that. In the current neoliberal era of
retrenchment and devolution (Streek 2013), federal support is by no means guaranteed.
Though the work of implementation of adaptation actions falls to local levels and
Miami Beach is moving to deal with flooding and sea level rise through its storm water
plan, City leaders have consistently stated that dealing with climate change is not just a
City problem. Partly this is due to the existing structure of jurisdictions and the need to
coordinate between the County and the City especially over transportation, water, and
environmental resources. Partly it is also due to the extra capacity and resources needed
to deal with climate change, as referred to in the City engineer’s statement above and to
the eagerness of the City to receive assistance from federal agencies, foundations,
universities, and others with expertise and resources. But it was partly also about taking
cover on potentially contentious issues. As one county level official stated,
it’s a politically charged issue, you’re talking about investments, long term
investments…. they’re talking about we’re going to need more pumps, so you’re
talking about spending a lot of money on something that we don’t know exactly
what’s going to happen. We’re saying ok based on the information we have now
we think this is going to happen we think that is going to happen, and it’s hard to
make very expensive decisions, and politically charged decisions on speculation.
So I totally understand where the mayor’s coming from, and it makes sense. And
that’s, it’s important, I think it’s great that the mayor has made that connection,
that statement, and it’s important that we’re all moving together with the same
goal as opposed to cross purposes. (Governance Official 6, interview August 31,
2012)
Miami Beach has developed relationships with the SFRCCC and Miami-Dade
County on climate change and sustainability and sought opportunities to work together
with these different levels of governance also for resource and knowledge sharing. The
Environmental Resources division has developed relationships with County’s
Sustainability Office, seeking to use the County’s Green Business Certificate to offer
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incentives to Miami Beach businesses and collaborating on a grant proposal on climate
resilience. Miami Beach became the second municipal representative on the Compact
steering committee, officially representing Miami-Dade municipalities, and has studied
the SFRCCC recommendations to determine to which recommendations apply to the
City, and which are already in place and which could be considered for
adoption/implementation.
This City’s desire for this sort of cooperation may be indicative of a shift in
municipal-county relationships, which traditionally have been characterized by resistance
by municipalities to County control. As a County level official put it,
Municipalities incorporated because they want to be independent, they want to be
able to do their own thing, within reason obviously they have to follow certain
guidelines. So there’s always that kind of well, we don’t want the county to tell us
what to do because we’re doing our own thing and we’re self-sufficient and we
don’t need the county because we’re doing our own thing. (Governance Official
6, August 31, 2012)
But as another County official stated,
One of the things that got brought up by the mayor of Miami Beach was they felt
that regional transportation networks didn’t consider MB often enough, that they
were overlooked, and that may be a disadvantage where if you’re a little bit
separate then you don’t get included sometimes….. So the fact that Miami Beach
is now sitting on the compact staff steering committee they may suddenly have a
voice in the region that they never would have had without the Compact.
(Governance Official 7, interview June 24, 2013)
Quality of Life vs. Economic Development
But the resident activists suspected that the City had a bias against discussing
climate impacts because of fears about the potential economic impacts. When I asked one
resident activist what he thought about the mayor’s statement that the City should look at
climate adaptation planning in a holistic way, he said,
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But I don’t think that she really wants that, because she said that her greatest
responsibility is protecting the economic viability of this city. She said that she
said we have to have hotels, we have to have the beaches, we have to have the
convention center for the betterment of the people. Cause it brings jobs and this
and that. Well I don’t agree with that (Resident Activist 3, interview October 5,
2012).
What this comment belies is one of the main fault lines of Miami Beach politics,
development versus neighborhoods. Since the mid-1990’s when the economy really
started to pick up and major development was happening, there had been conflict
between developers who want to build hotels, entertainment venues and luxury condo
towers, and residents who want smaller scale development, less traffic and less noise.
Although development has continued at a rapid pace, residents have organized to have a
strong voice in City Hall as well, for example in 1997 winning a campaign to pass a
charter amendment requiring popular approval in order to increase the size of
development projects beyond the current zoning (Posner 2009).
Some of the resident activists criticizing the SWMMP were very active as
representatives of neighborhoods and generally took the stance of fighting back against
what they perceived as incursions from hotels, noisy sidewalk cafés, and large scale
development that would increase traffic. At the time when the SWMMP process was
under way, the development debate was focused on the convention center, which was
universally recognized as in need of upgrading. But there was a debate over whether to
maintain the relatively small scale of the center or to conduct a major overhaul which
would provide facilities for larger conventions and include retail and entertainment, as a
“city center” type of project. The City Commission appeared to be in favor of the latter,
having stipulated the inclusion of a hotel in the project, and having selected two
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development teams with world-renowned architects as finalists (Veiga and Viglucci
2013). The resident activists regarded the City as favoring large-scale development,
which would be at risk from sea level rise in a matter of decades anyway. As one said in
an interview,
Are we going to build out the convention center and put a hotel there, put three
parking lots back on the other parking lots, put retail underneath them…. I mean
it’s going to take 10 years to build this stuff out, by the time they get done with it
then we’re really in deep trouble and its life expectancy will only be 20 years. I
mean you want to spend a few billion dollars to do that? I like Miami Beach the
way it is now, I don’t want to live in more construction. (Resident Activist 3,
interview October 5, 2012)
This is an expression of the intense skepticism towards more development and the fear
that development would increase cost of living and make for a poorer quality of life.
This skepticism contributed to fears that the City was preventing debate over climate
change for fear of the impact on economic development.
But City leaders, along with business leaders, generally saw development
differently. Political leaders had long argued that development and tourism are necessary
to bring in taxes that fund services and upgraded infrastructure. As one official explained
in an interview,
Tourism pays a good portion of the residential expense. The budget is sixty
percent from non ad-valorem taxes. So, you’re getting a sixty percent discount on
your tax bill, but you have to put up with the tourists. And so finding that balance,
and getting people to realize that there should be a balance, that it’s not all or
nothing, and you know the night clubs can’t just run freely, and the residents can’t
expect them to close at midnight, then figuring out how to find that solution, is
always the issue (Administration Official 7, interview February 22, 2012).
He applied this specifically to the convention center, saying, “it’s not about keeping up
with the Jones’s it’s about what do we need over the next twenty years…. a convention
center hotel, and connectivity to all of our assets, and taking that land and redeveloping it
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so that it repositions Miami Beach as a new destination again” (Administration Official 7,
interview February 22, 2012). But getting such large scale plans implemented wasn’t
straightforward. A 2010 plan was rejected by the City Commission because of its scale,
and a 2013 plan was similarly scrapped in part due to resident opposition.9
Business leaders also generally thought that development was necessary for the
City, and so resident activists generally assumed that business interests like the Chamber
of Commerce would be opposed to bringing attention to climate change impacts on
Miami Beach, but in fact the opposite proved to be true. One resident activist stated,
“well the Chamber of Commerce is going to deny all of this. They’re the biggest climate
deniers” (Resident Activist 3, interview October 5, 2013). But the Miami Beach Chamber
of Commerce had a sustainability committee and had several members who paid close
attention to climate change issues, who were also concerned that not enough action was
happening and that businesses needed to get more involved. In June 2013 the Chamber
hosted a panel discussion on sea level rise, called “High Tide on South Beach: What
Every Business Leader, Citizen, and Government Official needs to know about how
Rising Tides and Storm Water will reshape Miami Beach.” The speakers included,
among others, representatives from the South Florida Water Management District, John
Englander author of “High Tide on Main Street: Rising Sea Level and the Coming
Coastal Crisis,” and a representative from the Dutch consulate. One business leader I
interviewed said he felt the City needed to be more proactive about planning for sea level

9

Partly due to the support of resident activists who opposed the convention center plan, incumbent City
Commissioners who had supported the plan were defeated in the 2013 elections, and the new commission
send the project back to the drawing board.
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rise to maintain a favorable situation for investment, and that contrary to scaring real
estate investors away, planning would reduce risk and give the City time to adapt.
Your community will embrace the fact that you’re forward thinking…. There are
things that you can do that will add positive economic reinforcement. Like if you
say, we’re taking these precautions because we want to keep land values high, we
want to keep insurance rates low, this is why we’re doing it and we’re starting
now so that in 25 years we’re not faced with a situation where we can’t do
anything. (Administration Official 7, interview February 22, 2012)
He argued that development was needed to bring in money to pay for infrastructure
upgrades to deal with sea level rise.
If you don’t have the money in the community coffers you can’t do these
improvements…. you also have to understand where’s the money going to come
from. If you keep advocating that, like on West Avenue there’s a proposal that the
commission’s going to vote on that no more hotels on West Ave. Ok, well that
might sound good for traffic purposes, and noise purposes but what about the
money that you need? Hotels generate a lot of tax revenue for a community. So
now if you don’t have the tax revenue for the community you’re going to have to
raise it from the residents. (Administration Official 7, interview February 22,
2012)
But despite the willingness and even urgency of some business leaders to address sea
level rise, they noted that most businesses and developers were not concerned and that
investment was pouring in to Miami Beach. As one stated in 2012,
Right now Miami Beach has got to be the about the hottest city in the world from
an investment standpoint. There is money coming in, not just the monies coming
in, money that wants to come into this city that can’t find a place to park it, is
staggering. From all parts of the world, Wall St. has woken up and really
discovered Miami Beach. Some of the bigger high profile projects I’ve been
reading about now, the Crown Hotel… this is foreign money and lots of it. (FIU
School of Architecture Symposium 2013)
But he pointed out that climate change and sea level rise would eventually increase
development costs, if the cost of insurance rose, or if construction became more
expensive due to stronger building codes.
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I’m sure that eventually the cities especially Miami Beach will have to amend
their building code in order to deal with this at least in the interim and when that
does that’s going to drive construction costs up which right now on the beach are
quite high, and of course you can’t keep generating income something has to give
and the values of the property will have to come down to compensate for that.
(FIU School of Architecture Symposium 2013)
He also explained that rising risk would lead to reduced value.
At some point somebody, some analyst is going to say, you know what – you’ve
got to look at this because, in twenty-five years when we finish paying this off, is
Miami Beach going to be under water or… is there going to be a big assessment
like they’ve done in other coastal places over the years? As the risks get higher
the rate gets higher. And rate and value are in inverse proportion. At some point,
the rate is going to factor into some long term and it’s going to have a decreasing
effect on the value. I don’t know when. (FIU School of Architecture Symposium
2013)
The politics of development vs. neighborhoods took an unusual turn in the
November 2013 elections. A prominent business figure who had not previously been
involved in City politics was elected with the support of resident activists who opposed
the large-scale convention center plan (Del Vecchio 2013). Phillip Levine and two
commission candidates, widely perceived to be running as a “slate,” defeated three
incumbent commissioners, including Michael Gongora who had initiated the
Sustainability Committee. Election campaign fliers from the “slate” criticized the scale
and handling of the convention center project, promised to end corruption and fix the
City’s flooding problems. Two months after the election the mayor created a “blueribbon panel” on flooding and appointed a prominent realtor, a University of Miami
engineer, and an outspoken critic of the storm water plan. After three public hearings the
panel recommended that the boundary condition for the plan be increased to 2.7 feet
NAVD “based on peak historical tidal values” (Resolution C7K February 12, 2014), and
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the cost of the new plan would be $400 million, likely paid for in part through fee
increases (Veiga 2014).

Conclusion
In such a contested situation as climate change, with all its uncertainty and
complexity, understanding the differing “logics” held by different groups involved in the
emerging governance networks of climate adaptation is key to understanding how the
process is unfolding and what it may portend. As I have shown, there are areas of
convergence and divergence in the different logics. The City’s approach is largely a
“protection” approach, given that there is little flexible space for accommodation or
relocation of assets. Their approach has evolved from traditional infrastructure planning
methods by using sea level rise projections together with a widely used storm water
management modeling system. The results are framed as meeting current needs and being
flexible enough to accommodate future needs as sea level rises. The City doesn’t view
the situation as a crisis but as something that can be managed with periodic monitoring
and assessment. This represents a “mainstreaming” approach to climate change
adaptation, which incorporates adaptations into existing structures and processes, and an
“adaptive management” decision making framework that uses an iterative approach to
dealing with environmental changes and planning for climate impacts.
Business interests also believe that a protection approach is the way the city
should go, and think the City should be more proactive about directly addressing sea
level rise across a wider range of areas such as planning and building codes. Instead of
fearing growing awareness of climate change, as many suspected, they argue that having
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a proactive plan will signal confidence to the insurance market and lead to a stable
climate for investors which will bring in needed money for the expensive infrastructure
needs. They argue for a balance between development interests and neighborhood
interests and fear that resident activists do not fully understand the consequences of the
restrictions of development that they advocate for based on quality of life or historic
preservation concerns.
The resident activists however do not have confidence in the City’s leadership on
climate change or the adaptive management approach. They believe that it will lead to
higher cost of living and that the City should be upfront about this with the public. They
argue that the City’s plans should be based on “the best science available” which to them
would mean much higher projections than the ones currently in use. Those who believe
that protection efforts are ultimately futile would rather that the City emphasize quality of
life than further development.
Miami Beach is on the front lines of a larger region that is grappling with these
questions, and the City believes that they should not have sole responsibility for dealing
with sea level rise, that it should be addressed regionally and that policy guidance should
come from higher levels of government. However the experience of the City with this
SWMMP, their first effort at adaptation and one of the first in the region and in the
country, reveals many challenges and difficult questions about the fitness of a
“mainstreaming” approach in this unique context.
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CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSION
To conclude I want to return to the question of South Florida’s vulnerability to
climate change. I have examined how the physical dimensions and human dimensions of
climate change adaptation interact at multiple scales, from the household to the regional
scale. I have taken Miami Beach as a case-study because it is one of the first
municipalities in the region to be dealing with sea level rise impacts, and the first to
implement adaptation actions directly in response to those impacts. I present this
dissertation as an ethnography of the onset of sea level rise on Miami Beach that explores
the factors that produce vulnerability to climate change.
While approaches to vulnerability vary among researchers and practitioners, I am
writing mostly from a “human security” perspective, principally concerned with what
makes people vulnerable, particularly those who are already socially vulnerable. I draw
on several strains of literature concerned with vulnerability as related to humanenvironment interactions. I draw on the sociology of disasters, which has demonstrated
that those who are economically disadvantaged, have physical limitations, or are
otherwise socially or politically marginalized, suffer greater impacts from disasters. I also
draw on the framework of political ecology which holds that the vulnerability of
communities to their environment is determined as much or more by political and
economic structures as natural causes. Relatedly, I consider environmental justice, which
is concerned with the greater exposure of low-income and minority communities to
environmental hazards and the processes that lead to this spatial injustice. Although in
my case study location is not the main factor in the exposure of vulnerable groups to
climate impacts, spatiality does and will matter as climate adaptation goes forward and
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decisions are made about where to invest in infrastructure, where to make land use
changes, who will pay the costs and who will receive the benefits of these actions. As
adaptation planning signals which locations are viable and which are not, the
consequences for people who have invested and built lives in neighborhoods are
potentially significant and not unlike the impacts of a decision to locate a toxic waste
dump in a certain neighborhood, thereby negatively impacting property values and
quality of life.
Climate adaptation decisions are one way in which vulnerability is produced, and
understanding those decisions is part of the larger understanding of vulnerability as
produced by “conditions that are created and maintained through a series of historical
relationships that interact across spatial scales” as Dooling and Simon (2012, 5) articulate
it, speaking to a wide field of vulnerability research. By seeing vulnerability not as a
static state either in context, location, or outcome but as dynamic, then efforts to
understand and assess vulnerability must take a wide variety of factors and processes into
account and seek to understand their interactions in a particular context, and consider
how they may evolve over time. Vulnerability isn’t just about location, or lack of
protection from hazards, or an immutable condition, but about the ever-changing
contexts, processes, and multiple stressors that create and perpetuate disadvantage. With
respect to climate change, that disadvantage increases harm from environmental impacts
or their second-order socio-economic impacts.
To shed light on how vulnerability to climate change is produced in South Florida
I have collected empirical research on the drivers and impacts of urban flooding in the
early stages of sea level rise and explored where they interact with current socio-
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economic conditions and trends. I have also documented the response to this flooding and
the beginnings of climate adaptation planning at the regional and local scale, in order to
draw conclusions about the different and conflicting logics at work and to expose gaps in
adaptation planning theory and practice that contribute to vulnerability.
In this final chapter I will summarize my findings and draw conclusions about
how people are potentially vulnerable to climate change in South Florida. I will reveal
how South Florida’s context is unique but shows important gaps in our knowledge of
climate change adaptation. The reason I want to do this is because it is important in a
practical sense for adaptation planning and because there are some rich theoretical
contributions about vulnerability and adaptation.

Findings
1. Urban flooding is disruptive for residents and businesses. The established theories of
vulnerability to environmental hazards, such as the sociology of disasters and
environmental justice, tell us that those who are already socially vulnerable are more
likely to suffer from environmental impacts. Certainly this is true on Miami Beach as
well, where disruptions of routines or work cause greater hardship for those with
fewer resources. Small businesses that lose customers when streets are flooded are
concerned about the loss of revenue, particularly when they face multiple stresses
from competition. Residents who can’t get to school lose time due to flooding, and
elderly or disabled residents are endangered attempting to navigate flooded streets.
2. Residents and businesses are finding ways to deal with flooding but not making major
changes – yet. Some residents and business owners/managers I interviewed were

158

beginning to take steps to adapt their property such as constructing walkways over
flooded sidewalks, but most were coping on the spot. Although everyone
acknowledged the disruption, only a few expressed strong emotion about it and none
indicated that it had influenced their decision making or future plans. The flooding
was attributed to a variety of causes including human caused climate change,
improper development on the island, problems with the drainage system, and that
flooding is simply a fact of life on a barrier island. A few were beginning to think
about how sea level rise might impact their future plans, but none were making
immediate changes. Businesses in particular stated unequivocally that they would
stay as long as they had customers. Smaller businesses with large sunk costs felt
particularly tied to their current locations.
3. Infrastructure planners and managers face challenges incorporating even small
amounts of sea level rise into existing models in low-grade areas. The City has
created a plan to improve storm water infrastructure to deal with the flooding. The
plan incorporates projections for accelerated sea level rise, and provides flexibility for
further infrastructure upgrades should they be necessary. The plan is based on a
widely used storm water management modeling system, but incorporating sea level
rise estimates proved challenging and provoked controversy. Miami Beach has very
low elevation and a “flat” grade, which means that a difference of a matter of inches
in ocean height makes a large difference in the extent of urban flooding due to high
tides or storm surge, as I have shown. Sea level rise has made such flooding events
more common and more problematic, and the NOAA datums currently in use for
predicting and measuring tide levels are not fine-tuned enough for reliable use by
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infrastructure planners working in this type of environment. The lack of an accepted
alternative method of estimating the boundary condition opens room for controversy.
Given the uncertainty about the current boundary condition and future sea level rise,
the City has adopted an “adaptive” approach that provides for flexibility and includes
monitoring and periodic re-assessment to ensure the desired Level of Service.
4. Rising cost of living is a concern for homeowners and renters. The SWMMP is a 20
year plan that will cost approximately $400 million, financed by bonds and increases
in storm water utility fees. This will undoubtedly contribute to increased costs for
residents through fees or taxes but exactly how much is unclear. However the cost of
living has been rising on Miami Beach due to other factors, especially rising property
values and insurance increases. This is a concern for renters, both middle-income and
low-income who may be priced out of the area, as well as homeowners who face
rising insurance costs.
5. There is tension between iterative adaptation and long-term planning under a scenario of
rapid change. The iterative process addresses uncertainty by incorporating new
information and adjusting strategies as needed. However it is not clear whether, if change
occurs rapidly, the process could be speeded up to gather data, assess options, and make
new decisions enough in advance of increased impacts to avoid major disruption.

Mainstreaming sea level rise projections into existing infrastructure planning was a
logical first step for the City of Miami Beach for dealing with the increased flooding
due to the onset of accelerated sea level rise. The City added adaptive elements to the
strategy such as monitoring and flexibility in order to deal with future increased impacts.

But this does not represent, nor was it intended to, a comprehensive climate change
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adaptation strategy. Flooding is the major climate change impact that Miami Beach
faces, and adaptation will likely center around flood control for some time to come.
The approach to flood control that the City outlined is adaptive, with the ability to
accommodate future higher levels of impacts, but the adaption is conceived as
quantitative, meaning more, of the same approach - pumping. It does not indicate
when a qualitatively different or transformational approach might be called for, such
as relocation. But this makes long term planning difficult, as residents pointed out,
not knowing how much costs would go up, or whether property values would be
stable. In addition to the uncertainty about impacts this creates uncertainty about how
they’ll be dealt with, which severely complicates decision making for households and
businesses.
6. An iterative adaptation framework does not adequately deal with the temporal
dimension of decision making. In the iterative approach to climate adaptation favored
in much of the literature (NRC 2010), the impacts of climate change are assumed to
be slow enough that data can be gathered and decisions can be made and
implemented with time to adjust. Felgenhauer and Webster (2012), who argue that
investments can be made in adaptation stock and then adjusted later depending on the
progression of change, state “All but the longest-lived investments in adaptation will
have useful lifespans that are shorter than the several decades required for mitigation
to take effect. Over this long timeframe then, a role for adaptation is as a series of
repeated investments whose value is not in reducing the demand for mitigation but
rather in increasing the strategy’s longevity until the benefits of near-term mitigation
are realized” (1558). But given the accelerating impacts this may not be the case for
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Miami Beach. If the current predictions come true and sea level rises by two feet in
50 years, or more, 28% of the city island will be below sea level (Harlem,
unpublished). Although there may be engineering solutions that can protect against
this amount of sea level, all indications are that sea level will continue to rise which
means that eventually a qualitatively different approach will be needed. Pursuing an
incremental engineering centered approach encourages further development, which is
path dependent and cannot easily and quickly be shifted when data begins to indicate
the system is in imminent danger of being overwhelmed and a transformation is
called for. The challenge is to anticipate this transformation point with enough time in
advance to implement changes that minimize harm and disruption. The recommended
adaptation decision making models do not offer adequately guidance on the temporal
dimensions of the decision process.
7. Climate adaptation cannot fully be dealt with locally. Conventional wisdom has been
that mitigation is global but adaptation is local, given the endless variety of different
local contexts. While it is true that there is no one-size-fits-all solution, the case of
Miami Beach shows that adaptation cannot just be the burden of a single
municipality. This is true in several senses. For one, many crucial public services
such as water and sewer, transportation, emergency management and environmental
resources management, are all the shared responsibility of Miami Beach and the
County. For another, Miami Beach’s economy is fully integrated with the region and
it is the main economic engine of the entire region. Much of its workforce lives
elsewhere, and its property values are a huge part of the county’s tax base. What
affects Miami Beach affects the region. And in an even larger sense, Miami Beach is
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part of a global real estate market with its own logic and drivers. The forces that drive
development in Miami Beach, which provide funding for and strongly influence the
course of adaptation, cannot be fully controlled locally. As scholars have previously
noted, “inaction at higher levels of collective action effectively transfers
responsibility for adaptive responses to lower levels of collective action or to
individual actor such as firms or households, with attendant consequences for the
range of available alternatives and burden sharing” (Adger et al. 2006, 7). The ability
to develop alternatives is also limited by state and federal policy such as on taxes. In
Florida local governments only source of revenue is property taxes, since they do not
have the power to levy sales tax, income tax, or other taxes that would bring in funds
without encouraging dependency on development (Alm, Buschman and Sjoquist
2012).

Logics
As I have argued climate change has a growing governance network in South Florida,
made up of scientists, activists, government officials, businesses, and residents. These
sectors are involved in transdiciplinary processes of crafting action and policy changes
based on science and the mandate of government. The different “logics” of groups in the
governance network illuminate the challenges of embarking on adaptation planning with
its inherent uncertainty, different values, and competing interests. Analyzing these logics
allows us to better understand the processes that are driving socio-ecological change and
how vulnerability may be produced.
Government
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The logic of local government is practicality, taking care of problems. In my
interviews with local government staff and officials, they often emphasized this. One told
me,
My approach has always been much more practical, and yes it’s a 50-100 year
problem, but what can we do in this next 5 years? And there are things that are
happening today, there’s flooding happening today all the time even more. The
days are getting hotter. All these things are happening. So what can we do now in
your realm, in your 4 year election cycle, or in your job as a planner? What can
we do to start to make these changes? That’s been my approach. (Governance
Leader 4, interview August 14, 2012)
Local government officials believed their job was to get the work of adaptation started,
and to do the work that’s possible now, and fulfills their responsibility to manage the
sectors within their purview. A Miami Beach official expressed,

So I think we are amongst the first cities to actually be planning dollars and
capital dollars to address the situation, others are trying to pooh-pooh that it’s not
going to happen, just kick the can down the road, we’re actually confronting it,
and dealing with it in a head on manner and a reasonable manner. (Elected
Official 2, March 5, 2013)
This practical, incremental approach is also at the heart of the Regional Climate Action
Plan, the most comprehensive effort to deal with adaptation to date. The plan states,
The overall objective was and remains to integrate climate adaptation and
mitigation into existing decision-making systems and to develop a plan that can
be implemented through existing local and regional agencies, processes and
organizations. It is in that spirit that this plan provides the common integrated
framework for a stronger and more resilient Southeast Florida starting today and
for tomorrow. (SFRCCC 2012, vi)
This statement reflects the mainstreaming and incremental approaches, which I have
argued cause frustration for residents and businesses because it does not provide for longterm planning that takes account of the potential need for qualitatively different or
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transformative approaches, particularly on an accelerated time scale. Mainstreaming is a
logical first step for adaptation, but different decision making frameworks need to be
sought.
Business
As I showed in Chapter 5, business interests were pressing the City of Miami
Beach to create an adaptation plan that would demonstrate that the City is aware of the
challenges and taking action to minimize loss. They argued that such a plan would
reassure investors and insurance companies, and provide more certainty and stability
necessary for businesses to operate. The logic of businesses is return on investment, and
risk is inherently part of that calculation. Business leaders who recognized that climate
change would eventually mean increased risk did not indicate they foresee a “crash” but a
gradual increasing of costs as construction and insurance expenses rise. For a business
then, adaptation means understanding the increased risk and adjusting plans accordingly,
but as long as there is sufficient revenue stream there is incentive to stay. Although this is
true for large and small businesses, the adjustment is much more difficult for small,
proprietor owned businesses. For business owners who have sunk substantial costs into
setting up their business relocating is cost-prohibitive, and many are financially
vulnerable where they are because they do not have flood insurance due to the high cost.
They have little choice but to absorb the lost revenue caused by the flooding, and in
extreme cases this leads to frustration and feeling trapped.
Residents
The logic of residents is quality of life and their personal investments. Residential
property owners face similar problems as businesses of increasing costs and risk to their
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investment, with one major difference – they do not have a revenue stream that can
absorb losses. Residential property owners only get a return when they sell the property,
and so increased risk means loss, period. The impossibility of judging what risk sea level
rise presents for this investment means that residential property owners in areas of high
risk have little protection against loss under the current system of residential property
ownership. Property insurance pays (in the best case) for destruction due to disasters, but
it does not pay for loss of value over time, whether rapidly or gradually. For most middle
class residents the investment in property is such a substantial part of the household
finances that its loss would be catastrophic, and this is a major source of vulnerability for
these households in Miami Beach.
In the absence of sufficient information for judging risk, residential property
owners prioritize other concerns such as quality of life, family needs, and community
connections. To some, they appear to be making a non-rational choice to ignore the risk
from climate change. This is likely true for some, but for others it could be interpreted as
a different calculation of Return On Investment, one that takes into account quality of life
and other factors. Despite the difficulty of monetizing these factors, there is no doubt they
play a part in the decision calculus, perhaps balanced against the household’s tolerance
for risk.
For renters, the return on investment is the flip side of quality of life, and they are
monetized in rent. But renters also face opportunity costs of deciding to remain a renter in
a location because of unknown risk to the investment in property, whereas all other things
being equal such an investment would make sense. Over time this could add up to
financial disadvantage, which in the adaptation literature translates to reduced adaptive
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capacity and therefore greater vulnerability. Renters and homeowners therefore are both
vulnerable due to lack of ability to assess risk of climate impacts, but for different
reasons.
Cities
These logics of businesses, residents, and local governments are all based on the
core logic of cities, which is growth (Logan and Molotch 1987). Businesses expect
revenue growth, property owners expect a return when they sell and residents expect
improving quality of life. Local government functions are at heart about supporting and
protecting these processes through planning and regulation. In order to do that they must
balance sometimes competing interests in order to raise the revenue to support these
functions. This is why the logical first step of climate adaptation is to mainstream
adaptation into existing functions, and then take an incremental approach to planning.
This is also why the question of transformative adaptation is so difficult. Miami Beach is
having a difficult time developing a long-term plan and looking at transformative
solutions because it fears interfering with the city’s economy as it is currently structured.
But in fact, trying to maintain the status quo is putting people at risk. Private property
ownership means that risk is individualized and detached from the original risk-taking
decisions made to develop Miami Beach a century ago by the state which sold the land,
the developers who improved it, and the citizens who settled there and built the city. The
risk has been passed down through sales of property to the present day, based on the
assumption implicit in all land sales - that the land will continue to exist and its
approximate present use will continue to be viable. If that ceases to be the case, who
bears responsibility for those losses?
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Vulnerability and Adaptation
Miami Beach’s, and South Florida’s, vulnerability to climate change is thus the
result of a century’s worth of decisions made at multiple scales. People are vulnerable to
the physical impacts of flooding and storms, and to the socio-economic impacts of
decisions made to adapt to environmental changes, decisions which raise costs, promote
continued development in exposed areas, and do not adequately involve the public in
decision making and knowledge sharing. These impacts are greater on groups with less
adaptive capacity such as lower income, less mobile residents. This study captures the
very beginnings of these impacts and as yet considerations of justice are largely missing
from adaptation planning, but incorporating justice considerations could point the way to
transformative solutions. A transformative approach will mean rethinking the goals of
adaptation and finding new ways to think about the problem. As I have noted a full
solution is not possible through local decision making alone, but below I will offer two
possible ways of rethinking this problem in South Florida.
First, coastal cities threatened by sea level rise could redefine “growth.” Since the
1970’s some economists have been working on alternative models of growth,
incorporating things like sustainability and quality of life (Söderbaum 1994). Currently
Miami Beach’s, and South Florida’s, primary economic drivers are tourism and real
estate, and these are primary drivers of decision making and tax spending. If cities
redefined sustainability as a top priority, they may be able to continue to generate
revenue from tourism that is sustainability oriented, and they could continue to attract
residents and businesses interested in a different quality of life. Cities around the world
are already experimenting with this, such as Madrid which recently announced the entire
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downtown would become a pedestrian zone (O’Sullivan 2013). As interest in urban
living resurges in the U.S. cities like Miami Beach with good “bones” for a pedestrian
lifestyle. Miami Beach is already one of the top cities in the U.S. for biking and walking
to work according to Census figure (Eisenhauer 2013) are becoming increasingly
attractive. The interest in urban living has undertones of sustainability, with research
showing that cities use less energy per capita (Glaeser 2011). If a more environmentally
concerned urban population will support adaptation solutions that work through natural
processes, such as the protection offered by mangroves and sand dunes, Miami Beach
may be able to reconfigure its land area in a way that offers more longevity.
The other way that Miami Beach and South Florida could rethink the growth logic
of cities is to place human security at the center of the city’s purpose. Instead of
designing adaptation to protect the built environment, adaptation would first focus on
human needs. As Edward Glaeser argued in Triumph of the City (2011), poverty in cities
is not necessarily a bad thing. People move to cities because there are opportunities, and
it should be the job of cities to help people access them. This is certainly true of Miami,
which has drawn enormous numbers of immigrants from Latin America over the last five
decades, both wealthy and poor. They are still coming, because Miami is less risky in
many ways than where they have come from, and the threat of climate impacts will not
change that. If adaptation planning put human security at the center of efforts, different
answers would emerge, ones that may be less costly than major engineering, and that in
fact are already available. This has been observed by researchers particularly in
development contexts, but has not been as widely discussed in industrialized, “first
world” contexts.
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The reality, of course, is that adaptation is already mainstreamed. The roof over
your head, complex reinsurance contracts for disasters or, indeed, every other
institution, technology and policy that helps people to live safely and prosperously
in the face of climatic variability, change and uncertainty are mainstream. The
challenge is to move more of humanity into this mainstream. (Pielke et al. 2007)
I would argue that this is precisely Miami’s major opportunity for climate change
adaptation, that even in the face of rising seas, it can improve the lives of people who
seek refuge here by placing human security at the center of efforts to reduce socioecological vulnerability.
Scholars have noted that “questions of justice and democracy are inescapable
even if policy objectives are guided by science” (Beckman and Page 2008). Despite the
prominent role that science plays in climate change policy, adaptation planning is still a
political process, at least proactive adaptation. This means that vulnerabilities, how they
manifest and how they are produced, must be paid attention to. Scholars working on
vulnerability to climate change from a human security perspective have argued that
individuals and communities must “have the options necessary to end, mitigate or adapt
to risks to their human, environmental, and social rights and have the capacity and
freedom to exercise those options” (O’Brien et al. 2007, 77). The voices of the most
vulnerable, the elderly, poor, working class, and politically marginalized groups, are
rarely heard in adaptation planning, and so a golden opportunity is at risk of being lost –
the opportunity that comprehensive adaptation planning harbors to reduce vulnerability in
important ways, by providing better housing options, health care, emergency services and
assistance with increased costs. South Florida’s unique climate challenges and socioecological context mean that decision making on climate adaptation will always be
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uncertain. But adaptation decisions based on principles of reducing social vulnerability is
the true “no-regrets” strategy.
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Interviews
Miami Beach Residents
Owner 1. Interview by author. Notes. January 18, 2013.
Owner 2. Interview by author. Digital recording. March 31, 2013.
Owner 3. Interview by author. Digital recording. March 9, 2013.
Owner 4. Interview by author. Digital recording. February 14, 2013.
Owner 5. Interview by author. Digital recording. March 14, 2013.
Renter 1. Interview by author. Digital recording. May 2, 2013.
Renter 2. Interview by author. Digital recording. May 23, 2013.
Renter 3. Interview by author. Notes. February 6, 2013.
Renter 4. Interview by author. Notes. February 7, 2013.
Renter 5. Interview by author. Digital recording. May 2, 2013.
Miami Beach Businesses
Small business 1. Interview by author. Notes. November 28, 2012.
Small business 2. Interview by author. Digital recording. November 28, 2012.
Small business 3. Interview by author. Digital recording. November 30, 2012.
Small business 4. Interview by author. Digital recording. December 3, 2012.
Small business 5. Interview by author. Notes. January 16, 2013.
Small business 6. Interview by author. Notes. December 14, 2013.
Small business 7. Interview by author. Notes. December 19, 2013.
Large business 1. Interview by author. Digital recording. December 4, 2012.
Large business 2. Interview by author. Notes. February 5, 2013.
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Miami Beach Resident Activists
Resident activist 1. Interview by author. Digital recording. September 19, 2012.
Resident activist 2. Interview by author. Digital recording. October 3, 2012.
Resident activist 3. Interview by author. Digital recording. October 5, 2012.
Resident activist 4. Interview by author. Digital recording. November 21, 2012.
Resident activist 5. Interview by author. Digital recording. December 4, 2012.
Resident activist 6. Interview by author. Notes. February 1, 2013.
Miami Beach Business Leaders
Business leader 1. Interview by author. Digital recording. April 3, 2013.
Business leader 2. Interview by author. Digital recording. August 8, 2013.
Miami Beach Officials
Administration Official 1. Interview by author. Digital recording. June 5, 2012.
Administration Official 2. Interview by author. Digital recording. August 28, 2012.
Administration Official 3. Interview by author. Digital recording. October 2, 2012.
Administration Official 4. Interview by author. Digital recording. October 12, 2012.
Administration Official 5. Interview by author. Digital recording. October 18, 2012.
Administration Official 6. Interview by author. Digital recording. November 30, 2012.
Administration Official 7. Interview by author. Digital recording. February 22, 2013.
Administration Official 8. Interview by author. Digital recording. July 9, 2013.
Elected Official 1. Interview by author. Digital recording. October 1, 2012.
Elected Official 2. Interview by author. Digital recording. March 5, 2013.
Other Local and Regional Governance Network Leaders
Governance Leader 1. Interview by author. Digital recording. June 11, 2012.
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Governance Leader 2. Interview by author. Digital recording. July, 3 2012.
Governance Leader 3. Interview by author. Digital recording. August 13, 2012.
Governance Leader 4. Interview by author. Digital recording. August 14, 2012.
Governance Leader 5. Interview by author. Digital recording. August 24, 2012.
Governance Leader 6. Interview by author. Digital recording. August 31, 2012.
Governance Leader 7. Interview by author. Digital recording. June 24, 2013.
Governance Leader 8. Interview by author. Digital recording. July 17, 2013.

Meetings
State and Regional Conferences and Workshops
National Environmental Journalists conference, Miami, October 19-23, 2011
Florida State University System Climate Change Task Force workshop, Gainesville, FL,
November 14-15, 2011
SFRCCC 3rd annual Climate Leadership Summit, Key Largo, FL, December 7-8, 2011
CLEO Anniversary Celebration, Pinecrest, FL, December 1, 2012
SFRCCC 4th annual Climate Leadership Summit, Jupiter, FL, December 6-7, 2012
University of Miami/CLEO Climate Communicators training, spring 2012
Florida Atlantic University Sea level rise conference, June 21, 2012
Good Government Initiative, “Is Miami the next Atlantis?” Miami, October 9, 2012
Urban Land Institute, “Can Southeast Florida Stay Afloat Despite the Changing Climate?
How Sea Level Rise is Already Altering Our Built Environment,” Miami, FL, January 8,
2013
National Climate Assessment regional town hall, Tampa, FL, February 19, 2013
South Florida Climate Action Partners workshop, Boca Raton, FL, March 2, 2013
FIU School of Architecture Symposium, Miami Beach, March 14, 2013
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Florida Sea Grant Adaptive Planning Workshop, Davie, FL, April 19, 2013
Miami Chamber of Commerce climate change forum, April 28, 2013
Seven50 Opening Summit, Delray Beach, FL, June 27, 2012
Seven 50 Miami-Dade County Workgroup, Miami, FL, November 15, 2012
Seven50 Second Summit, Miami, FL, January 23, 2013
Seven50 Third Summit: The Future in Focus, West Palm Beach, FL, June 11, 2013
City of Miami Beach Government Meetings
SWMMP Public Meeting, August 17, 2012
County Commission meeting, November 14, 2012
County Commission meeting, January 16, 2013
Land Use Committee Meeting, January 23, 2013
Sustainable and Authentic Conference Organizational meeting, January 29, 2013
Convention center public meeting, January 29, 2013
Sustainability Committee Meeting, February 11, 2013
SFWMD Public Meeting, February 25, 2013
Sustainability Committee Meeting, March 12, 2013
FDOT Alton Rd. meeting, March 21, 2013
Sustainability Committee Meeting, April 16, 2013
Sustainable and Authentic Conference organizational meeting, April 18, 2013
Resilient Miami Beach: A Dialogue with the Dutch, September 18, 2013
Miami Beach Community Meetings
Tuesday Morning Breakfast Club, emergency management, August 14, 2012
Tuesday Morning Breakfast Club, Dan Kipnis and Dwight Kraii, August 7, 2012
Flamingo Park Neighborhood Association, September 5, 2012
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CLEO press event, October
Tuesday Morning Breakfast Club, Commissioner Ed Tobin
16th Street meeting, October 13, 2012
Flamingo Park Neighborhood Association, October 28, 2012
Collins Canal Centennial, November 3, 2012
Flamingo Park Neighborhood Association, November 12, 2012
West Avenue Neighborhood Association, November 27, 2012
Tuesday Morning Breakfast Club, Convention Center, November 27, 2012
West Avenue Neighborhood Association, November 28, 2012
Flamingo Park Neighborhood Association, December 3, 2012
West Avenue Neighborhood Association, December 11, 2012
West Avenue Neighborhood Association, January 15, 2013
Flamingo Park Neighborhood Association, February 4, 2013
Flamingo Park Neighborhood Association, March 4, 2013

Documents Reviewed
State and Regional Documents
SFRCCC Agreement, January 20, 2010
FL Dept. of Community Affairs, Adaptation Action Areas white paper, 2011
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Saving Florida” brochure, March 2002
SFRCCC 1st Annual Climate Leadership Summit agenda, October 2009
Broward Climate Action Plan, May 2010
SFRCCC Draft Climate Action Plan, February 2011
Seven50, Draft Subsidiarity Report, May 20 2013
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Miami-Dade County Documents
CCTF Second Report and Initial Recommendations, April 2008
CCATF meeting minutes, 2009-2010
County Manager memo on climate change, September 2009
EAR townhall comments, August 2009
Green Jobs Pledge, 2009
ICLEI local vs. federal action, October 2009
EAR reports, 2010
Greenprint, 2010
ICLEI case study, 2010
ICLEI vulnerability assessment training, 2010
MDCCTF Annual Report and Supplemental Recommendations, April 2010
NOAA workshop, 2010
CCTF web page, Accessed August 28, 2011
Department of Environmental Resources, Climate Change Task Force website, accessed
August 28, 2011.
Comprehensive Development Master Plan amendments, 2013
MDC RCAP approval, 2013
RCAP resolution, January 2013
State and federal legislative agenda, January 2013
Miami Beach Government Documents
Comprehensive Development Master Plan agreement, June 9, 2010
Miami Beach magazine flooding article, September 2009
Letter to Commission seasonal flooding, September 18, 2009
Miami Beach Economic Indicators, 2010
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Economic development assistance, 2010
Analysis of 2010 Evaluation and Appraisal Report, 2010
FDOT elevations 10th & Alton, 2011
Draft SWMMP report, 2011
SWMMP Appendix H, 2011
Sustainability Plan, 2011
Miami Beach magazine Flood hazard information, 2012
Miami Beach magazine Hurricane Guide, 2012
National Flood Insurance Program Manual, 2012
Miami Beach Magazine Beaches awards. Spring 2012
Miami Beach Magazine EcoZone award, Spring 2012
Miami Beach Magazine Excellence survey results, Summer 2012
Miami Beach Magazine Recycling law, Summer 2012
Miami Beach Magazine Hurricane season, Summer 2012
Miami Beach Magazine Sunset Harbour garage, Summer 2012
Climate change resolution, June 22, 2012
Letter to Commission Alton Rd, June 2012
Letter to Commission Community Rating System Class Increse, July 13, 2012
Finance committee agenda, July 25, 2012
Letter to Commission SWMMP and sea level rise, August 14, 2012
SWMMP Public Presentation, August 17, 2012
Finance committee agenda, August 22, 2012
Miami Beach Magazine SWMP article, Fall 2012
Resolution Adopting 2011 Citywide Storm Water Master Plan, October 24, 2012
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Letter to Commission Miami Beach biking to work, November 2012
SWMP resolution, November 14, 2012
Commission Meeting Discussion Item, sea level rise, November 14, 2012
Letter to Commission Miami Beach United and residential uses, December 2012
Capital budget 2012-2013
Convention center LEED, 2013
Letter to Commission, Convention center, January 2013
Commission meeting, Netherlands engineers, January 2013
Land Use Committee meeting sea level rise report, February 2013
Land Use Committee Special Meeting on sidewalk cafes, February 2013
Commission meeting mayor’s climate action pledge, February 4, 2013
Netherlands engineers presentation to commission, February 6, 2013
Energy Economic Development Zone ordinance, March 21, 2013
Commissioner Weithorn email, November 17, 2013
Resolution C7K, February 12, 2014
Flood hazard brochure, n.d.

Miami Beach Community Documents
Flamingo Park Neighborhood Association, Capital Improvement Program
recommendations, 2002
16th St. Basis of Design report, September 2007
Miami Beach newspaper - Tony Goldman, September 20, 2012
16th Street meeting report, November 1, 2012
Miami Beach United position paper on city center, January 2013
Miami Beach United 2013 priorities survey, January 9, 2013
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Flamingo Park Neighborhood Association Alton Rd opposition paper, February 2013
Flamingo Park Neighborhood Association email on Alton Rd., February 12, 2013
Resident Activist email on SWMMP, March 2013
West Avenue Neighborhood Association blog on Alton Rd., March 20, 2013
Del Vecchio, Frank, various election emails, September – November 2013
Election campaigns mailed informational fliers, May – November, 2013.

Flooding Observations
Date
10/29/2011
11/2/2011
11/9/2011
11/25/2011
2/10/2012
5/23/2012
6/8/2012
6/18/2012
6/23/2012
8/20/2012
8/23/2012
8/26/2012
9/18/2012
10/14/2012
10/15/2012
10/16/2012
10/17/2012
10/26/2012
10/27/2012
10/28/2012
10/29/2012
10/31/2012
11/1/2012
11/2/2012
11/7/2012
11/12/2012
11/13/2012

Location
Alton
all sites
Alton
Alton
Park
all sites
all sites
all sites
all sites
all sites
Alton
10th & Alton
outfalls
all sites
6th St.
6th & Meridian
10th & Alton
10th & Alton
10th & Alton
all sites
all sites
10th & Alton
10th & Alton
10th & Alton
10th & Alton
10th & Alton
6th & Meridian

Hours
0.5
1.5
3
0.5
0.5
1
1
1
0.5
3
1
1
1
2
2
4
5
1.5
0.5
5
3.5
4.5
0.5
4.5
0.5
1
0.5

Pictures
8
24
37
4
19
4

71
6
33
52
73
20
15
45
38
63
13
3
4
3
192

11/14/2012
11/16/2012
11/26/2012
4/24/2012
4/30/2013
32

6th & West
10th & Alton
10th & Alton
6th & Meridian
all sites
Total

3
0.5
0
1
1
56

3
43
581
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